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Abstract 
 
CHANGING RELIGIOUS STRUCTURES AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN LATIN 
AMERICA:  THE CASE OF NICARAGUA 
 
by John G. Poffenbarger 
 
Two phenomena have been ongoing in Central America over the past 30 years.  
The first has been a change in the dominant religious structures in the region with the 
growth of Evangelical Protestantism and Pentecostalism, as well as ongoing changes 
within the Roman Catholic Church, such as the rise and fall of Progressive Catholicism.  
The other major phenomenon has been the establishment of democratic regimes across 
the isthmus.  Putnam, Inglehart, Almond & Verba, among others, assert that for a 
democracy to flourish a vibrant civil society must be present.  These scholars, along with 
Huntington, Weber, and Wald et al. believe that religious institutions are among the most 
efficient providers of civil society because of their size and type of associational activity.  
Furthermore, some religious institutions are more conducive to democracy than others.  
 
This paper examines support for democracy to determine which religious 
institutions produce the strongest civil society.  It also examines whether this religious 
trend supports or undermines democratization efforts.  Using survey data collected in the 
spring and summer of 2003 in the Granada, Managua, Masaya, and Pueblos Blancos 
areas of Nicaragua, the paper tests the differences in the forms of civil society produced 
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 The past thirty years have provided Central America with major shifts in 
its dominant political and social institutions.  A once dominant Roman Catholic region 
has experienced fragmentation in the Roman Catholic Church, as well as an opening for 
other religious actors. These fragmentations and openings have lead to a sharp rise in 
alternative forms of religious practice, especially Evangelical Protestantism and 
Pentecostalism.  Coinciding with religious changes has been a wave of democratization 
taking hold with a level of stability unprecedented in the region.  Religion and politics 
tend to interact most frequently in the realm of civil society, which is commonly defined 
as the area outside the state where autonomous societal groups articulate and advance 
their interests or the general politicization and popular activation of societal groups (Linz 
and Stepan 1996, p. 16; Fukyama 1995, p. 7; Gellner 1994, p. 5; O’Donnell 1986, p. 26).  
The coincidence of these movements leads to questions of whether they are 
related in some way.  Furthermore, if a relationship does exist, which of these phenomena 
is the driving force?  Finally, are these new democratic and religious phenomena simply 
trends that will eventually wane or are they becoming a long-term part of the 
sociopolitical reality in Central America? 
To gain a thorough understanding of these phenomena this dissertation will utilize 
concepts found in the civil society literature to explore the relationship between religious 
institutions and their contribution to creating a civil society capable of sustaining 
democratic political institutions in Nicaragua.  Using data collected in the spring and 
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summer of 2003 from the Granada, Managua, Masaya, and Pueblos Blancos areas of 
Nicaragua , this research examines the growing Evangelical Protestant and Pentecostal 
movements in Nicaragua to determine whether they are contributing to civil society in 
ways that aid democratization efforts in the politically tumultuous region.  
Despite assertions that these particular religious movements may not contribute to 
civil society because of their inward focus, this research will argue that religion is 
essentially a product of the culture in which it is practiced.  In Nicaragua Fundamental 
Protestantism and Pentecostalism may be one of the most prominent pro democratic 
forces to emerge in civil society.   
 Rather than examining civil society as a whole, as has been the tradition in recent 
research (Brysk 2000; Galston 2000; Booth and Richard 1998; Fukuyama 1995; Gellner 
1994; Seligman 1992), the concepts of civil society will be broken down to specific 
effects and activities to determine how particular actors within civil society affect the 
overall form.  As many studies have noted, different forms of civil society produce 
different outcomes in the political arena.  Some forms of civil society may promote 
democratic institutions; others may produce anti-regime attitudes, while still others may 
produce violent and confrontational attitudes independent of government structures 
(Booth and Richard 1998; Foley and Edwards 1996).   
The research explores both the differences between religious structures in 
producing pro-democratic attitudes through their associational activities, as well as their 
role enriching civil society as a whole through encouraging activation of other actors.  
There is no attempt to establish a direct causal correlation between religion and 
democracy.  This research is simply suggesting that religious institutions are important 
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actors within civil society and that the composition of civil society is an important 
variable in the establishment and maintenance of democratic institutions.   Therefore, the 
intent of this research is to investigate the different religious forms that contribute to civil 
society, and their role in producing attitudes and beliefs capable of maintaining 
democratic institutions.  The current Nicaraguan religious forms of Evangelical 
Protestantism and Pentecostalism are not generalizable across all cases; after all, religion 
is a cultural phenomenon. Inglehart (1988) claims that societies are characterized by their 
political culture attitudes and these attitudes are enduring, but not immutable.  Thus, as 
these inputs change from Traditional Catholicism to Evangelical Protestantism and 
Pentecostalism, so too will civil society. As these forms of civil society become an 
integral part of society, the political culture will also change.  
 The central question of this research is to what extent do different religious 
structures, practices, and orientations produce different forms of civil society?  Are some 
religious orientations, and the specific form of associational activities encompassed 
within them, more likely to produce a civil society capable of establishing and 
maintaining democratic institutions than other religious forms?  More specifically, does 
Pentecostalism, because of its role in redefining community and creating a safe haven 
from the hardships of every day life, produce a civil society better able at maintaining 
democratic institutions than either Traditional Catholicism or Progressive Catholicism?  
Does Traditional Catholicism, because of its hierarchical structure and mediated 
relationship with God, create a civil society conducive to authoritarian forms of 
government?  Does Progressive Catholicism, as born out of liberation theology and 
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structured in CEBs, create an anti-regime civil society?  Does Evangelical Protestantism 
produce a civil society capable of establishing and maintaining democratic institutions? 
 To help answer these complex but important questions a number of hypotheses 
have been generated.  
H1. Pentecostalism will have a positive significant relationship with a civil society 
capable of establishing and maintaining democratic institutions. 
 
H2. Evangelical Protestantism will have a positive significant relationship with a civil 
society capable of establishing and maintaining democratic institutions. 
 
H3. Traditional Catholicism will have a negative significant relationship with a civil 
society a capable of establishing and maintaining democratic institutions. 
 
H4. Progressive Catholicism, as espoused by Liberation Theology, will have a negative 
significant relationship with a civil society capable of establishing and maintaining 
democratic institutions. 
 
H5.  Charismatic Catholicism will have a positive significant relationship with a civil 
society capable of establishing and maintaining democratic institutions 
 
The Outline of this Dissertation  
Chapter Two reviews the literature on the effects of the different religious 
structures and how they affect civil society and thus democracy.  It begins with an 
exploration and definition of civil society and who the actors are and continues with an 
analysis of different views regarding the importance of religious actors in civil society.  
The chapter further delineates the differences and similarities between Traditional Roman 
Catholicism, Progressive Catholicism, and Charismatic Catholicism, as well as 
Evangelical Protestantism and Pentecostalism.   Finally, Chapter Two provides an 
investigation of Nicaragua’s political and religious history to provide context for the 
research. 
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Chapter Three establishes the conceptualization of civil society into measurable 
variables.  The chapter further explains the construction of index variables produced to 
offer an accurate measure of all the concepts encompassed within civil society.  It 
addresses the survey methodology used to specifically measure civil society structure and 
effects.  Finally, the chapter provides an explanation of the statistical analysis 
implemented to explain the role of religion in civil society. 
Chapter Four provides a descriptive analysis and discussion of the current state of 
civil society in Nicaragua.  It begins with an exploration of the state of formal civil 
society actors and the level of participation in officially established organizations.   The 
second section of the chapter examines participation in informal civil society through 
participating and donating money or material to informal organizations at the 
neighborhood or barrio level.  The chapter then examines the effects of civil society 
participation such as political efficacy, interpersonal trust, institutionalization of 
democratic principles, and attitudes towards governmental institutions.  Finally, this 
chapter supplies an analysis of other possible explanatory variables such as gender, 
educational attainment, income, and age. 
Chapter Five begins with a discussion of the state of religion in Nicaragua.  First 
is an exploration of the adherence to various religious denominations and forms under 
investigation.  The chapter also explores the levels of religiosity through index variables 
examining the level of religious belief, value, and participation.  This chapter also 
provides the results for the multiple regression analysis used to determine the 
relationships between religious denomination, religiosity, and the state of civil society in 
Nicaragua. 
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 Chapter Six presents analysis in a comparative perspective with El Salvador, 
using data provided by World Values Survey.  World Values Survey data comes from the 
1995-1996 third wave of the survey.  Incomplete as the data on El Salvador may be, it 
does provide similar data to that collected for Nicaragua to provide a comprehensive 
comparison of religious denomination, religiosity, rates of participation, and effects of 
civil society.  Finally, Chapter Seven provides the conclusions to this research which 
essentially find that adherence to specific religious denomination is fluctuating and 
association with denomination only has a minor effect on civil society.  However, the 
level of religiosity does have an effect on civil society participation and the production of 
attitudes capable of establishing and maintaining democratic institutions in both 




What is civil society?  According to the United Nations Development Program civil 
society: 
 “…Embraces an immense range of human activity outside both the 
market and the state, but linked with constant interaction and mutual 
influence with both.  It is often described as the space between the citizen 
and the state where the will of the citizen is manifested and mobilized 
outside official auspices” 
  (http://www.undp.org/csopp/CSO/NewFiles/faqs.htm) 
 
While this definition provides a concise view of civil society, the rich literature 
surrounding the concept has its roots in the French, German, and Scottish Enlightenments 
(Seligman 1992, p. 5).  For Seligman (1992, p. 5), civil society, in its purist sense, is that 
arena where the private individual seeks his or her own self-interest.  Thus, civil society 
is essentially an arena for the aggregation of personal interests.  However, what interests 
Seligman is the idea found in Western thought that the individuals encompass some 
metaphysical or moral values in these pursuits.  He credits Weber for tracing it back to 
the “Reformation Religions” (Seligman 1992, pp. 5-6).  It appears that mores and values 
founded in religious and other beliefs about working for the pursuit of interests in the 
aggregate is what makes society “civil” or provides the norms for peaceful interaction 
among individuals in a society. It is the idea that civil society can be traced back to 
religious mores and values that make exploring its effect on contemporary 
democratization in Latin America a worthwhile endeavor. 
 Linz and Stepan (1996, p. 17) define civil society as an arena for “self-
organization” where relatively autonomous groups articulate interests, create 
associations, and advance their interests.  Fukuyama (1995, p. 7) claims it is the realm of 
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spontaneously created social structures, separate from the state and underlying 
democratic political institutions.  For Gellner (1994, p. 5) civil society is a set of diverse 
non-governmental institutions that counterbalance the state, but does not stop it from 
fulfilling its role as peacekeeper and arbitrator of interests.  In the context of Latin 
America and the “decompression” of authoritarian rule, O’Donnell (1986, p. 26) 
describes the “resurrection of civil society” as a sharp increase in general politicization 
and popular activation.  
 A number of scholars, inspired by de Tocqueville (1835), have put forth the idea 
that civil society is essentially associational life, as well as patterns of association that 
foster habits of civility and organization in the actions of citizens in a democratic polity 
(Brysk 2001; Putnam 2000; 1995; 1993; Galston 2000; Ireland 1999; Booth & Richard 
1998; Foley & Edwards 1996; de Tocqueville 1984, 1835).  This form of civil society is 
known as civil society I.  Foley and Edwards (1996, pp.38-41) extend their definition of 
civil society beyond the “Tocquevillian”, or civil society I, to include different forms of 
civil society.  Civil society II is constituted of those forms of associational activity, in 
societies characterized by repression, such as in Central America that tend to be 
conflictual and anti-tyrannical.  Group actions are capable of energizing resistance to a 
tyrannical regime. Booth and Richard (1998, pp. 781-782) extend the debate to include 
civil society III or groups that produce an uncivil society by generating violent and 
confrontation forms of associational activity.  Groups of this type include the Klu Klux 
Klan, Neo-Nazis, skinheads, paramilitary groups, or death squads.  These definitions are 
created to test the direction of Putnam’s (1995, pp. 65-66) causal claim that the quality of 
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public life and performance of social and political institutions are influenced norms and 
networks of civic engagement (Booth and Richard 1998, pp. 781-783).   
The differences between civil societies I, II, and III are intriguing because they 
demonstrate that diverse forms of associational activity may produce disparate forms of 
civil society.  Therefore, one can conceive that certain civil society actors may be 
efficient producers of democratic ideals or patterns of civility while others generate an 
anti-regime civil society depending upon the forms of associational activities within civil 
society.  In essence, diverse civil society actors may produce assorted outcomes in terms 
of civil society output. 
Who or what are civil society actors?  Civil society actors come from all sectors 
of society.  They may be born out of social movements such as women’s groups, 
neighborhood associations, religious groups, academic or grass roots organizations, as 
well from all levels of socioeconomic status such as trade unions, entrepreneurial groups, 
and professional groups (Linz and Stepan 1996, p. 7; Brysk 2000, pp. 152-153).  For 
Brysk (2000, pp. 152-153) civil society is more than just a list of actors, but includes all 
non-profit and non-governmental actors that provide associational life and produce social 
capital. Civil society actors serve as intermediaries between the government and the 
citizen, which may sometimes delegate authority on specific issues.   
If civil society is associational activity outside of government fostering patterns of 
civility and producing trustworthiness in democratic institutions, then a look at these 
connections is necessary.  Putnam (2000, pp. 19-22; 1995, pp. 65-67) claims that 
associational activity creates interpersonal trust through reciprocity, which in turn creates 
social capital that lubricates social life and creates trust in governmental institutions.  
 10
Putnam (2000 pp. 17-23) defines social capital as the level of trustworthiness 
accumulated by individuals through social networks and positive reciprocal interactions 
with others.  Putnam associates social capital with civil virtue that is created through 
participation in civil society.   
Verba, Nye and Kim (1963) argue that participation in civil society organizations 
creates stimuli expanding people’s worldview, thus encouraging individuals to participate 
in politics. Pateman (1970) claims participation teaches people the social skills and 
attitudes necessary for democracy to take root. Brysk (2000, p. 152) asserts that political 
functions of civil society in democratization include developing citizens, shaping the 
public agenda, and changing institutions through collective actions.   Inglehart (1988, p. 
1205) states the “viability” of democratic institutions is affected powerfully by attitudes 
about political efficacy, positive feelings about political institutions, and the belief that 
other citizens are trustworthy. 
These effects of civil society are crucial because they shape attitudes about 
politics, but more importantly they shape attitudes about the legitimacy of political 
institutions.  This is the essential basis of a state’s political culture.  Almond and Verba 
(1989, p. 13) define political culture as “…attitudes toward the political system and its 
various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system…It is a set of 
orientations toward a special set of social objects and processes.”  Almond and Verba 
(1989, p. 14) further assert at the individual level political culture is defined by one’s 
cognitive orientation or their knowledge and beliefs about the political system; affective 
orientation or feelings about the political system; and evaluation orientation judgments 
and opinions about political objects.  Therefore, it appears that political culture is partly 
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born out of civil society. This being the case, then one can assume the role of civil society 
in a democratic setting is directly to shape these orientations.  As different forms of civil 
society or associational life produce different outcomes, they may also produce different 
political cultures. 
The research here essentially draws on Brysk (2000), Booth and Richard (1998), 
Foley and Edwards (1996) and Inglehart (1988) to define civil society as associational 
activity outside the state that produces beliefs and attitudes conducive to the viability of 
democratic institutions.  Moreover, diverse societal actors produce a variety of 
associational activities, which create a range of civil society forms and thus differing 
attitudes and beliefs towards democratic institutions.  The concept of civil society is 
dissected to investigate which institutions produce attitudes and beliefs towards the 
maintenance and viability of democratic institutions.  The research focuses on religious 
institutions because they are among the largest associations and organizations forming 
civic skills, civic norms, civic recruitment and community interest, as well as 
encompassing direct influence on culturally accepted beliefs and behaviors (Putnam 
2000, pp. 66-67; Ireland 1999, p. 126; Castles 1998, p. 58; Wald, Owen, Hill 1990, pp. 
197-198; Griffith, Plamentz and Pennock 1956, pp. 102-104, 113). 
Religion, Civil Society, and Democracy 
 Religion has universally been acknowledged as an important variable in 
determining whether a state will turn towards democracy as a form of government (see 
Huntington 1991, pp.71-85; Lipset 1994, p. 5; Barro 1999, pp. 175-177). Some religious 
forms or denominations, due to their structure and specific characteristics, are conducive 
to democratic institutions while others are not.  Religious practices and associational 
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activities of the same denomination may differ depending on the culture where they are 
being practiced as time and societal changes force them to deal with new and more 
complex issues. For example, religious institutions are the most important societal 
institutions in countries with low human development since they perform the functions 
that educational and scientific institutions, the mass media, arts, museums, and 
philanthropic foundations, also fill in industrial societies (Inglehart and Norris 2004, 
Chapter 1; Inglehart 1988, p. 1221).  Inglehart (1988, p. 1204) states that religion is a 
better predictor of electoral behavior than social class.  To get a clearer understanding of 
these relationships, a survey of claims about the relationship between religion, 
democracy, and civil society must be conducted. 
 Weber (1934) explored the possible correlation and causal influences between 
Protestantism, the spirit of capitalism, and democracy.  He found that religious ideals 
were important in terms of their relevance for collective action, whereby the convictions 
of a few become the convictions of many.  Religion serves to maintain the reality of 
everyday life because religion engenders a legitimizing power that provides a 
comprehensive set of norms to aid the individual in marginal situations.  Prior to Vatican 
II, Catholicism’s contribution to defining culture was obedience to authority, collectivist 
values, and fatalism (Patterson 2004, pp. 345-347).  Conversely, Weber found that 
Protestantism, due its religious focus on individual faith, priesthood of individuals, 
emphasis on elections, and approval of materialism “…created cultures of individuality, 
frugality, competition, and equality – the foundation of capitalist democracy” (Patterson 
2004, p. 345).  This relationship explained why in German business institutions 
Protestants held the majority of executive positions over the Catholic population.  This 
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thesis has allowed many scholars to put forth that Protestantism has been more likely to 
give rise to democratic regimes than Catholic ones (Lipset 1994, p. 5; Huntington 1991, 
pp. 72-78; Torres 1992; Weber 1934). Weber’s thesis is significant because of the 
assertion that different religious orientations produced different outcomes in society as a 
result of different associational activities and practices encompassed in the different 
religions. 
 Huntington (1991) derives similar findings in his book about waves of 
democratization.  He found that the first democratic wave occurred in Protestant 
countries. He attributed the first wave to the more democratic organization of Protestant 
churches, the stress on individual consciousness, and the individual relationship with 
God.  The first wave of democratization lasted from 1826 until 1928 and consisted of 
Switzerland, the English “overseas dominions” and smaller European nations, England, 
France, Ireland, and Iceland. Argentina, Spain, and Italy were also among the 130 states 
establishing at least minimal democratic regimes before a reverse wave from 1922 
through 1942 (Huntington 1991, pp. 16-19). 
Starting during World War II first wave states assisted second wave states, like 
West Germany, Italy, Austria, Japan, and Korea in democratization through aid 
recovering from the devastation of war and de-colonization.  Finally, third wave states 
democratizing in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, has been the result of loss of legitimacy of 
authoritarian states, changes in the Roman Catholic Church, global economic growth, a 
democratically conducive international environment, and a “snow-balling effect” or 
democratic diffusion. Overall thirty states in Europe, Latin America, and Asia replaced 
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authoritarian regimes with democratic ones during the third wave (Huntington 1991, pp. 
36-46).   
Catholicism’s previous failures at democratization had been attributed to its 
mediated relationship with God and its hierarchical or authoritarian structure as well as to 
poor economic development in Catholic countries.  For Huntington (1991), increased 
democratic activity among third wave Catholic states was linked to doctrinal changes 
within the Roman Catholic Church. The Church became “… a powerful social institution 
in opposition to repressive regimes” rather than maintaining its traditional role as a 
source of legitimacy for the oligarchy and wealthy classes (Huntington 1991, pp. 77-85; 
Casanova 2001, p. 1043).  This explanation implies that as the focus of the religious 
institution changed, so too did the associational activity within it, thus a change to a more 
democratic civil society. Huntington also states that economic growth during the third 
wave may have also been central to democratic growth. 
Wald, Owen, and Hill (1990) show that churches can serve as effective 
transmitters of political information.  They state that theological conservatism is a 
powerful predictor of moral conservatism and ideological self-identification on the part 
of the congregation.  The connection between faith and politics extends well beyond 
voter choice to encompass partisan self-identification, political ideology, preferences for 
candidates, issue outlooks, and views toward a wide range of political objects.  They find 
that churches function as political communities by promoting attitudinal consensus 
(Wald, Owen, and Hill 1990, pp. 197-198; 209-213). The influence of religion on civil 
society and politics is derived from highly salient or visible religious organizations 
providing much of the content of symbolic political attitudes. Griffith, Plamentz and 
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Pennock (1956, pp. 102-104, 113) assert that religious institutions and practices shape the 
“mores” or “norms” of society. 
 For many citizens, group related attitudes provide the cognitive structures 
through which the political world can be simplified and understood.  Religious group 
identifications have been shown to be important predictors of political attitudes among 
religious adherents and political elites (for a summary of the literature see Jelen 1992 pp. 
692-696; Wald, Owen, and Hill 1990, p. 197).  Ireland (1999, p. 111) argues that the 
popular religions growing in Latin America are building the necessary infrastructure to 
the maintenance of democracy parallel to the vital role religion played in the United 
States as shown by Alexis de Tocquiville.   
 This brief look at the effects of religious institutions on the viability of democratic 
institutions demonstrates an important relationship between religion and democracy. 
Religion is a provider of associational activities affecting the beliefs and attitudes of the 
individual adherent toward politics and the state structures. This relationship also reveals 
how different religious orientations influence the establishment of different political 
institutions.  Protestantism is strongly correlated to democracy or capitalism and 
Catholicism traditionally less so, but has been gaining ground over the last quarter of the 
century.  These religious shifts are of great consequence in Latin America as Evangelical 
Protestantism and Pentecostalism are challenging this once Catholic-dominated area of 
the world.  To understand the effects of this movement, it is imperative to explore, not 
only the growth of Evangelical Protestantism and Pentecostalism, but also changes in the 
Traditional and Progressive Catholic Church and how these new and evolving institutions 
are affecting democratization efforts in the region and civil society. 
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Changes in Catholicism: Its Effect on Civil Society 
 Traditional Roman Catholicism has engendered a negative relationship with 
democracy and the establishment of democratic institutions (Huntington 1991, p. 72; 
Lipset 1994, p.  5; Casanova 2001, p. 1043).  Three causes have been cited for this 
relationship.  Economically, Catholic countries have tended to be poorer.  Economic 
development leads to democracy, which until recently many Catholic dominant states 
have been unable to achieve. Catholicism’s mediated relationship with God and 
authoritarian religious system structured within rigid ranks of priests, cardinals, and  
bishops has meant an authoritarian structure in the spiritual world may have developed 
similarly in the secular. Finally, traditional Roman Catholicism has habitually been a 
source for the legitimization of the military, dictatorial states, and upper classes 
(Casanova 2001, pp. 1042-1043; Bastian and Cunnen 1998, pp. 330-338; Sawchuk 1997, 
p. 39; Reuschmeyer ed. 1998; Lipset 1994, p. 5; Huntington 1991, pp. 72-76). As Sabia 
(1997, p. 12) states, “In Latin America, the establishment and rise to power of the Roman 
Catholic Church has been characterized by a close, often turbulent, relationship with 
wealthy elites and traditional authoritarian regimes.”  As a result, Traditional Roman 
Catholicism has been associated with conservative views across most issues (Reichley, 
1986; Castles 1998, p. 54). Thus, Traditional Catholicism has been a religion of 
conservatism, both spiritually and politically.   
In Nicaragua the Traditional Church has always had close ties with the 
government and the elite classes.  As Mulligan (1991, p. 65) points out, President 
Emiliano Chamorro gave the land for Managua’s first Cathedral as a gift to the Church.  
In more recent times, upon the installment of Archbishop Obando y Bravo, the Somozas’ 
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provided him with a Mercedes that he used, but eventually gave away after much 
criticism (Sawchuk 1997, p. 42). Even the Catholic schools in Nicaragua were 
traditionally supported and attended by the small upper class, unconsciously operated to 
preserve the social structure (Mulligan 1991, pp. 70-72).  Mulligan (1991, pp. 72-75) also 
notes that the Nicaraguan Catholic Church was not necessarily working directly in 
concert with elites, but was fulfilling a world wide Church doctrine in opposition to 
Communism. 
 “Progressive” or “Popular” Catholicism may run contrary to the conservatism of 
Traditional Catholicism (Williams 1992, Ch. 7).  Progressive Catholicism was born out 
of Liberation Theology and the Church’s preferential option for the poor.  Established 
through the Second Vatican Council (Vatican II) and the Latin American Bishops 
Conference (CELAM), the Roman Catholic Church updated its social doctrine with a 
new stress on Catholicism’s commitment to justice, extension of social outreach, and 
increased role of the laity (Vasquez 1999, pp. 1-2; Sabia 1997, pp. 12-28; Williams 1992 
Ch.7).  These innovations were structured as grassroots movements in Christian Base 
Communities (CEB’s), which created new forms of associational activities through Bible 
reflection and social action projects.   
CEBs began springing up in Latin America in the 1960s and were composed of 
small groups, usually ten to 25 people, meeting on a regular basis.  Adherents, mostly 
from the poor and lower economic classes, use Bible reading and discussion to address 
common needs, resulting in some sort of cooperative action (Levine 1990, pp. 721-722).  
Levine (1990, p. 722) credits their organizational form as responses to various perceived 
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social, political, and economic threats by working with and reinforcing existing 
friendships and community ties, thus putting religion into familiar and accessible content. 
These associational activities have been hailed for helping the poor develop a 
critical understanding of national and local politics, acquire confidence and leadership 
skills, and establish social networks and alliances (Sabia 1997, pp. 33-47; Williams and 
Peterson 1996, pp. 873-897).  Progressive Catholicism created an ethic of public 
engagement because doctrinally God is served through other humans. This public 
engagement is enhanced through the Progressive Church’s mission to serve the 
underprivileged and the belief that a just and peaceful world can be achieved through the 
cooperative interaction of humans (Ireland 1999, Levine 1992 , Drogus 1992).  Studies of 
CEBs have shown how adherents have engaged in collective struggles for land, services, 
and rights and liberties (for a review see Ireland 1999).  Stein (1998, pp. 13) states in El 
Salvador community organizing of religious actors prior to 1992 “…had a significant 
impact on public discourse about democratic values and the nation’s political culture.” 
 Unfortunately, Liberation Theology and the Progressive Church as CEB, appears 
to fall short in the long run (Deonandan 2001; Gill 1999; Ireland 1999; Lynch 1998; 
Daudelin and Hewitt 1995).  Ireland (1999, p. 111) states: 
“…the base communities [CEBS], which were to be at the same time both 
a ‘new way of being church’ and a source of new citizens, new civic 
communities, and a new civic culture – the very infrastructure for 
sustaining and deepening democracy –appear, against those high 
expectations, to have failed.” 
 
Lynch (1998, pp. 269-270) and Stoll (1990, pp. 140-141) attributes the failure of 
Liberation Theology and Progressive Church to the focus of liberation priests, nuns, and 
laity on the concepts of Marxism to provide social analysis, combined with religious 
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teachings.  The problem is that these teachings do not empower the poor exclusively.  
The poor are treated with special care in the eyes of God because they are poor.  Lynch 
(1998, pp. 269-270) also states that the Marxist principles’ encompassed within 
Liberation Theology rejects capitalism and democracy as they do not empower the poor. 
These religious assertions also create a “psychological blunder” by focusing on the pains 
and struggles of everyday life as a central tenet to Biblical teaching when people attend 
religious ceremonies to escape these hardships.  The failure may also be a special case in 
Nicaragua because after Progressive Catholicism’s success in influencing the revolution, 
it had achieved its main mission and lost its focus as a religious movement as hope under 
a new political system turned to reality. 
 The failure of the Progressive Church is one reason for the rise of Charismatic 
Catholicism in recent years.  Built out of the middle classes’ distrust of both the 
Traditional Roman Catholic Church and the Marxist ideals of Progressive Church, 
Charismatic Catholicism is able to provide an escape from the struggles of life.  Looking 
similar to Evangelical Protestants and Pentecostals in Latin America, but modeled after 
Charismatic Catholics of North America, this movement is more interested in pastoral 
care than social movements.  It focuses on devotion to the Bible, personal relationship 
with God, and the priority of Evangelism (Stoll 1990, pp. 27-30).  Stoll (1990, p. 30) 
claims this is the least political of the three forms of Catholicism, but may have surpassed 
the Progressive Church in its influence at the local level.  Charismatic Catholicism is of 
interest to this study because of its similarities to the Evangelical Protestantism and 
Pentecostalism sweeping the region; therefore it may have implications for the creation of 
civil society.  
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 Analysis of variations within Catholicism demonstrates the various forms of 
associational activity occurring within these institutions.  Traditional Catholicism 
produces a civil society built around acceptance of authoritarian structures and 
conservative issues.  On the other hand, Progressive Catholicism structured through 
CEBs produces associational activity reminiscent of civil society II, as it was at its 
strongest when it was the sole opposition voice to many Latin American dictatorships 
(Gill 1994, p. 403).  Progressive Catholicism appeared to be a new form of civil society 
conducive to the establishment of democracy, but Lynch (1998) reminds us that its 
reliance on Marxist principles may have been its downfall in terms of adding to the 
viability of democratic institutions.  Finally, Charismatic Catholicism may be producing 
democratic forms of civil society similar to those of Evangelical Protestantism and 
Pentecostalism.   
The Growth of Evangelical Protestantism and Pentecostalism: Its Effect on Civil Society 
The question now turns toward the effect of these new religious movements 
sweeping Latin America. The democratic transition in recent years has also brought about 
pluralism and fragmentation in the religious arena.  Pluralism and fragmentation has 
opened up room for dialogue and practices challenging traditional actors, including the 
Roman Catholic Church (Vasquez 1991, p. 2).  Gill (1999, p. 292) states that the 
proliferation of religious actors, such as Evangelical Protestantism, coincides with major 
social dislocations in the second half of the twentieth century.  Noting that destitution 
was nothing new to the area, he states that aggravated levels of impoverishment, 
violence, and rural-urban migration have crushed traditional views of society (Gill 1999, 
pp. 292-293). According to Stoll (1990, pp. 8-10), ten percent of Latin Americans 
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consider themselves evangelico, with higher percentages in Central America, Brazil, and 
Chile.  Though the majority of Latin Americans still consider themselves Catholic, 
relatively few of these actually participate.   
One explanation for the growth in Evangelical Protestantism and Pentecostalism 
may be the entrepreneurial roles of evangelical ministers, who both recruit members and 
secure financial resources (Daudelin and Hewitt 1995. pp. 221-237).  These efforts have 
been aided by an influx of missionaries from abroad, with more than 54,000 from North 
America alone contributing to the growth of Evangelical Protestantism and 
Pentecostalism from 25 to 50 million people in a five-year period (1990-1995) (Daudelin 
and Hewitt 1995, pp. 221-237). This assistance has led most mission histories to assume 
that many of the structural and pastoral decisions of Evangelical Protestant and 
Pentecostal churches have been made from abroad (Cleary 1997, p. 8). This is not the 
case. These churches have been conceived and structured by “survival strategies” of 
Latin Americans rather than from their sister denominations of Europe and North 
America (Cleary 1997, p. 8; Mariz and Campos Machado in Cleary 1997, pp. 41-42). 
Evangelical and Pentecostal churches are essentially responsible for their own survival 
and have to adapt their teachings to the reality of their members to ensure the 
maintenance of the church.  The independent structure of these churches may be one 
possible explanation to the growth of these denominations, but others have cited much 
larger structural changes. 
Gill (1999) and Iannaccone, Fink, and Stark (1997) have espoused market 
explanations for the growth of Evangelical Protestantism and Pentecostalism in terms of 
supply and demand side explanations.  The demand side explanation simply states that 
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the failure of Progressive Church to ease the burden on people experiencing major social 
and economic dislocation has lead to an increase in demand for religious and 
associational activities, especially for non-traditional faiths.   
The supply side explanation asserts that increased growth in religious activities is 
a direct result of an increased supply of religious goods.  The decrease in restrictions on 
religious activity results in a decrease in costs to religious suppliers, which in turn 
translates into greater supply (Gill 1999; Iannaccone, Fink, & Stark 1997). When a 
religious monopoly is in place, the priority of that religion is retaining membership 
among the wealthy or status quo for their financial backing necessary to maintain the 
institution.  As states deregulate religious activities, competition increases, making more 
room for denominations where membership becomes the priority over finances.  In short, 
as new denominations enter the religious market place they tend to use membership as a 
means to establish their place in society (Gill 1999; Innacone, Fink, & Stark 1997).    
For Lancaster (1988, p. 104) conversion to Protestantism has been triggered by 
the same stimuli that led to the growth of Liberation theology.  Lancaster makes this 
assertion on the basis that adherents in both forms of religion come from the same low to 
middle class socioeconomic backgrounds and complain about the same problems of 
crime, drugs, poverty, and social disorganization.  Both Progressive Catholicism and 
Evangelical Protestantism are organized at the barrio level and provide social 
organization whereby adherents of each of the faiths interact with those experiencing 
similar problems, creating a common social bond and an outlet for addressing social 
issues. 
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Pentecostalism has been one of the biggest religious movements filling the 
religious void. Founded by Charles Parham in Topeka, Kansas and at the Asuza Street 
Missionary in Los Angeles, California (Cleary 1997, p. 9; Chestnut 1997, pp. 25-26) 
Pentecostalism’s greatest theological achievement in Latin America is the freedom of 
expression and the affirmation of the individual’s worth within the community. Willems 
(1967) and D’Epinay (1968) claim that Pentecostalism offers institutional structures and 
practices that help people navigate the present, baffling, threatening world (Chestnut 
1997; Gill 1999; Vasquez 1999).  Though Latin American Pentecostalism remains 
Biblically literalist and individualistic, even believing that inclusion in the political arena 
is defiling, they are beginning to make inroads into politics. This is evident from the 
election of Evangelical political figures throughout the region.  For example, in 1990-
1991, twenty-two Evangelical Congressmen, some Pentecostal, took office in Guatemala 
along with Jorge Serrano Elias, the country’s first Evangelical President (Gill 1999; 
Daudelin and Hewitt 1995; Stoll 1990).  
Pentecostalism and Evangelical Protestantism are similar some distinct doctrinal 
differences do exist.  Pentecostals is a Protestant religious movement emphasizing the 
“gifts of the Holy Spirit” (Chestnut 1997; Stoll 1993).  Pentecostals believe in 
“sanctification” or that a true believer can reach Christ’s perfection on earth, as well as a 
belief in being rebaptized in the name of Jesus only.  Evangelical Protestants on the other 
hand believe that Jesus died for their sins and thus cannot replicate Jesus’ life.  The 
difference in these beliefs means that Pentecostals are more likely to be otherworldly and 
believe in such things as speaking in tongue and faith healing.  
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While these outward political activities demonstrate the growing prominence of 
Evangelical Protestantism and Pentecostalism in the region, it is within their communities 
and churches where interpersonal trust begins to develop, affecting civil society and 
politics.  Chestnut (1997, pp. 11-24), in his look at Pentecostals in Belem, Brazil, finds 
that it is predominantly occupied by the poorest of the poor.  Pentecostalism appears to 
have begun as a women’s movement as they attempted to cope with the alcoholism, 
tobacco use, drugs, and marital infidelity of their spouses that accompany machismo 
attitudes (Chestnut 1997, pp. 11-24; Cleary 1997, p. 18).  The Pentecostal and 
Evangelical Protestant belief in abstinence has been proven to be an effective mechanism 
for combating alcoholism (Gorsuch 1995, pp. 65-80).  Though Pentecostal women are 
not “feminists”, the conversion experience does increase women’s autonomy and 
undermines traditional machismo attitudes (Mariz and Machado in Cleary 1997, pp. 41-
42).    
  Pentecostalism and Evangelical Protestantism allow women more ability to enter 
the micro-entrepreneur sector.  According to Chestnut 1997, pp. 116-117) Evangelical 
and Pentecostal women see poverty as the “…hands of Satan”; thus they are able to enter 
in to the workforce washing clothes, baking cakes, or creating other small enterprises 
where they help their families escape poverty.  These micro-entrepreneurial businesses 
also allow women to be self-employed, setting their own schedule and thus permitting 
their true dedication of time towards God and their particular church. 
Money saved by the abstinence from drugs and alcohol allows some Pentecostal 
and Evangelical Protestant adherents further interclass upward mobility and some ease 
from their impoverished situation.  Pentecostalism and Evangelical Protestantism have 
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also become safe havens and places for community interaction and job referrals for those 
making the shift from rural to urban settings. It helps them to establish themselves in this 
rugged, complicated and baffling new world (Martin 1990; Stoll 1993; Chestnut 1997).  
In cases of dire poverty, the belief in faith healing has provided adherents with 
alternatives to inaccessible medical care. 
Campos (1996, pp. 42-45) sums up the effects of Pentecostalism by stating it 
provides meaning to everyday life, gives power to the weak, and even provides social 
identity.  Pentecostalism and Evangelical Protestantism’s autonomous financial 
structures, focus on Latin American liturgy, and popular expressions of religiosity have 
created a community experience that affirms individual worth and permits adherents a 
role in society.  Combined with its provision of solidarity with the less favorable sects of 
society, Campos (1996, pp. 48-49) believe it will, in the end, change civil society.  
Pentecostalism and Evangelical Protestantism alter the civic identity of the 
individual.  The individual becomes part of a community that includes others under 
similar duress and gives adherents power to work together in finding solutions.  The 
religious forms of Evangelical Protestantism and Pentecostalism may alter civil society 
by establishing communities that form interpersonal trust and empower adherents to be 
more active in the political system.   One can argue that Evangelical Protestantism and 
Pentecostalism “…may be one of the new social movements that are defining the 
parameters of democracy … the very boundaries of what is properly defined as the 
political arena: its participants, its institutions, its processes, its agenda, and its scope 
(Alvarez et al 1998, p. 90)”.  Patterson (2004, pp. 356-357) claims that Evangelical 
Protestant adherents in Latin America are not necessarily more democratic in attitudes 
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than Catholics but appear to be composed of common citizens and therefore are not an 
obstacle to democracy. 
The Case of Nicaragua 
Central America provides a fertile ground for the study of civil society, religion 
and democracy.  The region as a whole has suffered waves of dictatorial regimes, military 
regimes, Marxist uprisings, and failures at democratic consolidation.  Nicaragua itself has 
endured three generations of a dictatorial regime under the Somozas and eleven years of a 
Marxist movement led by Daniel Ortega under the auspices of the FSLN until its most 
recent democratic transition in 1990.  The Roman Catholic Church has been the major 
contributor to civil society throughout Nicaragua’s tumultuous political history.  The 
Catholic Church, in all of its forms, has had a profound effect on shaping Nicaraguan 
society:  From legitimization of the Somoza dictatorship by the Traditional Roman 
Catholic Church, to providing the organizational capacity and religious justification for 
the Sandinista insurrection by the Progressive Church, and finally as the primary provider 
for associational activity in this newly democratized state. 
To provide a base line understanding of Nicaragua’s political and historical 
development Figure 2-1 provides a timeline of significant historical events. 
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Figure 2-1:  Historical Timeline of Nicaragua 
Date Event 
1838 Independent Nicaragua established. 
1856 American William Walker, hired by Cornelius Vanderbilt, briefly 
assumes control of Nicaragua. 
1909-1933 U.S. Marines occupy of Nicaragua 
1927 César Agusto Sandino leads five year uprising against U.S. Marines 
1934 General Anastasio Somoza García assassinates Sandino and overthrows 
President Juan Batista Sacassa, and takes over the government 
1956 General Anastasio Somoza García is assisinated and succeeded by his 
oldest son Luis Somoza.  Dies four years later of a heart attack and 
replaced by a puppet president. 
1960 The Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) is founded in 
protest to the Somoza regime 
1967 General Anastasio Somoza Debayle, youngest son of General 
Anastasio Somoza García, becomes president. 
1972 Most of Managua is destroyed by earthquake at 12:27 AM on 
December 23, 1972 
1978 Assassination of Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, editor of La Prensa 
newspaper, blamed on Somoza, sparks several days of strikes and 
boycotts.  
1979 Sandinistas (FSLN) oust Somoza who flees on July 17 
1981 Contra attacks begin. 
1984  Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega is officially elected President for a six 
year term. 
1990 Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, wife of Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, defeats 
Daniel Ortega in Presidential elections. 
1996 Former Managua mayor Arnoldo Aléman is elected president. 
2002 Nicaraguan businessman Enrique Bolaños is elected president. 
2002 Arnoldo Aléman is charged with money laundering and embezzlement 
during his presidency. 
2002 Arnoldo Aléman is convicted and sentenced to 20 years in prison, 
which has since been reduced to house arrest by Enrique Bolaños. 
Sources: Wynia, Gary W. The Politics of Latin American Development, 3rd Edition, Cambridge University 
Press, 1990 p. 310 and Walker, Thomas Nicaragua: Living in the Shadow of the Eagle, 4th Edition, 2003, 
pp. 25-77. 
 
Prior to the 1960s the Traditional Roman Catholic Church in Nicaragua had 
continually been a source of legitimization for the Somoza regime (Sabia 1997; Kirk 
1992; Mulligan 1991; Lancaster 1988; Belli 1985).  From the 1930s to the 1960s, Kirk 
(1992, 48) claims the Traditional Church “deliberately” sought to protect the Somoza 
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regime in exchange for favorable treatment from the elite class.   In turn, the Traditional 
Roman Catholic Church produced a secondary social doctrine where socioeconomic 
dislocation could only be overcome through prayer and patience.  To resort to other 
methods was to reject divine will.  A pastoral letter from Archbishop Fonalez y Robleto 
in August 1959 demonstrates that the body of pastoral care directed at Nicaraguan 
Catholics was a clear attempt to convince them unquestioningly to accept the Somoza 
administration as the legitimate constitutional government (Kirk 1992, p. 49). 
Lancaster (1988, p. 29) explains that in peasant-based societies religious elites are 
instruments of the ruling elites, legitimizing ruling class power, because in these societies 
religious and ruling elites are in continuous interaction with one another.  Almost 
invariably elites adhere to traditional and conservative Catholicism, which posits spiritual 
and moral authority in the established offices of the Traditional Church.  Therefore, the 
message of elite religion is to proclaim the justness and wisdom of the ruling class. 
Nicaragua is no exception, as the major diverging points of religious belief correspond to 
socioeconomic strata.  The elites tend to adhere to the Traditional Catholic Church, and 
as one moves down the socioeconomic continuum Catholicism undergoes a series of 
transformations to Liberation Theology and even on to Charismatic Catholicism and 
Evangelical Protestantism (Lancaster 1988, pp. 27-29). The idea that changes within the 
Nicaraguan Catholic Church started at the grass roots level should come as no surprise.  
The bishops and upper clergy mixed with the privileged sectors of society while the 
priests and religious laity lived along side of the impoverished masses (Kirk 1992, pp. 66-
67) 
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 At the heart of Traditional Roman Catholic Church policies was an effort to 
protect the Church as an institution.  The desire to protect the Traditional Church 
remained even after the Church changed its position toward the Somoza regime, which 
came about in the 1970s when the Traditional Roman Catholic Church bravely took on 
the dictator (Kirk 1992, p. 84; Sabia 1997, p. 62).  Change in the Church’s stance was a 
direct result of the updated church doctrine coming out of Vatican II and the CELAM in 
Medellin, Columbia, in the early 1960s.  These events produced a Traditional Roman 
Catholic Church more responsive to the needs of the disadvantaged through an adoption 
of the “preferential option for the poor” (Kirk 1992; Sabia 1997; Lancaster 1988; Belli 
1985)   
In Nicaragua the Traditional Roman Catholic Church was slow to adopt the 
changes encompassed in Vatican II and CELAM.  The impetus for change occurred in 
Managua in January and February of 1969 at the “Encuento Pastoral”.  The three central 
themes for the deliberations were the nature of the Catholic Church in Nicaragua, the role 
of the Roman Catholic Church, and an analysis of the sociopolitical reality of 
contemporary Nicaragua.  The “Encuento Pastoral” became a debate between 
conservatives of the aging hierarchy and more liberal clergy.  Criticisms of the 
Traditional Roman Catholic Church included a lack of true spiritual leadership; a lack of 
dialogue and distance from concerns of the faithful, lack of social justice commitment; a 
formalistic ritualized approach to Catholic catechism, and excessive fees shared by parish 
priests for religious services.  With criticisms of the Nicaraguan Traditional Roman 
Catholic Church in mind, the Vatican decided in late 1970 to install a leader without 
close ties to the Somozas to revive sagging Church moral.  Miguel Obando y Bravo was 
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appointed Archbishop of Nicaragua.  Obando y Bravo rejected attempts to be co-opted by 
the Somozas, and leading up to the revolution, served as intermediary between the 
Somozas and the FSLN.  The relationship between the Sandinistas and Obando y Bravo 
soured shortly after the revolution as a result of differing ideas about the role of the 
Church in Nicaraguan society (Kirk 1992, pp. 52-64).   
These events are noteworthy because they signify the changing of church - society 
relations and provide the necessary ingredients for the growth of the Progressive Church.  
For example, it was not inconsequential that the founding of the FSLN coincided with the 
opening of Vatican II.  The climate arising from Vatican II helped to foster the conditions 
favorable for future relationships between the Progressive Church and the Sandinistas 
(Sabia 1997, p. 55).  
   The Sandinista revolution was successful because of cross-class cooperation and 
movement (Everingham 1996, p. 4, Kirk 1992, pp. 60-62).  Kirk (1992, pp. 60-62) 
attributes this cooperation to three factors.  First was the popular reaction to the 
devastating 1972 earthquake, which left 10,000 dead and a quarter of all Managuans 
homeless. Dissatisfaction with the regime was a result of the diversion of relief funds 
from the bourgeoisie and middle classes to Somoza personally.   Second was the gradual 
development of a diverse societal opposition, from peasant groups to elites, which had 
either been co-opted by Somoza in the past or had developed some reason to wish for the 
end of the regime.   Both of these factors were intensified by unfair business practices 
resulting from Somoza’s virtual control over the nation.  For example, making campaign 
contributions and paying some bribes were simply part of usual business practices and 
widely accepted. However, the transfer of so much relief money away from the middle 
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classes, coinciding with the steady growth in economic marginalization, drew support 
away from Somoza in the elite classes.   
The third factor was the growth of the FSLN movement, strengthened through the 
exposure they received by seizing the house of a close associate of Somoza during a 1974 
Christmas Party attended by U.S. ambassador Turner Shelton and the mayor of Managua, 
Somoza’s brother in law.  The FSLN forced Somoza to release political prisoners, 
including the future FSLN President of Nicaragua Daniel Ortega, and to publish the 
FSLN manifesto.  These actions demonstrated to the rest of Nicaraguan society that 
Somoza was not invulnerable. The growth of the FSLN was also assisted by the growth 
of the Progressive Church through the creation of Christian Base Communities (Kirk 
1992).   
Kirk (1992), Sabia (1997), and Lancaster (1988) all attribute the growth of the 
FSLN to the explosion of the Progressive Church through Liberation Theology.  The 
formation of the Progressive Churches provided the FSLN with a network through which 
Church members could participate directly by becoming members of the FSLN or 
passively by providing its members with safe houses, food, and other supplies.  Through 
this sort of participation, they often became targets of National Guard terror.  This 
influenced once passive members to militate against these human atrocities and 
confirmed the beliefs of more militant participants (Sabia 1997, p. 65).  It is this religious 
foundation of a revolutionary movement through associational activities that makes a 
study on the affect of religion and civil society in Nicaragua compelling.   
In order to understand the role of popular or progressive religions of the poor, one 
must note the characteristics that differentiate it from traditional or elite religions.  The 
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Progressive Catholic Church and Traditional Roman Catholicism are all part of the same 
system and thus share some views.  However, they are also distinctly different because in 
“popular” or “progressive” forms the poor interpret the meanings of religious doctrine 
from their point of view. For example, the Liberation Theology practiced in the 
Progressive Church emphasizes class struggle as the key to the Kingdom of God while 
Evangelical Protestantism posits that the key is the individual (Lancaster 1988, p. 31, p. 
96).   
Evangelical Protestantism is the most competitive religion for Progressive 
Catholicism in Nicaragua, especially in the poorest barrios (Lancaster 1988, p. 101). 
Evangelical Protestantism and Progressive Catholicism have been extremely important 
for civil society in Nicaragua. They have a similar demographic configuration, supported 
by the poor and middle classes, and have been creators of normative communities.  Both 
religions see a link between wealth and sin.  Progressive Catholicism claims that wealth 
separates man from community and God while Evangelical Protestantism’s focus on the 
individual means that wealth takes away from spiritual pursuits of the individual.  
Progressive Catholicism produces normative communities through the structure of CEBs, 
while Evangelical Protestantism has created communities through the concepts of 
evangelical deeds or good works (Lancaster 1988, pp. 111-115).  This link has played a 
significant role in the associational activities undertaken by their adherents.  The question 
becomes, do these differing associational activities, though linked, produce the same 
forms of civil society? 
Sabia (1997) conducted a study on the development of popular religions and the 
revolutionary movement in Nicaragua and created a four-part typology based on the 
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affect of popular religions and revolution on the individual.  The first of Sabia’s religious 
types is the "Marxist Type".  The Marxist Type is distinctive in two ways.  First , these 
individuals accept Marxism as their political ideology.  Second, although some still 
consider themselves member of CEBs, they no longer consider themselves to be Catholic 
or even Christian in the traditional sense.  Their motivation is purely political, rejecting 
any type of religion and viewing religion as an alienating influence in human society 
(Sabia 1997, pp. 96-97).  Politically, they speak of the weaknesses of liberal democracy, 
claiming that the right to vote is neither sufficient nor necessary to ensure poor peoples’ 
equality. The Marxist Type remains dedicated to the Sandinista movement and is 
negative toward religious figures, often referring to clergy as Judases.  Though they 
appear nonreligious, they often speak in spiritual terms (Sabia 1997, pp. 105-109).   
The second part of the typology is the “Revolutionary Christian Type”. Like the 
“Marxist Type”, these individuals accept the notion that there are obstacles to human 
development.  They were won over to the Sandinistas by the idea of class struggle and 
tend still to support them, as well as remaining members of CEBs.  The Revolutionary 
Christian Type differs from the Marxist Type in that they have not had a de-
Christianizing experience and speak of their political commitment to social justice as a 
consequence of their faith and Liberation Theology, which continues to motivate their 
political activity.  The Revolutionary Christian Type’s political motivation is a logical 
outgrowth of their growing social consciousness, the themes of liberation theology, and 
acceptance of the Sandinista historical project.  According to Sabia, it is typical to hear 
them speak of "God as the liberator of the poor and the role of Christ as a political 
revolutionary".  Revolutionary Christians regard their active service to the community as 
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taking priority over their devotion to the local church but openly regard themselves as 
Catholic (Sabia 1997, pp. 116-132) 
“The Reformist Christian Type” members of the Progressive Church have more 
secular motivations.  Reformists suggest that while the interpretation of Christianity in 
Latin America may have facilitated greater consciousness of social justice, it was the 
overt corruption of the regime and economic crises that inspired their involvement in the 
insurrection.  As a result they only tenuously supported revolutionary reforms of the 
1980s.  Reformists are highly critical of an ideology that defends one class over another 
and reject the idea that society can be changed from the top down.  Reformists argue that 
the work for change must occur at the civic level through the maturation of Christian 
consciousness, which means creating a new person in Nicaragua.  Reformists are more 
likely to be engaged in religious and educational activities in their neighborhoods.  
Whereas they appear to be politically cautious, they also support popular organizations 
that they perceive are working for a more democratic, equitable, and socially just society 
(Sabia 1997, pp. 144-147) 
Finally, the “Alienated Christian Type” includes wealthy members of Nicaraguan 
society, some poor and middle class Nicaraguans, critics of the Traditional Roman 
Catholic Church and Progressive Churches, and opponents of the Sandinistas.  Many are 
former Catholics, former members of CEBs, and early Sandinista supporters.  Like 
Reformists they claim that social and economic crises explain the anti-Somoza 
insurrection.  In the 1980s Reformists became disaffected with the Progressive Church 
and departed.  Reformists view the Progressive Church as a political organization with 
separate practices and doctrine from the traditional Roman Catholic Church. Alienated 
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Christians appear not to believe in a preferential option for the poor and believe poverty 
is a natural part of the world. Sabia finds that Reformists are most likely to convert to 
Evangelical Protestantism and Charismatic Catholicism (Sabia 1997, pp. 173-209). 
Sabia's typology is significant because it makes a strong connection between 
religion, civil society, and government.  The religion practiced within the Progressive 
Church greatly influenced the worldview of adherents by providing an understanding of 
the relationship between government and society.  These are normative in nature, but it is 
the primary way in which people view the outside world, government institutions, and 
society as a whole.  The associational activities undertaken by each type tend to produce 
different outcomes.  The Marxist Type and Revolutionary Christian Type look to be 
producing a civil society supportive of socialism as espoused by Marxist principles, while 
the Reformist and Alienated types appear to be producing a civil society supportive of 
democracy. 
 In the years since the democratic consolidation (1990) under President Violetta de 
Barrios Chamorro, the Progressive Church in Nicaragua has been dwindling in both 
numbers and activism.  The poor organizational structure of CEBs, their close association 
with the FSLN, and the FSLN’s poor conduct damaged the Progressive Church in 
Nicaragua (Deonandan 2001, pp. 451-452). In its final years in government, the FSLN 
was accused of corruption and criticized for implementing financial policies that 
countered their Marxist vision. This led to their defeat in 1990, and also in 1996 by 
Armando Aléman, who actually had supporters of the Somoza regime campaigning on 
his behalf, and again in 2000 with the ascension of Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC) 
candidate Enrique Bolaños to the Presidency.  Furthermore, the leadership and direction 
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of the Progressive Church has been in decline, and the Traditional Roman Catholic 
Church has been reasserting its power and de-legitimizing the CEBs (Deonandan 2001; 
Williams 1992).   
 These events have implications for civil society, as cross nationally traditional 
Roman Catholicism has been associated with theological conservatism.  In Nicaragua this 
conservatism has become evident in some of the Traditional Roman Catholic Church’s 
contemporary public policies.  Economic and employment policies are pushing women 
back into the home, which Deonandan (2001, pp. 454-455) claims are a policy of both the 
Traditional Roman Catholic Church and the Nicaraguan State.  This is important for the 
health of civil society, especially as it relates to the viability of democratic institutions.  
As Casanova (2001, p. 1044) points out, the Roman Catholic Church can only be 
considered a civil society actor as long as it remains outside the state.  If it works in 
concert with the state, it then becomes part of the state, and these new policies put its 
independence in question.   
 Concurrent with the demise of the Progressive Church and rebirth of the 
Traditional Roman Catholic Church, Evangelical Protestants and Pentecostals have taken 
hold.  The latest census conducted in 1995 in Nicaragua states that 72.9 percent of the 
population belong to the Roman Catholic Church in all of its forms, 15.1 percent were 
members of Pentecostal and Evangelical churches, 1.5 percent belong to the Moravian 
Church, 0.1 percent belong to the Episcopal Church.  Other Christian denominations, 
including Amish and Mennonite communities, the Church of Jesus Christ and the Latter-
Day Saints (Mormons), Jehovah’s Witnesses make up 1.9 percent with 8.5 percent 
claiming no religious affiliation (US Dept of State 2001 
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http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2002/14052.htm).  Today, Traditional Roman Catholicism 
remains the largest religion in Nicaragua.   
Two studies of Protestant movements have found that the stereotypical 
assumptions that Pentecostalism and Evangelical Protestantism lead to conservatism 
appear not to hold in Nicaragua.  Lancaster (1988) and Smith and Haas (1997) have 
studied the Evangelical Protestant and Pentecostal movements in Nicaragua and found 
that politically they appear to be much less conservative than previously thought.  They 
found that adherents to these denominations are just as likely to support revolutionary 
action as others with similar demographic background.  Evangelical Protestants and 
Pentecostals form communities of underprivileged and working class people; thus, if the 
policies of the revolutionary government can help these communities, they are just as 
easy to court as Catholics (Smith and Haas 1997, pp. 446-450).  In terms of civil society, 
this demonstrates that the associational activities of Evangelical Protestants and 
Pentecostals in Nicaragua form communities through which they enter into political 
action to have their demands met.  Therefore, an exploration of how this affects civil 
society as a whole, may go a long way in helping us understand the depth of the 
democratic movement currently establishing itself in Nicaragua. 
As has been illustrated from this overview of religious development in Nicaragua, 
traditional religious institutions have fragmented and new religious institutions have 
taken hold.  For Sabia (1997), participation in the popular churches has produced 
different types of individuals and orientations toward the role of government in society.  
Lancaster (1988) and Smith and Haas (1997) have demonstrated that the Evangelical 
Protestant religions are not as conservative as previously believed and these churches are 
 38
producing communities capable of coming together for political action.  To move 
forward with this research, an understanding of how civil society is affected by religious 





Questions and Hypotheses 
 This micro-cultural study of Nicaragua’s densely populated Central Pacific region 
is not an attempt to make a direct causal correlation between religion and democracy, nor 
between civil society and democracy.  It is simply asserting that civil society is an 
important variable in the establishment and maintenance of democratic institutions and 
religious institutions are central actors within civil society.  Therefore, the research is 
exploring whether distinct religious forms or denominations create diverse forms of civil 
society, of which some forms may be more capable than others at producing attitudes and 
beliefs capable of maintaining democratic institutions. It also explores the effects of 
religiosity, or the level a respondent uses religion as a guide to everyday life, on civil 
society participation. 
Religion is a cultural phenomenon. Inglehart (1988, p. 1204) claims that societies 
are politically influenced by their cultural attitudes.  These attitudes are enduring but not 
immutable.  As the input for civil society changes from Traditional Roman Catholicism 
to Evangelical Protestantism and Pentecostalism, then so, too, will inputs for civil 
society. As these forms of civil society become more codified, the political culture will 
also change. 
 To implement this study, a number of research questions and hypotheses have 
been generated.  The central question is to what extent do various religious structures, 
practices, and orientations produce different forms of civil society?  Are some religious 
denominations, and the specific associational activities encompassed within them, better 
at producing a civil society capable of establishing and maintaining democratic 
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institutions than other religious forms?  More specifically, do Evangelical Protestantism 
and Pentecostalism, because of their role in redefining community and creating a safe 
haven from the hardships of every day life, produce a civil society better at maintaining 
democratic institutions than either Traditional Roman Catholicism or Progressive 
Catholicism?  Does Traditional Catholicism, because of its hierarchical structure and 
mediated relationship with God, create a civil society conducive to authoritarian forms of 
government?  Does Progressive Catholicism, as born out of Liberation Theology and 
structured in CEBs, create an anti-regime civil society illustrated by the definition of 
Civil Society II? 
 This research differs from previous studies of civil society and democracy in 
Central America by focusing on religious institutions as central figures in civil society. 
The goal is to understand the effects of religion on the individual’s propensity to 
participate in civil society and with other civil society actors rather than simply exploring 
religion as one small civil society actor among many.  Religion is of growing concern as 
a major source of conflict and the basis for governance in many regions of the world, 
especially when two different religions, such as Islam and Christianity, come into contact 
with one another. According to Huntington (1997) conflicts based on cultural and 
religious entities are the “fault lines” dividing the world today.  This study intends to 
understand whether this relationship exists between different forms of the same religion 
creating a “fault line” in the establishment and maintenance of domestic political 
institutions and support for democracy.  Does the current mix of religions in Nicaragua 
favor a democratic or authoritarian domestic political structure?   Will there be a decline 
in the democratic regimes in the region and can religion be a predictor of political decay?  
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 To help answer these complex and important questions a number of hypotheses 
have been generated.  
H1. Pentecostalism produces a civil society capable of establishing and maintaining 
democratic institutions. 
 
This hypothesis is derived from the literature produced by Chestnut (1997), 
Cleary (1998); Stoll (1990); Vasquez (1999); Gill (1999); and others who espouse that 
Pentecostalism and Evangelical Protestantism provide communities that ease the burden 
of an uncertain world and an escape from daily life in the region.   These communities 
help adherents deal with social problems such as alcoholism, drug abuse, and adultery 
associated with machismo (manliness) attitudes by providing a community experience 
that endows adherents with a role of worth in their community. They provide 
opportunities for upward social mobility through money saved out of abstinence from 
vices.  The communities also endorse the entrance of women in the micro-entrepreneurial 
sector and encourage solidarity with the less favorable classes.  Furthermore, their 
independent structures from both the state and their sister denominations, as well as being 
based on “survival strategies” for Latin Americans shows that these religions are forming 
communities that help produce interpersonal trust and social capital.  The survival 
strategies undertaken by these independent churches exemplify hope to the individual in a 
complicated and often harsh environment and provide a successful route to follow.  
 
H2. Evangelical Protestantism produces a civil society capable of establishing and 
maintaining democratic institutions. 
 
According to Stoll (1990, p. 4) differentiation between denominations can be a 
daunting task because of their independent forms.  Stoll uses “Evangelical” to denote all 
non-Catholic Christians.  Stoll admits that within the United States this term “…connotes 
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a theological conservatism with emphasizes on the Bible, personal salvation, and 
evangelism.”  However, in Latin America the term is less restrictive in its use.  In Latin 
America, Evangelical Protestant and Pentecostal Churches are independent from their 
sister denominations abroad both financially and structurally.  Their independence means 
they are not as polarized along theological and political boundaries as are many of their 
sister denominations in the North.  To then separate religious institutions by 
denomination in studying their effect will negate the religious effects on civil society that 
cross cut these formal boundaries (Stoll 1990, pp. 3-13). For the purpose of this study, it 
is worthwhile to explore whether associational differences between Evangelical 
Protestantism and Pentecostalism produce different forms of civil society.   
 
H3. Traditional Roman Catholicism produces a civil society less capable of establishing 
and maintaining democratic institutions. 
 
 Huntington (1991), Lipset (1994), and Casanova (2001) all state that Traditional 
Roman Catholicism has conventionally engendered a negative relationship with 
democracy because of its hierarchical structure and its large number of impoverished 
adherents.  Huntington’s (1991) third wave of democratization consisted mainly of 
Catholic countries and was a result of internal changes within the Roman Catholic 
Church, accompanied by relative economic success among Catholic dominated countries 
(Huntington 1991, pp. 75-80).  However, other scholars (Casanova 2001; Deonandan 
2001) have found that the Traditional Roman Catholic Church still upholds its role in the 
maintenance and legitimacy of the status quo for the wealthy and upper classes.  
Casanova (2001, p. 1044) claims that the Traditional Roman Catholic Church can be a 
source of civil society, in as much as it is independent of state power.  In cases where the 
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Traditional Roman Catholic Church has maintained its dominance, it is much less an 
exemplar of civil society, but part of the state.  Today in Nicaragua the Traditional 
Roman Catholic Church may be reasserting itself in society through the state, as is 
indicated from Church endorsed employment policies encouraging women out of the 
workforce and reasserting the woman’s traditional role as homemaker (Deneonandon 
2001, pp. 454-456).   Traditional Roman Catholics are more conservative across issues, 
which translates into low levels of trust in subordinate classes. Thus, in terms of adding 
to civil society Traditional Roman Catholicism will be negative for the production of 
democratic civil society. 
H4. Progressive Catholicism, as espoused by Liberation Theology, produces a civil 
society less capable of establishing and maintaining democratic institutions. 
 
 Progressive Catholicism will have an overall positive affect on civil society.  
However, the form it will create will be more reminiscent of Civil Society II or anti-
regime civil society.  Progressive Catholicism will demonstrate greater characteristics of 
civil society I than Traditional Roman Catholicism, but less than Evangelical 
Protestantism and Pentecostalism.  Progressive Catholicism, as practiced in Nicaragua, 
was founded on Marxist principles under the duress of the Somoza dictatorial regime.  As 
a result of these circumstances, Progressive Catholicism will engender negative 
associations with formal civil society and confidence in political institutions by 
exhibiting more revolutionary tendencies and distrust of formal organizations.  As the 
motivating factor behind Progressive Catholicism, a repressive dictator like Somoza, 
disappears, so, too, will the motivation of adherents to fight for the social justice issues 
espoused by Progressive clergy and lay people.   Though social justice is not achieved by 
the deposing of a dictator like Anastasio “Tachito” Somoza Debayle, the main obstacle to 
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social justice is removed.  Once this occurs, the movement fragments as different 
adherents and clergy are now free to pursue their own vision of social justice. 
 
H5.  Charismatic Catholicism produces the most capable civil society for establishing 
and maintaining democratic institutions among the Catholic Denominations. 
 
Charismatic Catholicism appears to be a mix between the doctrine of Traditional 
Catholicism and the communities and practices formed through the Pentecostal and 
Evangelical Protestant denominations.    Charismatic Catholicism is a religion of the 
middle classes built out of a rejection of the socialist ideals of Progressive Catholicism 
and the legitimacy of the status quo of Traditional Roman Catholicism.  Though it looks 
to be modeled after the Evangelical structure, it is hypothesized that because it has been 
built out of a rejection of politically motivated religious practices of both the Traditional 
and Progressive Catholic Churches, it will be the least politically active and most inward 
focused of all religious denominations.  Therefore, the role of Charismatic Catholicism in 
civil society should be muted because of its outright rejection of politics, irrespective of 
its similarities to Evangelical Protestantism and Pentecostalism.  Charismatic Catholicism 
may also be conservative across issues as their doctrine remains Catholic.  However, 
Charismatic practices and churches are similar to Evangelical thus they may act more like 
Evangelicals in civil society, but with less of an impact. 
Methodology 
To collect the data for this research a survey instrument was developed measuring 
the political attitudes of 602 Nicaraguan respondents to determine how their associational 
activities create a civil society capable of sustaining and maintaining democratic 
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institutions or Civil Society I.  Surveys were conducted February through June 2003, in 
Granada, Managua, Masaya, and the Pueblos Blancos areas of Nicaragua.   
The residents of Granada claim is the oldest city in the western hemisphere and 
traditionally has been the stronghold for conservatives throughout Nicaragua’s 
tumultuous political history.  Francisco Hernandez de Cordoba founded Granada in 1542 
and Nicaragua’s currency has been named for him. 1  The 98,600 (www.world-
gazeteer.com) residents of Granada are socioeconomically diverse, with some living in 
beautifully maintained and brightly colored colonial houses on Calle Alcazada, and 
others in small sparsely constructed dwellings in barrios like El Estación.  Granada is one 
of the most popular cities among tourists due to its colonial setting and accessibility to 
such attractions as Volcán Mombacho and its cloud forests, Lago de Nicaragua, and La 
Isletas.  This has given a boost to many impoverished residents working in the micro-
entrepreneurial sector such as selling juices, chic-lets, nuts and fruits, and providing 
carriage rides.  Working class Nicaraguans such as taxi drivers, boat drivers, and 
restaurant owners also thrive in this blossoming tourist economy.2   
Masaya is situated directly between Granada and Managua and has a population 
of around 122,200 (www.world-gazeteer.com).   Masaya is known for its large market 
place, one of the largest in Nicaragua and one of the most popular among Nicaraguans 
and tourists alike, and its series of volcanic lakes sitting on either side of the city.  As one 
of Nicaragua’s larger cities, it engenders socioeconomic diversity but it is less extreme 
                                                 
1 One of the signs entering the city states that Granada was discovered in the 1542 and claims it is the 
oldest city in the Western Hemisphere. 
2 Neighborhoods in Granada represented in the survey are: Colonia Alvarado; Pueblo Chiquito; Palmira; 
Calle Corrales; Julian Guintana; Bartolome; Rosario; Calle la Libertad; Trabajista; Estación; Calle Cieba; 
14 de Septiembre; La Isleta; Colonia Alvarado; Calle Tamarindo; La Concepción; Mirra Laguna; Calle 
Guzman; Calle San Juan del Sur; Calle Alcazada) 
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than the disparity between rich and poor found in Granada.  Masaya is also not 
considered to be as strongly partisan as Granada or León, but probably is a little more 
leftist than Granada, given the vast numbers of statues and memorials dedicated to the 
FSLN found throughout the city. 
The Pueblos Blancos are a series of mountain towns known for having a white 
cathedral in the square of each town.3 The Pueblos Blancos are rich in culture and history 
as the birthplace of Augusto César Sandino, an early revolutionary and the symbol of the 
Sandinista movement.  The area is known for being sympathetic to the FSLN.  These 
towns average from a few hundred residents to a few thousand.  Catarina is known for its 
plant vendors and San Juan Del Oriente for its artisans.   
Nicaragua’s capital Managua is the largest city in the country with a population of 
around 1,440,500 (www.world-gazeteer.com)4. Managua is by far the largest and most 
socioeconomically diverse city in Nicaragua.  It is the center of government and 
exemplifies polarization, with neighborhoods ranging from the wealthiest Nicaraguans 
such as Los Robles to the many squatter camps and shantytowns dotting the city.  
Leveled by the tragic 1972 earthquake that killed more than 10,000 Managuans and left 
more than 300,000 homeless, it is a confusing city with poor infrastructure and few street 
signs or markers.  Addresses in Managua are given in blocks away from some arbitrary 
landmark (Ross 2002; Bohning 1998).  A single neighborhood will have different names 
depending on whether the respondent uses the name under the FSLN, the pre-
                                                 
3 Towns in the Pueblos Blancos area where the survey was conducted: Diriá; San Juan Del Oriente; 
Naindaime; Diriomo; Catarina; Ninquinohomo; Nindirí 
4 Barrios in Managua where the survey was conducted, these barrios are very large and mainly working 
class, El Jardín is the wealthiest neighborhood of the three: 14 de Juneo; El Jardín; Maximo Jerez 
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revolutionary name, or the current one.5  The Carretera de Masaya has become the most 
modern section of Managua, with newly constructed hotels and modern shopping centers.  
Managua is also the center of culture with universities such as the National Autonomous 
University Nicaragua (UNAN) and the Universidad Centroamericana (UCA) as well as a 
number of museums, theaters, and nightlife.6  
The surveys were face-to-face interviews lasting anywhere from 15 minutes to 
well over an hour.  Each respondent was over the age of 18 at the time of the survey.  The 
surveys were read in Spanish to the respondent with the aid of a research assistant and 
each respondent was provided with placards indicating possible responses.  To maximize 
validity surveys were taken at every fifth house.7 Many Nicaraguan dwellings are small 
in size and may only consist of one or two rooms with many residents, thus privacy and 
influence from others in proximity to the interview means that interference may be a 
problem.   
Variables 
The dependent variable, Civil Society I, is derived from the definitions provided 
by Booth and Richard (1998) and Brysk (2000).  Civil Society I is defined as 
associational activity outside the state that produces beliefs and attitudes conducive to the 
viability of democratic institutions.  Civil Society II is defined as associational activity 
that tends to be conflictual and anti-tyrannical which encourages resistance to the current 
regime.  Civil society III consists of those forms of associational activities that encourage 
                                                 
5 The author of this research lived in a neighborhood in Managua in 1995 named Barrio La Luz or 14 de 
Juneo (FSLN name).  When navigating the city via taxi it was extremely important to know both names. 
6 UNAN is the largest public educational institutions and the UCA is a large, private, Jesuit educational 
institution.  
7 Though attempts were made at every fifth house, the author was not granted permission to conduct the 
interview at every fifth house.  In the process of the fieldwork if the researcher was not granted permission 
to the fifth house, the survey was conducted at the next available house. 
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hate, distrust, and discrimination towards specific sectors of society or other civil society 
providers. 
In order to produce quantitative data on Civil Society I, Civil Society II, and Civil 
Society III as defined above, the concept of civil society is broken down into its 
individual components and effects.  Each component, defined below, is analyzed against 
a number of independent variables to ascertain which religious forms are carrying out the 
establishment of a democratic civil society. If Civil Society I outputs are beliefs and 
attitudes conducive to the establishment and viability of democratic institutions, then it is 
important to decide what these attitudes are and which are most important. 
The composite civil society dependent variable will rely on components from 
Booth & Richard (1998), Inglehart (1988), Muller and Seligson (1994), Almond and 
Verba (1963), and Brysk (2000).  Almond and Verba (1963) measure civic culture 
through a variety of indicators such as attitudes or feelings about government and 
politics, patterns of partnership and the connections between community and the polity, 
obligation to participate, civic and political knowledge, and the effects of membership in 
organizations.  Inglehart (1988) measures political culture with indices of life 
satisfaction, support for gradual or radical change, and interpersonal trust.  These 
measures do not necessarily measure civil society, but they do evaluate the effects of civil 
society, or at the very least denote the role civil society has for the establishment and 
maintenance of democratic institutions. 
Booth and Richards (1998) measure civil society according to their associational 
activity modes.  The first associational activity mode is formal group activism, which 
includes affiliation or membership in unions, civic associations, cooperatives, and 
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professional groups.  The second mode of communal activism denotes affiliation in self-
help groups and activities at the local level.  Booth and Richard (1998) also measure the 
outputs of civil society by looking at social capital.  These measures, based on Putnam’s 
(2000; 1993) concept, include interpersonal trust and political knowledge, as well as 
political capital levels such as citizen’s commitment to democratic norms, including 
support for gradual change. 
Civil Society Dependent Variables 
Formal Civil Society 
The first component of the composite civil society dependent variable, extracted 
from Booth and Richard (1998), is formal participation in civil society.  This variable 
measures the participation in official organizations such as labor unions, civic 
organizations, cooperatives or collectives, etc. To operationalize this variable respondents 
are asked whether they are members of official organizations.  The organizations are 
sports or recreation organizations (FOCSR); arts, music, or educational organizations 
(FOCAM); labor or trade unions (FOCLU); professional associations (FOCPA); political 
parties (FOCPP); environmental organizations (FOCEO); and philanthropic or charitable 
organizations (FOCCP). The respondents are also asked to list other organizations to 
which they are affiliated.   
To gain an understanding of the respondent’s level of involvement in formal civil 
society organizations, they are asked to state their level of participation based on a 5-
point Likert scale ranging from very active (5) to not a member (1). The scores across all 
levels of participation and list of organizations were aggregated to create a single score 
known as the Formal Civil Society Index (FOCIND) which takes into account the 
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number of organizations and level of participation in each. The greater the score on the 
Formal Civil Society Index (FOCIND), the greater the level of participation in formal 
civil society. 
Informal Civil Society 
The second component of the variable, also taken from Booth and Richard (1998), 
is participation in informal civil society such as self-help organizations or grass roots and 
barrio level organizations.  This component includes membership in various 
neighborhood organizations and women’s organizations as well as informal groups that 
take part in recreational, volunteer, and community activities.  Within the informal civil 
society a respondent may contribute in two distinct ways, support and participation.   
Participation in Informal Civil Society 
Participation means the respondent organizes and attends meetings and activities 
that work to solve community problems or those of an individual within the community.  
Respondents are asked to state whether they belong to a community or neighborhood 
group that works to resolve community issues (IOCCG); whether they have ever donated 
their work to solve a community problems (IOCDW); whether they have attended a 
meeting aimed at solving the problems of the community or one of its members 
(IOCAM); and finally, whether they have ever organized a meeting for the purpose of 
solving a problem of the community or one of its members (IOCNG).  Responses for 
these questions are “yes (2)” or “no (1)” and include a series of follow up questions to 
determine whether the problems being addressed through these activities were resolved 
satisfactorily.  These four variables are combined to create an additive index expressing 
the level of participation of the respondent in the Informal Civil Society Participation 
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Index (ICSPIN).  On this index a respondent can range from “no civil society 
participation, meaning the respondent answered “no” to all four variables to “high civil 
society participation” if the respondent answered yes to all of the variables.  
Informal Civil Society Support Index (ICSSIN) 
 
Informal Civil Society Support denotes the respondents’ participation in 
associational activities by donating money or sporadic volunteer activity such as 
spending the day cleaning the street or neighborhood.  The Informal Civil Society 
Support Index (ICSSIN) variable highlights people who support efforts to improve the 
community or the problems of one of its members by donating money and materials, or 
who may participate in one large event, but not actively participate implementing a 
solution. Respondents are asked to indicate “yes (2)” or “no (1)” whether he or she has 
worked to solve the problem of the community or one of its members (IOCCP) and/or 
donated money (IOCDM).   
Finally, an additive index of the Informal Civil Society Participation Index 
(ICSPIN) and the Informal Civil Society Support Index (ICSSIN) created the Informal 
Civil Society Total Index (ICSTIN) an overall variable of informal civil support and 
participation society in Nicaragua.  
Effects of Civil Society Dependent Variables 
 To realize the importance of civil society, both formal and informal, for 
democracy, it is important to explore how participation in civil society affects individual 
political attitudes and beliefs, thus affecting political culture and the structure and form of 
political institutions.  To implement this, respondents are given a series of questions 
exploring the concepts of: interpersonal trust, political efficacy, belief in the correctness 
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of governmental actions, confidence in governmental institutions, and political 
knowledge. 
Political Efficacy Index (POLEF) 
 A central component to viability of democracy is the citizen’s belief that his or 
her actions in the political arena affect the overall structure and actions of the 
government.  Fukuyama (1992) claims that the world is embracing democracy out of the 
basic human need for expression. All history or struggle up until this point has been for 
the achievement of a political system that permits individual expression.  Dahl (1971) 
states that for democracy to exist people must have the ability to form and articulate 
demands, the right to organize for the purpose of articulating their demands to those in 
government, and then have those demands weighted evenly in the conduct of 
government.  Therefore, for democracy to be maintained the citizen must feel that his or 
her actions influence government or that they are efficacious.  Citizens must feel that 
through their actions they have made their views known. 
 For this line of questioning respondents are asked to indicate the level of political 
efficacy by stating their level of agreement on a 5-point Likert Scale where 5 equals 
“strongly agree” and 1 equals “strongly disagree”.  Variables measuring political efficacy 
are whether respondents feel comfortable asking for the help and cooperation of a 
member of the National Assemble (PEHNC) and/or the mayor or a representative of the 
mayor (PEMMO).  These variables measure whether respondents believes their demands 
are weighed in the conduct of government.  Respondents are then asked their level of 
agreement with the responsiveness of government in addressing needs of society 
(PERNS) and whether the government is run in the best interests for society as a whole or 
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only for the benefit of a few (PEGFP).  These variables measure the level to which the 
respondent feels the government works in the best interest of society or in the interest of 
the state and specific classes.  Finally, respondents are asked to state the importance of 
their vote and participation in the electoral system (PEVPI). An additive scale using these 
variables produces the Political Efficacy Index (POLEF), which measures the overall 
political efficacy levels of the respondent.   
Political Knowledge Index (PKIND) 
 
 According to Dahl (1971) for a democracy to flourish several thresholds must 
exist. Two of the primary criteria are minimum economic and literacy standards, which 
ensure the citizen is capable of political participation.   Przeworski and Limongi (1997, p. 
159) state that the greater a state’s per capita income the greater chance democracies have 
of surviving.  Once the ability to participate has been established, the citizens must 
generate knowledge sufficient to produce politically informed decisions.  The level of 
political knowledge is measured by the respondents’ ability to name the President of 
Nicaragua (PKPRN) and the mayor of the respondent‘s city or town (PKMCT) as a 
measure of domestic political knowledge, and the President of the United States 
(PKPUS) as a test of international political knowledge.  Responses are coded “2” if the 
respondent knows the political figure and a “1” if they do not.  The responses are added 
to create the Political Knowledge Index (PKIND), measuring the overall political 
knowledge of the respondent. 
Interpersonal Trust (IPTRUST) 
Interpersonal trust is the level of trust an individual has in other individuals on the 
basis of a reciprocal relationships.  These relationships outline the patterns of civil 
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interaction in a democracy.  According to Putnam (2000, 1995, 1993) as reciprocal civil 
interaction between individuals increase, so to does the level of trust between the two 
individuals.  As the number of reciprocal civil interactions between individuals increases 
the level of trust in people increases.  The more the individual trust people, the more they 
trust people in government, and the more general trust that develops the more the 
individual begins to trust government as an institution.   
To explore the level of interpersonal trust in Nicaragua, respondents are asked a 
series of questions with the level of agreement ranging from “strongly agree (5)” to 
“strongly disagree (1)”.  The statements measure the respondents’ beliefs in the 
trustworthiness of people in general (IPTGT); whether people try to help other people the 
majority of the time (IPTHO); and whether generally people do not try to take advantage 
of them (IPTNA).  These three variables (IPTGT, IPTHO, IPTNA) are combined to 
create the Interpersonal Trust Index (IPTRUST), which provides an overall measure of 
the level of interpersonal trust found in the respondent.  
Confidence in Governmental Institutions (CIGIND) 
Two different variables have been created to gauge the respondent’s attitudes 
towards Nicaraguan domestic political institutions and political figures.  The first series 
of statements asks respondents to scale the level of confidence they have in various 
institutions on a five point scale from “total confidence (5)” to “none at all (1)”.    
Political institutions examined include the public educational system (PEINC2), the legal 
or judicial system (PEINC4), police (PEINC8), political system in general (PEINC11), 
the National Assembly (PEINC9), and the president of Nicaragua (PEINC12).  These 
variables create an additive scale of overall Confidence in Governmental Institutions 
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Index (CIGIND).  Non-governmental institutions included on the list include the Roman 
Catholic Church (PEINC1), the respondents’ church or denomination (PEINC2); the 
press (PEINC5); community organizations (PIENC7); Organizaciones representantes de 
los commerciantes or trade unions (PEINC6); and large corporations (PEINC10).   
Belief that Government Actions are Correct (BGAIND)  
The second variable of trust in governmental institutions asks respondents to 
indicate their level of belief in the correctness of government actions.  In making the link 
between individual attitudes and beliefs, associational activity outside the state, and trust 
for the government, a debate exists as how to approach it.  Muller, Jekham, and Seligson 
(1994) argue that, if asked whether or not respondents trust the government they will 
answer according to specific trust or distrust of the candidates or political figures they are 
familiar with.  Belief in the correctness of governmental actions differs from the level of 
confidence in political institutions because, rather than asking respondents to think solely 
of an institution, it adds a second component requiring respondents to think of an action 
taken by that specific institution.  On a five point scale, from “almost always (5)” to 
“never (1)” respondents indicate their belief in the correctness of actions taken by:  the 
government of Nicaragua (PETNG); the president (PETFG); National Assembly 
(PETRG); and the municipal government of the respondent’s city or town (PETLG).  
These responses are combined to create an overall additive index known as the Belief in 
Correctness of Government Actions Index (BGAIND).  
Alternative Political Expression Index (APEIND) 
A third line of inquiry asks respondents to indicate the types of acceptable 
political participation and who can participate in the political process. To understand 
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whether respondents support revolutionary action or what forms of political participation 
are acceptable in a democratic polity, they are asked to state their level of agreement with 
the right of a person to sign a petition (GCPPA), join a boycott (GCBPA), occupy 
factories and buildings (GCOBA), and attend lawful or legal demonstrations (GCLDA).  
The responses are coded from “strongly agree (5)” to “strongly disagree (1)” and 
combined in an additive index where the greater the combined score, the greater the 
tolerance for political participation outside the voting mechanism.  The greater the 
toleration of alternative forms of expression, the better the democratic concepts of 
freedom of assembly and expression have been institutionalized. 
Openness of Political Participation Index (OPINDX) 
To explore the level of dissent tolerated, a series of statements invites respondents 
to indicate whether a person who has only negative things to say about the government 
should have the right:  to vote (GCSVV); to attend legal demonstrations (GCSSD); to run 
for political office (GCSPO); and to appear on radio and television to make public 
speeches (GCSRS).  The responses are used to understand if respondents believe in the 
rights of individuals with different political views to participate in the democratic 
process.  The greater the level of tolerance, the better democracy has been 
institutionalized.  Nicaragua provides an interesting case study for political science as 
these types of political participation are constitutionally protected and accepted without 
the fear of violent retribution for the first time in the lives of most adult Nicaraguans. 
Finally, to gain an understanding of the spectrum of political ideology, 
respondents are asked to place their personal political beliefs on the left right continuum 
(GCLRC).  The question asks the respondent to pick a number between “1” representing 
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the left and strong FSLN affiliation, “5” representing centrality or no affiliation, and “10” 
representing the right or strong PLC affiliation.   
Religious Denomination Independent Variables 
Religious Denomination 
A number of independent and control variables have been created to ascertain the 
effect of specific religious institutions.  The principal independent variable asks 
respondents to state their primary religious denomination (RBPRP). Respondents are also 
asked to state whether they are members of more than one denomination (RBMOD).  
Many people in the process of conversion may claim affiliation to more than one 
denomination.  A third follow up asks respondents to state which denomination they 
practice most often (RBNOC).  In these cases the denomination most practiced becomes 
coded as the respondent s’ primary religious denomination. Finally, respondents are 
asked if they have ever converted from one religious denomination to another (RBORP); 
how long since the conversion (RBNYA); and the reason for conversion (RBRFC).  
These questions measure the depth of the conversion as newer converts may not be as 
faithfully aligned with their newly adopted denomination and may return to their previous 
denomination.  For example as Jacobs (1987, p. 305) points out that deconversion from 
charismatic forms of religion are not uncommon especially when adherents become 
disaffected or disappointed in their new religion or religious leaders. 
Difficulties emerged in distinguishing between different denominations, 
especially within the three forms of Catholicism.  Consequently, Charismatic and 
Progressive Catholics may be underrepresented in the sample.  As a test of religious 
knowledge and toleration, respondents are asked to state their level of agreement with 
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various religious denominations as read from a list (RBAOD).  Denominations provided 
to respondents are: The Catholic Church (RBAOD1); Progressive Catholicism or CEBS 
(RBAOD2); Pentecostals (RBAOD3); Protestants (RBAOD4); Baptists (RBAOD5); 
Evangelicals (RBAOD6); Seventh Day Adventists (RBAOD7); Jehovah’s Witnesses 
(RBAOD8); Mormons (RBAOD9); Muslims (RBAOD10); Hindus (RBAOD11) and 
Buddhists (RBAOD12).  In many cases respondents claimed membership in a Protestant 
denomination such as Baptists, but may have also stated that they disagreed with 
Protestants when read from the list.  Therefore, many respondents may not be able to 
distinguish between denominations, thus complicating the clarification of a particular 
respondent s’ denomination.  Confusion may also be attributed to the independent nature 
of Nicaraguan Evangelical Churches, as well as their use of Catholic rituals and practices 
in the conduct of worship.8    
Traditional Catholicism is defined as a form of Catholicism practiced within a 
formal Catholic Church, which meets regularly on Sunday where a parish priest performs 
the weekly services.  Liberation Theology based Catholicism, also known as 
“Progressive” Catholicism, is defined in accordance with Williams’ (1992) definition. 
Williams defines it as that sector of the institutional church dedicated to building a grass 
roots Church in Nicaragua.  The grassroots model advocates the decentralization of 
church decision-making and authority, with CEBs serving as the fundamental 
organization units in the church. Charismatic Catholicism is defined as those Catholic 
Churches that engender Protestant characteristics such as devotion to the Bible, 
individual relationship with God, and focus on evangelism. 
                                                 
8 The author was not fortunate enough to attend an Evangelical service as an invitation was never given.  
However, on several occasions the author was able to listen and see Evangelical worship from the street. 
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 Evangelical Protestantism is defined as a form of Christianity that is non-Catholic 
and is not Pentecostal.  As Stoll (1993, p. 4) noted the term “Evangelical” in Latin 
American encompasses all non-Catholic Christian denominations.  Due to their 
independent nature, the effect they have on society will crosscut their formal boundaries.  
Pentecostalism is a form of Evangelical Protestantism that is analyzed separately.  
Pentecostals may be different in that they emphasize the “Gifts of the Holy Spirit”, 
doctrinal differences include the belief in sanctification.  The belief in replicating Christ’s 
life on earth may increase a belief in “other worldliness” as shown through belief in faith 
healing and the practice of speaking in tongues.  As a result of this otherworldliness 
Pentecostals rely much less on social structures.    This is done to determine if there is 
any difference between Evangelical Protestantism and Pentecostalism in terms of civil 
society output.   
Nicaragua provides an interesting case as the Pentecostal movement has failed to 
grow as rapidly in Nicaragua as in other Latin American countries such as Guatemala and 
El Salvador.9  However, if the Pentecostal movement catches on, Evangelical 
Protestantism and Pentecostalism may become competitive for adherents and possibly 
create a fault line within Nicaragua’s religious structure.  Other religious denominations 
represented such as Jehovah’s Witnesses, Mormons, Seventh Day Adventists, Baptists, 
and Protestants are also coded (RBAOD).  All non-Catholic Christian denominations are 
also pooled to construct a Catholic and Evangelical variable (RBPRP4), for exploration 
of differences between the two major Christian movements.   
Religiosity Independent Variables 
                                                 
9 Pentecostalism as percentage of population is 7.65 % in Guatemala (World Christian Data Base) and 
7.34% in El Salvador (World Christian Database), 7.65% in Nicaragua (World Christian Database), only 
1.2% found in this study. 
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Taking into account the difficulties of categorizing respondents by their 
denomination, religiosity scales have been constructed to offer a second avenue for 
discerning the effects of religion on civil society and democracy.  Religiosity measures 
the role religion plays in the everyday life of the average citizen. One question often 
posed when studying religiosity is to ask the respondent to indicate how important God is 
in their life (RBIGL) on a 10-point scale.  Unfortunately, in Nicaragua this question 
showed little variation as most respondents placed maximum importance of God in their 
lives.    
Level of Religious Participation (RBLRP) 
The most popular method for studying the level of religious participation is the 
frequency of church attendance outside of weddings, funerals, and christenings.10  While 
participation is clearly an important construct of religiosity, the frequency of attendance 
is only one dimension and very difficult to determine.  Self-reported statistics by 
individual churches and denominations tend to be inflated and unreliable, especially 
given the supply side religious explanation where new churches and denominations 
establish their place in society through membership (Inglehart and Norris 2004; 
Iannicone, Fink and Starke 2000; Gill 1999).  Face-to-face interviews also provide 
challenges because religious devoutness remains a noble characteristic, even among 
skeptics, giving respondents an incentive to exaggerate attendance.  In the case of 
“Progressive Catholicism,” much of its worship and activities occur outside of a formal 
Cathedral and inside the house of one of its members or a community center.  Generally, 
Evangelical Churches limit formal participation by only convening worship services on 
Sundays and Wednesdays.  In Traditional Catholicism masses occur daily.   
                                                 
10 See the World Values Survey /European Values Survey 1999-2001; Variable Name – V185 
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For Evangelical adherents who have to leave their immediate neighborhoods to 
reach a place of worship, attendance may be limited by the ability to absorb extra time 
and transportation costs incurred in going to a service.  The Catholic dioceses in 
Nicaragua long ago erected Cathedrals in cities and towns within walking distance to 
most neighborhoods. However, in the more mountainous and rural regions, traveling to 
Church services can be impractical.  For many rural Nicaraguans, the only opportunities 
to engage in official religious practices are during infrequent trips made by priests to 
remote villages to hear confessions or rare visits to larger towns with markets.   Though 
these individuals may not have the opportunity officially to practice their religion as do 
urban Nicaraguans, the use of religion in the daily life of rural Nicaraguans may be even 
greater.    
This study chose to measure participation through the respondent’s use of God for 
day-to-day guidance, another significant dimension of participation.  If an individual 
consults God daily for answers and to make decisions, then each day the respondent is 
praying or participating in worship and practicing religion. This variable helps control for 
the disparity in participation that might occur as a result of religious affiliation.  The 
respondent was asked how often they pray outside of religious services (RBPOR).   The 
greater frequency with which respondents pray outside of religious services, the greater 
they participate in religion. 
Level of Religious Value (RBLRV)  
A second component of religiosity is the Level of Religious Value (RBLRV), 
which measures the depth of belief among respondents or how literally respondents take 
the Bible as the irrefutable Word of God.  Questions investigating the personal depth of 
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religion ask respondents if the Bible contains the word of God and is literally true 
(RBBLT); and whether eternal life is possible only for those who believe in Jesus Christ 
as God and Savior (RBHBG).  These variables also measure the degree to which the 
respondent uses the Bible as a guide to every day life.   
Level of Religious Belief (RBLRB) 
The third component to religiosity is the Level of Religious Belief (RBLRB) and 
is designed to measure the breadth or knowledge of concepts used by the respondent 
when interpreting the world via Biblical references.  The more concepts respondents 
believe in, the greater the level of religious belief and hence religiosity.  Respondents are 
asked whether they believe in God (RBWTB1), Life after Death (RBWTB2), a Soul 
(RBWTB3), the Devil (RBWTB4), Resurrection of the Dead (RBWTB5), Hell 
(RBWTB6), Heaven (RBWTB7), Sin (RBWTB8), and Reincarnation (RBWTB9).  These 
variables are coded “yes (2)” if respondents believe in the concept and “no (1)” if they do 
not.  
Religiosity (RELIGIOSITY) 
 In an effort to keep the number of variables to a minimum, the individual 
components of the Level of Religious Belief (RBLRB), the Level of Religious Value 
(RBLRV), and the Level of Religious Participation (RBLRP) have been combined to 
create an overall Religiosity (RELIGIOSITY) index variable.  This variable provides a 
thorough measure of how deeply respondents hold religion, their knowledge of religion, 
and how often they participate.  In the additive Religiosity index (RELIGIOSITY), the 
higher the score, the greater the respondent’s religiosity. 
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 To examine the role of religion and its intersection with society and politics, a 
two-part line of questioning has been created for the constructions of index variables. 
These index variables measure the role respondents believe religious institutions should 
carry out in society as well as the effectiveness of religious institutions in implementation 
of these functions. 
Role of Religion in Society (RBCRS)  
The first line of questioning surveys the role religious institutions should, and 
often do, perform in society and Church-State relations.  Respondents are provided with 
series of issues from which they reply by stating whether it is appropriate for “the 
Church” to address (RBCRS).11  These variables measure the degree of involvement 
religious institutions should have when moral issues force the Church and Government 
into interact with one another.  In short, it measures which set of institutions should be 
dominant when dealing with certain issues.  A second question asks the respondent if the 
church he or she attends should work to solve the social problems of Nicaragua (RBSSP).  
This variable measures the respondent’s attitude toward the role of “the Church" in civil 
society irrespective of the role of government.   
View of Religious Success in Society (RBCPAI)  
The second line of questioning measures how effective religious institutions are in 
shaping society and addressing specific issues. Respondents are asked whether religious 
organizations can be effective addressing problems of the community (RBRAP). Second, 
                                                 
11 RCBRS issues provided to the respondent: Disarmament; Problems of the Third World; Extra Marital 
Affairs; Drug Addiction; Alcoholism; Unemployment, Racial Discrimination; Euthanasia; Homosexuality; 
Ecology and Environment; Politics and Government; and Human Rights.  The respondent was also asked 
about abortion, but due to mistranslation and misunderstandings it was rarely understood and not asked 
throughout most of the survey. The question also does not specify which religious denomination the 
interview is discussing; the question simply states “the Church”.   
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respondents are asked whether the church is providing adequate answers to: the moral 
and social needs of the country (RBCPA1); problems of family life (RBCPA2); spiritual 
necessities of the population (RBCPA3), social problems facing the country (RBCPA4); 
financial problems of the poor (RBCPA5); and finally, if the church provides a sense of 
community (RBCPA6).  Together these variables provide measure of how well “the 
Church” is generating and participating in civil society.  These variables are combined to 
create an additive index variable summarizing the effectiveness of religious institutions in 
society called the Success of Religious Organizations in Society Index (RBCPAI).  
Higher scores indicate respondents believe the Church is effective in its contribution to 
civil society and lower scores mean respondents do not view the Church as providing 
valuable output in civil society. 
 
Control Variables 
Religion is not the only factor contributing to a vibrant civil society.  Therefore, to 
accurately portray its effect a number of control variables have been collected.  These 
variables are the age of respondents, the respondents’ level of education, gender, and 
income level.  
Age (DIAGE1) 
 To operationalize age, respondents are asked to provide the interviewer with the 
year they were born.  Age is a sensitive issue everywhere in the world, and many 
respondents will misrepresent themselves if simply asked to state their age.  The year 
provided by the respondent is subtracted from 2003, the year of the survey, and coded as 
the age of the respondent (DIAGE1).  For descriptive purposes the ages are also 
aggregated and coded into scales from “18-28 years of age (5)”, “28-39 years of age (4)”, 
 65
“40-50 years of age (3)”, 51-61 years of age (2)”; and “62 plus years of age (1)” to create 
an age ranking variable (AGERANK).  The belief, at least in the United States, is that 
older respondents provide greater contributions to civil society (Putnam 2000, p. 247-
277).  However, this may not be the case in Nicaragua as younger generations have 
experienced a more open civil society rather than the muted civil society experienced by 
the previous generations.   
Economic Level (DIINF) 
The income variable is constructed by asking respondents to estimate their 
personal monthly minimum income in Córdobas (DIINC), the currency of Nicaragua, as 
well as the minimum monthly income of the household (DIINCF).  From February 
through July, 2003, the exchange rate for the Córdoba fluctuated between C$14.60: 
U.S.$1 to C$15: U.S.$1. For this research, income is calculated on a C$15: U.S.$1 ratio.  
The greatest number of the two variables (DIINC and DIINCF), are coded into a third 
column to provide an overall income scale from “0 to 2000 Córdobas per month (1)”, 
“2001 to 4000 Córdobas per month (2)”, “4001 to 6000 Córdobas per month (3)”, “6001 
to 8000 Córdobas per month” to “8001 or more Córdobas per month (5)”.  It is theorized 
that (Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Dahl 1971) the greater the income, the greater the 
contribution to civil society because the respondent will have more leisure time and 
interest in politics and will provide greater contribution to civil society as more time is 
available for joining organizations and participating in associational activities. These 
forms of activities will make respondents better informed and more participatory in 
various political and associational activities. 
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The income data is difficult to accurately collect as Nicaragua is one of the 
poorest nations in the western hemisphere. Nicaragua also has a large informal economy.  
Participants in this economy may not have an accurate calculation of their monthly 
income, as it may fluctuate greatly from month to month. Respondents may also choose 
to exaggerate or minimize their income due to surveyor interference. To control for 
interference, respondents are also asked:  how many people live in their household 
(DINOP), their employment status (DIEMP2); occupation (DIJOB); whether they live in 
a house or apartment (DILAH); rent or own (DIOWN); whether they have a telephone 
(DITEL), television (DIHTV), refrigerator (DIREF), and radio (DINOR).  The surveyor 
also observed the type of floor (DIFLR) and roof (DIROF) of respondents’ dwellings.  
These variables are used to provide a second measure of income level that may be more 
accurate due to the reduction of surveyor interference. 
Gender (DIGEN) 
 Gender is an important variable in studying political and civil activation in 
traditional societies.  It is further intensified in studies of religion and politics; women 
have been the key impetus for the rise in both Progressive Catholicism and Evangelical 
denominations.  To operationalize this variable, the interviewer observed the gender of 
the individual and coded men as “0” and women as “1”. 
Education Level (DIEDU) 
A final control variable, which is central to understanding the interaction between 
the respondent and civil society, is education.  Theoretically, the greater the educational 
achievement of the respondent, the greater the possibility respondents participate in the 
political process and organizations providing associational activities.  The more educated 
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respondents, the greater interest and knowledge the respondents have and the better 
capable they are to seek out, collect, and analyze information central to making informed 
political decisions in their participatory venues such as voting or seeking solutions to 
society’s ills.  Asking respondents the last year or grade of school they completed 
produces the education variable (DIEDU). The responses were then aggregated into an 
education scale from:  “No formal education (1); “primary education (2)”; “secondary 
education (3)”; “university (4)”; to “formal education beyond university (5).”  Responses 
are coded so that if respondents attended university, but did not graduate; they are coded 
as “university (4)”.  Once again, surveyor interference may cause respondents to 
exaggerate or minimize their educational experience so a second avenue to tap into 
educational levels was created.  
These variables also explore the respondent’s regularity of gathering information 
on political issues, mainly through the press.  Respondents are asked: how often they 
watch the news on television (DINTV); how often they listen to news on the radio 
(DINOR); and the frequency at which they read the newspaper (DIFNP), all on a weekly 
basis.   
Regression Models  
 Variables from the survey are combined in different ways to create multiple linear 
regression models measuring the effects of religion, age, income, and education on the 
different aspects of the three forms of civil society.  Civil Society I represents a 
democratic civil society where participation in associational activities creates positive 
attitudes towards democracy and democratic institution.  Civil Society II represents a 
form of civil society that is anti-regime, or as in the case of the dictator, creates a civil 
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society where the associational activities are aimed at ousting repressive leaders.  Finally, 
Civil Society III is a form of hate-filled civil society where associational activities are 
aimed at a form of hyper-nationalism pitting one group against another usually through 
violent forms of activities (Booth and Richard 2002). 
 Figure 3-1 provides the formula for the multiple regressions conducted in analysis 
of the survey data. 
Figure 3-1:  Formula for Multiple Regressions 
 
Y = a + b1*X1 + b2*X2 + ... + bp*Xp 
 
Traditional Catholic Multiple Regression  
FOCIND = CATDUM + DIGEN + DIAGE1 + DIEDU + DIINF 
 
Progressive Catholic Multiple Regression 
FOCIND = CEBDUM + DIGEN + DIAGE1 + DIEDU + DIINF 
 
Evangelical Multiple Regression 
FOCIND = EVANDUM + DIGEN + DIAGE1 + DIEDU + DIINF 
 
Religiosity Multiple Regression 
FOCIND = RELIGIOSITY+ DIGEN + DIAGE1 + DIEDU + DIINF 
 
Note: The above models are demonstrating the formula using the Formal Civil Society 
Index as the dependent variables.  The formula is repeated for each of the eight civil 
society dependent variables 
 
Civil Society I Models 
If Civil Society I is being developed or encouraged by a specific denomination, 
then positive significant relationships should exist across all of the eight dependent 
variables measuring civil society and its effects.  There should be significant positive 
relationships between religious denomination (CATDUM, CEBDUM, EVANDUM) and: 
Formal Civil Society Index (FOCIND); Informal Civil Society Index (ICSPIN); Political 
Efficacy Index (POLEF); Interpersonal Trust Index (IPTRUST); Political Knowledge 
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Index (PKIND); Belief in Governmental Institutions Index (BGAIND); Confidence in 
Governmental Institutions Index (CIGIND); and Openness of Political Participation 
Index (OPIND). 
Civil Society II Models 
If Civil Society II is being developed through religious associational activities 
then there should be positive significant relationships between religious denomination 
(CATDUM, CEBDUM, EVANDUM) and Informal Civil Society Index (ICSTIN), 
Interpersonal Trust Index (IPTRUST), Political Knowledge Index (PKIND), and 
Openness of Political Participation Index (OPIND). As Civil Society II is known as an 
“anti-regime” form of civil society, then there should be significant negative relationships 
between religious denomination (CATDUM, CEBDUM, EVANDUM) and: Formal Civil 
Society Index (FOCIND), Belief in Governmental Institutions Index (BGAIND), and 
Confidence in Governmental Institutions Index (CIGIND). 
Civil Society III Models 
 If Civil Society III is being developed through religious associational activities 
there should be significant negative relationships between religious denomination 
(CATDUM, CEBDUM, EVANDUM) and Formal Civil Society Index (FOCIND), 
Informal Civil Society Index (ICSPIN), Political Efficacy Index (POLEF), Interpersonal 
Trust Index (IPTRUST), Political Knowledge Index (PKIND), Belief in Governmental 
Institutions Index (BGAIND), Confidence in Governmental Institutions Index (CIGIND), 







 Chapter Four explores the state of civil society in the populous Pacific region of 
Nicaragua during spring and summer of 2003.  It also investigates the eight civil society 
index variables in Nicaragua.  The first section considers the state of formal civil society 
in Nicaragua by surveying membership levels in formal organizations such as sports 
teams, art and educational organizations, labor unions, professional associations, 
environmental organizations, and philanthropic organizations.  The second section 
examines the variables that compose the informal civil society dependent variables.  This 
is an investigation of the degree to which people participate in neighborhood groups and 
the respondent’s propensity to attend, organize, and participate in meetings for solving 
problems of the community and its members.  Informal civil society also looks at the 
other forms of supportive activities such as donating money and materials to resolve the 
problems of the community and its members.   
The third section deals with the effects of participation in civil society such as 
attitudes towards various political institutions and leaders, the amount of confidence the 
respondents have in political institutions, and the belief that the actions of the government 
are correct.  This section also explores the level of support for gradual changes by 
examining the types of political activities the respondents feel are acceptable.   
The State of Formal Civil Society in Nicaragua 
 Civil society in Nicaragua is a study in contrasts.  While vibrancy in civil society 
does exist, mainly through the contributions of the informal sector, the state of formal 
civil society structures and participation outside of religious institutions are not 
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encouraging for the maintenance of democratic political institutions.  Table 4-1 is a 
summary of the index variable for the level of participation in formal organizations, such 
as labor unions, sports teams, educational and arts organizations, and political parties 
provided by the respondent. 
Table 4-1: Summary Table For the Formal Civil Society Index (FOCIND2) 
 Frequency Percentages 
High Formal Civil Society Participation 7 1.2 
Medium-High Formal Civil Society Participation 16 2.7 
Medium Formal Civil Society Participation 36 6 
Medium Low Formal Civil Society Participation 121 20.1 
Low Formal Civil Society Participation 421 70.0 
Total (N) 602  
 
As demonstrated by Table 4-1, 90.1 percent of the respondents exhibited “low” or 
“medium-low” formal civil society participation.   An overwhelming majority of the 
population is either not a member of an official organization or a non-active member.  
According to Almond and Verba (1963) democratic political cultures have a high 
numbers of “participants”, complimented with high numbers of “subjects” and 
“prochials”.  In Nicaragua then the high numbers of “participants” are missing. 
 Lack of formal participation is in part the product of a civil society deficit due to 
the decades of a closed civil society under both the Somoza and Sandinista regimes.  To 
the Somoza dictatorship, especially in its later years, organizing outside the state was 
viewed as a threat to the regime and usually suppressed via force, particularly if the 
organization dealt with political issues.  Conversely, under the FSLN, community or 
neighborhood organizing was a central tenet to their communist ideology.  However, 
state imposed organization automatically takes associational activity out of the realm of 
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civil society. Civil society requires voluntary participation outside the state in order to 
articulate and amass demands made on the state (Brysk 2000; Fukyama 1995; Gellner 
1994; Linz and Stepan 1993).   Today, many view the actions of the Sandinista regime as 
being as repressive as those of the Somoza regime. Respondents occasionally expressed 
that community organizing was an effort to strengthen the FSLN in response to the 
Contra activities rather than enhancing the community. 
Sports, Arts, and Educational Organizations (FOCSR) 
The most popular type of formal civil society participation occurs in sports 
organizations and arts, education, and folkloric groups.  “Active” and “very active” 
members of sports organizations make up 9.9 percent of the total sample population and 
8.3 percent claim to be members of educational or artistic organization.  The most 
popular sport in Nicaragua is baseball, followed by boxing, basketball and soccer.  Sport 
role models like Dennis Martinez, and Roberto Clemente (though not Nicaraguan died 
delivering relief supplies in the wake of the 1972 Nicaraguan earthquake) have made 
baseball the national passion.  Nicaragua has its own professional league, where games 
are often crowded and the season is long12.    
Nicaraguans also exhibit a strong affinity for their culture.  Folk dancing and 
historical interpretations are a major part of Nicaraguan life.  Cities like Granada and 
Masaya have weekly events, known as “La Serenata”.  These events usually begin with a 
number of dances staged by the various regional, youth folkloric groups followed by a 
mix of musicians performing a mix of popular and traditional music.  Events like “La 
                                                 
12 The author attended the 2003 National Championship Game (Granada vs. Leon), which was announced 
only days before the game and sold out in minutes.  The stadium was packed well beyond capacity and 
thousands stood outside in the parking lot to hear the game. 
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Serenata” not only provide a weekly lesson in Nicaraguan culture and history, but also 
offer an enormously popular social activity for the entire city. 13  
Political Parties (FOCPP) 
 The second component of the Formal Civil Society Index (FOCIND) variable 
asks respondents whether they are members of political parties.  Table 4-2 shows that 
only 12.5 percent of the respondents claim to be members of political parties, with 87.5 
percent of the total respondents stating no party membership. 
Table 4-2:  Member of a Political Party (FOCPP) 
 Frequency Percentages 
Very Active Member 6 1 
Active Member 47 7.8 
Somewhat Active Member  9 1.5 
Inactive Member  13 2.2 
Not a Member 527 87.5 
Total (n) 602  
 
Furthermore, only 10.3 percent of the respondents consider themselves to be “active” 
members in their respective parties.  Today, Nicaragua is technically a multi-party 
system, but only three parties are active as a result of strict election laws passed in 1996 
(U. S. Department of State, www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1850.htm).  Parties participating in the 
2001 elections were the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), Liberal 
Constitutional Party (PLC), and the Conservative Party of Nicaragua (PCN).  Despite low 
party membership, elections in Nicaragua stimulate high voter participation.  This 
research found 86.2 percent of the respondents voted in the November 4, 2001 
presidential elections while others sources have reported participation rates over 90 
percent (Schneider 2002; Mihaly 2002).  Suffrage is universal and granted at the age of 
                                                 
13 These “La Serenades” draw thousands of people from the community as well as tourists, who have begun 
flocking to Nicaragua for its natural and cultural beauty as well as for its low prices. 
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16.  The last elections were held November 4, 2001, requiring that respondents to the 
survey to have been 18 in 2003. 
Politically, Nicaragua is a divided country.  Though most Nicaraguans claim no 
party membership, they do express affiliation in terms of left and right as illustrated in 
Table 4-3. 
Table 4- 3:  Left – Right Political Continuum (GCLRC) 
 Frequency Percentage 
10 – Extremely Right  87 14.5 
9 39 3.6 
8 61 10.1 
7 41 6.8 
6 17 2.8 
5 – Center  225 37.4 
4 11 1.8 
3 33 5.5 
2 18 3.5 
1 – Extremely Left 69 11.5 
Total (n) 601  
 
Respondents claiming to be in the center or expressing no political affiliation made up 
37.4 percent of the total sample population, 22.3 percent are supportive of the left and the 
FSLN, and 37.8 percent sympathetic to the right and the PLC and PCN parties.  Party 
affiliation is evident in the make up of the executive and legislative branches of 
government.  The PLC currently controls the executive, with Enrique Bolanos receiving 
52 percent pf the vote compared to the FSLN’s Daniel Ortega’s 42 percent in 2001.  In 
the legislature, “the Liberal Alliance”, a PLC umbrella group consisting of the PLC, 
Nicaraguan Party of the Christian Path (PALI), Independent Liberal Party for National 
Unity (PLUIN), and Central American Unionist Party (PUCA), garnered 46.3 percent of 
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the seats in the unicameral National Assembly compared to the FSLN’s 36.55 percent, 
the National Party for the Christian Road (PCCN)’s 3.73 percent, and the Conservative 
Party of Nicaragua ‘s (PCN) 2.12 percent in 2001(CIA World Fact Book, 2004) 
Labor Unions (FOCLU) 
Labor Unions are an example of formal civil society organizations that were 
muted during the FSLN regime, but are slowly beginning to reassert themselves in 
society.  The Sandinistas came to office claiming that they would enact legislation that 
“…guarentee(s) and promote(s) labor, trade and people’s unions, both in the city and in 
the countryside” (Belli 1986, p. 79).  Prior to the revolution in 1979, the leading labor 
union was the Nicaraguan Confederation of Labor (CTN), with sixty-five thousand 
members.  Other pre-revolutionary unions included the Independent Confederation of 
Labor (CGR-I), Syndicalist Action and Unity Central (CAUS), and the Council of Trade 
Union Unification (CUS), all of which were affiliated with leftist organizations such as 
the Nicaraguan Socialist Party, AFL-CIO, and Maoists (Belli 1986, p. 79-80).  
Once in power, FSLN leaders established the Sandinista Confederation of Labor 
(CST) for urban workers and the Association of Agricultural Workers (ATC) for agrarian 
workers under the slogan “Only one workers’ class, only one trade union” (Belli 1986, p. 
79-81).  Resistance to join the CST and ATC led to harassment of private and 
independent unions by the FSLN.  Acts of harassment carried out by the FSLN consisted 
of the storming of union halls, the jailing of independent union leaders and workers, and 
even mob violence by Sandinista loyalists (Belli 1986, p. 79-83). 
 The creation of Sandinista labor and trade unions and the suppression of 
independent and private organizations created a deficit in this type of civil society 
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participation from which Nicaragua has been slow to recover.  Today, only 5.5 percent of 
the total respondents say they are members of a labor or trade union.  Of these 
respondents, 0.8 percent claim to be “inactive members”, another 0.8 percent are 
“somewhat active members”, and 3.7 percent are “active members” of labor unions.  
Overall, 569, or 94.7 percent of the respondents, stated no affiliation with trade or labor 
unions, which is not surprising given the suppression of independent labor unions.   
Low membership among labor unions may also be attributed to the fact that 50 
percent of Nicaraguans live under the poverty line (CIA World Fact Book, 2004).  
According to the CIA World Fact Book 2004, Nicaragua has an unemployment rate of 24 
percent; this research finds that 37.7 percent of the respondents are either unemployed or 
consider themselves to be out of the workforce (students or ama de casa).  Of the 62.6 
percent of people who claim to be employed, a large number of them are underemployed.  
College graduates can be found selling Cokes or other small products out of their homes 
due to a lack of opportunity to pursue the careers for which they are trained.14 
 Today the most popular type of trade and labor unions are those for transportistas.  
Transportistas are truck, taxi, and bus drivers who are organized into collectives to ease 
the burden of owning and maintaining vehicles that deteriorate quickly on Nicaragua’s 
poor transportation infrastructure.  The government does not provide public 
transportation in a country where automobile ownership is a relatively new phenomenon 
and out of reach for the majority of Nicaraguans.  They rely on transportistas to provide 
them transportation for every day activities.   
                                                 
14 At a number of interview with younger respondents the author was asked to take resumes and curriculum 
vitas back to the Unites States for circulation.  These respondents all had finished study at the university 
level or beyond but have been unable to find work in the fields for which they were trained. 
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A second type of popular trade or labor union is artisan cooperativas or 
collectives, where the majority of Nicaragua’s tourist goods, such as pottery and 
paintings, are produced.   The Pueblos Blancos area is home to a large population of 
artisans.   Creating these products is very taxing on the artisan.  To ease their burden, they 
often organize for the purposes of sales and marketing.  In both transportation and arts 
cooperatives, respondents did not differentiate between these as trade unions or 
professional associations.  
 Outside of small transportation and arts collectives, very little has changed in the 
structure of labor unions since the time of the revolution.  Today, the FSLN controls the 
National Workers Front (FNT), which is an umbrella group of eight labor unions: Farm 
Workers Association (ATC); Health Workers Federation (FETASALUD); Heroes and 
Martyrs Confederation of Professional Associations (CONAPRO); National Association 
of Educators in Nicaragua (ANDEN); National Union of Employees (UNE); National 
Union of Farmers and Ranchers (UNAG); Sandinista Workers Central (CST); and the 
Union of Journalists of Nicaragua (UPN).  A second umbrella union organization, 
independent of the FSLN, is the Permanent Congress of Workers (CPT) that includes the 
Autonomous Nicaraguan Workers Central (CTN-A); Confederation of Labor Unification 
(CUS); Independent General Confederation of Labor (CGTR-I); and Labor Action and 
Unity Central (CAUS).  Independent of these umbrella labor union groups are the 
Nicaraguan Workers’ Central (CTN) and Superior Council of Private Enterprise 
(COSEP) (CIA World Factbook, 2004). 
Professional Associations (FOCPA) 
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 Closely related to trade and labor unions are professional associations, which also 
have been slow to recover from generations of a closed civil society.  Today only 8.2 
percent of the population claim to be “active” or “somewhat active” members of 
Professional Associations, with 0.3 claiming to be “inactive” members and 91.8 percent 
of the total respondents declaring “no” membership or affiliation with professional 
associations.   
The concept of professional associations proved confusing to respondents as 
differences between unions and professional associations may not have been fully 
understood nor articulated.  Today there are a large number of small professional 
associations representing lawyers, doctors, nurses, veterinarians, téchnicos, and 
engineers.  Of the 45 respondents who are “somewhat active” or “very active” members 
of professional associations 17, are from the upper economic class or have family 
incomes of more than 8,000 Córdobas per month, 10 have family incomes between 4,000 
and 8,000 Córdobas per month, and 18 respondents with less than 4,000 Córdobas per 
month.  Thus, income plays only a limited role in determining membership in 
professional associations.  
Environmental Groups (FOCEO) 
 Environmentally, Nicaragua is a mixture of natural beauty coupled with 
environmental tragedy.  In Nicaragua everything, including drinks, are sold in plastic 
bags that litter the roads and streams in every populated area.  Water pollution and the 
dumping of mercury by companies such as Kodak and Electroquímica Pesada (Elpesa) 
have virtually killed Lake Managua (Cuadra 1992; Kaliner and Faber 1988).  In an effort 
to combat environmental problems, a number of small environmental organizations, 
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mainly affiliated with the government, have been established.  The most admired 
environmental organization is the Ministerio Del Ambiente y Recursos Naturales 
(MARENA), which “develops and fosters inter-institutional cooperation for the sharing, 
validation and adoption of methods to protect of water resources; assesses actions to 
protect, control and appropriate use of water resources in various areas” (www.iwrn.net). 
As a governmental organization MARENA is questionable as a provider of civil society 
and membership is not official. Respondents claiming “active” participation in 
MARENA generally based the concept of membership on whether they participated in 
projects and educational forums sponsored by the organization or worked there.   
Ministerio Agropecuario y Forestal (MAGFOR) is another environmental 
organization popular among Nicaraguans.  MAGFOR’s goal is to promote sustainable 
agricultural development as a central tenet to the resurgence and reactivation of the 
Nicaraguan economy (www.magfor.gob, 2003). As a governmental organization, 
MAGFOR uses its resources to prioritize and develop those agricultural products, such as 
coffee, that make up the basis of the Nicaraguan economy.  Where MARENA focuses on 
natural resources, biodiversity, and environmental quality, MAGFOR focuses on 
agriculture and forestry.  As a governmental organization, MAGFOR’s contribution to 
civil society is also limited and membership is not official but based on organizational 
interaction with respondents. 
  Visión Mundial, also known as World Vision International, is “…an international 
Christian relief and development organization working to promote the well being of all 
people - especially children”(www.wvi.org 2004).  Though not purely an environmental 
organization, Visión Mundial does try to improve the immediate environmental and 
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sanitation problems of those assisted by the organization.  Once again, membership is not 
official but based on interaction with the Visión Mundial’s projects and educational 
seminars.  Visión Mundial is an international civil society organization with religious 
affiliation dedicated to improving the situation of the world’s youth.  
Overall, 4.8 percent of the total respondents are at least “somewhat active” 
members of an environmental organization, with 95.2 percent expressing “none” or 
“inactive” membership.  The driving force for membership is age, with most members 
being students as 20 of the 29, or 68 percent, of members of environmental organizations 
are younger than 39 years of age.   
Philanthropic or Charitable Organizations (FOCCP) 
 Membership in philanthropic and charitable organizations is a rarity in Nicaragua.  
To be a member of one of these organizations, a person must have the resources to be 
charitable, which is rare in one of the poorest states in the Western Hemisphere.  Overall, 
3.2 percent of the respondents stated membership in philanthropic and charitable 
organizations.  Surprisingly, 66.7 percent of the respondents claiming membership in a 
philanthropic or charitable organization have family incomes of less than 6,000 Córdobas 
per month, or less than $400 per month.15  This may not be indicative of membership in a 
charitable or philanthropic organization, but most likely affiliation based on receiving 
services.   
The State of Informal Civil Society in Nicaragua 
 The majority of Nicaraguans’ civil society participation occurs in the informal 
sector.  Informal civil society is participation in the resolution of community problems or 
problems of one of its individuals through collective actions and/or the donation of 
                                                 
15 Exchange rates are based on a 15 Córdobas = $1.00, which was the bank rate in June 2003. 
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money and materials outside membership in formal organizations.  Individuals may 
participate in informal civil society by organizing and attending community meetings and 
donating work or money.     
Participation in Informal Civil Society (ICSPIN) 
When asked whether the respondent belongs to a community group or 
organizations in his or her neighborhood, 15.8 percent of the respondents claimed 
affiliation, with 84.2 percent claiming no affiliation (IOCCG). In terms of donating work 
to solve the problems of the problems of the community or one of its members, a 
majority of the sample population, 53.2 percent, has donated some form of work 
(IOCDW).   When asked what type of work they did, answers ranged from assisting the 
sick in getting medical care, raising money for funerals, working with street kids, 
working on infrastructure problems, and broad community issues. The respondents 
overwhelmingly stated that cleaning the neighborhood and street was the most popular 
activity.  Respondents were also asked whether they had attended a meeting to solve 
community problems or the problems of individuals in the community (IOCAM); 43.2 
percent stated they had attended a meeting.  Finally, 25.4 percent of the respondents have 
organized a meeting to help solve community problems or those of one of its members 
(IOCNG).   
These variables were combined to create the Informal Civil Society Participation 
Index (ICSPIN) as shown in Table 4-4. 
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Table 4-4:  Summary Table for Informal Civil Society Participation Index (ICSPIN) 
 Frequency Percentages 
High Participation 40 6.7 
Strong Participation  71 11.8 
Medium Participation 116 19.3 
Low Participation 146 24.3 
Does Not Participate 227 37.8 
Total (N) 600  
 
As demonstrated from the Table 4-4, 37.8 percent of the respondents do not participate in 
informal civil society.  This indicates that the respondents claimed not to have 
participated in any of the four types of associational activities.  On the other end of the 
spectrum, 18.5 percent of the respondents claimed to have participated in at least three of 
the four community activities presented to them.  It is a positive sign that in such an 
impoverished state a large number of its citizens have worked toward societal and 
community improvement in ways that are constructive for the maintenance of democratic 
institutions and development of civil society. 
Support for Informal Civil Society (ICSSIN) 
Support for civil society means that irrespective of their active participation, 
respondents may also provide encouragement for civil society.  Respondents show 
support by trying to resolve community and individual problems (IOCCP) and donating 
money and materials (IOCDM).  Trying to resolve community and individual problems 
(IOCCP) differs from than donating one’s personal work (IOCDW) in that the individual 
may not provide actual labor but has thought about or discussed with others resolutions to 
community and individual issues. 
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Of the respondents, 40.7 percent have attempted to resolve the problems of the 
community or one of its members (IOCCP).   With such a high percentage of the 
population involving themselves in the community and the lives of its members, activity 
and socializing is taking place.  Nicaraguan society is intimate, with tight social 
connections renowned for gossip, making large cities of 80,000 seem like small towns.  
Giving is another popular associational activity as an overwhelming 65.3 percent have 
donated money and/or materials to solve community and individual problems.  Donations 
include giving a few Córdobas, contribute construction materials for housing projects, 
providing clothing, and even giving scraps of left over food to street kids begging door to 
door and in restaurants.   
One of the most fascinating observations is the willingness of Nicaraguans with 
very little to give to those with even less.  For example, Granada has a large population of 
street kids who depend solely on scraps of food given to them by people eating in 
restaurants. While many of these street kids die from the effects of sniffing glue, murder, 
or accidents at young ages, very few, at least in Granada, appear malnourished. 16  
Managua is a different story, with a large number of street children living together in 
parks and vacant lots.17  Managua’s street kids appear in much worse shape, some 
showing symptoms of malnourishment, given increased competition among them and 
fewer interactions with sympathetic tourists in addition to the separation between the 
wealthy and poor found in the large and erratically constructed city. 
                                                 
16 During the author’s stay in Nicaragua, living with Donna Tabor, who works daily with street kids, two of 
them were murdered either by adults or other street kids, a few were seriously injured in traffic accidents, 
and a couple also simply disappeared, possibly traveling to other cities.  
17 One respondent showed the surveyor a park on the outskirts of El Jardín in Managua, where 30 to 40 
street kids were lying like around fallen soldiers holding baby jars of shoe glue.  Some appeared 
malnourished and were being attended to by international volunteers for wounds such as cuts on their feet. 
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The two civil society support variables are combined to create the Informal Civil 
Society Support Index (ICSSIN2) as shown on Table 4-5. 
Table 4-5:  Summary Table for Informal Civil Society Support Index (ICSSIN) 
 Frequency Percentages 
High Levels of Support 192 31.9 
Medium Levels of Support 254 42.2 
Low Levels of Support 156 25.9 
Total (N) 604  
 
This table shows that 74.1 of the sample respondents exhibit “medium” to “high” 
informal civil society support.  These respondents demonstrated concern and made at 
least some attempt to improve society through peaceful means.  It also shows that 74.1 
percent of the respondents at one time or another have had hope or the belief that a small 
action could improve society and interacted enough with other individuals to know that 
problems exist.  The hope or patience for peaceful resolution appears positive for the 
maintenance of Nicaragua’s domestic political structures. 
Informal Civil Society Index (ICSTIN) 
 
 To get an overall view of the state of informal civil society in Nicaragua the 
variables in the Informal Civil Society Support Index (ICSSIN) and those in the Informal 
Civil Society Participation Index (ICSPIN) are combined to produce the Informal Civil 












Table 4-6:  Summary Table for Informal Civil Society Participation and Support 
Index (ICSTIN) 
 Frequency Percentages 
Low Levels of Support and Participation 204 34.2 
Medium Levels of Support and Participation 306 51.2 
High Levels of Support and Participation 87 14.6 
Total (N) 597  
 
When compared to the Formal Civil Society Index (FOCIND), this table shows that civil 
society participation and support is strong in Nicaragua, however it is unorganized.  
Overwhelmingly, the types of civil society and associational activities taking place are 
informal or locally oriented.  Community or neighborhood improvements are the most 
common form of associational activities taking place.  Activities usually focused on 
infrastructure needs such as street repairs, housing issues, and cleaning the neighborhood.  
Essentially, communities at the barrio level take up activities that would normally be left 
to the state in economically developed countries.  Neighborhood groups tended to be 
structured around a neighborhood "jefe" or president and a committee rather than within 
religious or other types organizations.  These structures do appear to be a positive 
residual of the earlier FSLN form of organizing.  These micro organizations deal not only 
with infrastructure issues, but also help raise funds from the neighborhood for things like 
funeral costs, medical costs, and hospital transportation.  Neighborhood organizations are 
successful for the most part, as 74.1 percent of the respondents acknowledged having 
made some type or contribution. 
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Effects of Civil Society Support and Participation 
 What are the effects of these interactions?  How do these interactions affect 
attitudes towards the democratic system?  Are people being socialized into accepting a 
democratic regime as a form of government?  
 Political Efficacy (POLEF) 
 Political efficacy measures the level to which the respondent feels his or her 
participation in the political process affects the conduct of government.  In a measure of 
the level to which the respondent feels they have access to public officials, 40.2 percent 
of the respondents either “agree” or “strongly agree” that they feel comfortable asking for 
the help or cooperation of a member of the national assembly (PEHNC). An even larger 
55.9 percent of the respondents feel comfortable asking the mayor of their city or town or 
his/her representative for help or cooperation (PEMMO).  It is encouraging for the 
maintenance of democratic institutions as a majority of the population feel they have 
access to some venue of government to make demands and raise grievances on the state. 
 As an overall measure of whether this access affects the conduct of government, 
63.3 percent either “strongly disagreed” or “disagreed” that the government was 
responding to the needs of society (PERNS).  It is discouraging that an overwhelming 
majority feels that even though they make demands on government the state does not 
respond.  However, the question of responding is not a simple answer, especially given 
the level of poverty.   Do Nicaraguans believe that the government, is simply not 
responding to society or is government responding the best it can with the resources 
available to it?  
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 To answer this question, the respondent was asked whether the country is run for 
the benefit of a few or in the interest of society as a whole (PEGFP).  Of the respondents, 
68.6 percent feel the government is run in the interests of a few individuals. A minority, 
31.2 percent of the respondents, considers government to be run in the best interest of 
society.  From these figures it is evident that respondents feel the government is choosing 
not to answer the needs of citizens, rather than not being incapable due to lack of 
resources.   Distrust in the motives of government is not unexpected, given Nicaragua’s 
history with autocracy under the Somozas and the oligarchy of the Sandinistas.  The 
history of state structures in the surrounding states of Honduras, El Salvador, and 
Guatemala also illustrate the democratic deficit in the region, as domestic political 
institutions have rarely been mechanisms run in the interests of society as a whole. 
Finally, the respondent is asked if his or her vote and participation in the electoral 
system is important (PEVPI).  This measures the respondents overall feeling of affect in 
deciding on their representatives.   A majority of 88.2 percent of the respondents feel 
their vote and participation in the electoral system is important. The respondents trust the 
election mechanism even though the majority of the respondents do not consider that the 
government is being run in the best interest of society. 
The divergence among respondents between effectiveness choosing 
representatives with the belief those representatives do not govern in the best interest of 
society points to the concept of “personalism” or “Presidencialismo” common in Latin 
America.  Ai Camp’s (1999, p. 11-13) examination of the Mexican system found that the 
“viceroy” system, which governing structure in most of Latin America during 
colonialism, led to a belief in personalism or “Presidencialismo”.   Personalism consists 
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of beliefs that state institutions mean little and all government outputs, good or bad, result 
directly from the executive. Overall, 68.6 percent of the respondents do not believe 
people in government are trustworthy, but 88.2 percent of the respondents feel their vote 
and participation in the electoral system is important, indicating a trust in governmental 
institutions.  In short, Nicaraguans may trust democratic institutions even if they do not 
trust the individuals running those institutions.   
An additive index of these variables, as demonstrated in Table 4-7, provides a 
general measure of political efficacy (POLEF). 
Table 4-7:  Summary Table for Political Efficacy Index (POLEF) 
 Frequency Percentage 
High Political Efficacy 33 5.9 
Medium High Political Efficacy 197 32.7 
Medium Political Efficacy 179 32.2 
Medium Low Political Efficacy 128 23 
Low Political Efficacy 19 3.4 
Total (N) 556  
 
A 70.8 percent majority of the respondents have at least a “medium” sense of political 
efficacy, or believe their democratic expressions have an effect on the conduct of 
government.  This is encouraging for democracy, as the majority believes their 
participation has an impact, irrespective of their beliefs about the intent or ability of 
politicians.  
Political Knowledge Index (PKIND)  
 
 With a large percentage of the respondents feeling that their participation in the 
electoral system is important, the next issue is whether these respondents are making 
informed decisions.  To measure the level of knowledge about politics, respondents were 
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asked whether they could name the President of Nicaragua (PKPRN) and the mayor of 
their city or town (PKMCT), as a measure of domestic political knowledge, and the 
president of the United States as a measure of foreign political knowledge (PKPUS).  
Political knowledge is high in Nicaragua, with 96.8 of the respondents identifying the 
President of Nicaragua, 92.2 percent identifying their mayor, and 78.7 percent identifying 
the President of the United States.  Political knowledge in general, as shown in Table 4-8, 
illustrates the political sophistication of the respondents. 
Table 4-8:  Summary Table for Political Knowledge Index (PKIND) 
 Frequency Percentages 
High Political Knowledge 434 72.3 
Medium Political Knowledge 142 23.7 
Low Political Knowledge 23 4 
Total (N) 600  
 
 
An amazing 72.3 percent of the population could name all three of the political figures 
and 23.7 percent could name two of the three.  Overall, 96 percent of the respondents 
exhibited “high” or “medium” levels of political knowledge.  Nicaraguans do engender a 
sophisticated political knowledge and actively seek information regarding politics, as 
78.5 percent of the respondents claim to watch the news on TV daily and another 14.5 
percent watch it two or three times a week.   At least two times a week, 93 percent of the 
population receives news about politics and events from which to create attitudes and 
beliefs about government and the way the world should work. 
Interpersonal Trust (IPTRUST)  
 The next relationship of inquiry is to measure the effects of civil society 
interactions and political knowledge on the level of trust respondent have in other 
individuals.  Of the respondents, only 27.4 percent “agree” that people are generally 
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trustworthy (IPTGT) and 39.3 percent “agree” that most of the time people try to help 
others (IPTHO).   Twenty-nine percent feel that most of the time people do not try to take 
advantage of them (IPTNA).  An astounding 78.3 percent of the respondents feel that if 
given a chance most people will try to take advantage of them (IPTTA).  Earning a living 
in Nicaragua is a difficult task, especially given that 40 percent of all Nicaraguans living 
under the poverty line, with high underemployment and unemployment (CIA World 
Factbook 2004).   Chances to earn Córdobas are limited, and many Nicaraguans will 
make the most of any opportunity.  As evidence of this phenomenon, 83.4 percent of the 
respondents agreed or strongly agreed that most of the time people only worry about 
themselves (IPTWP). 
 To create a general measure of interpersonal trust, three variables (IPTGT; 
IPTHO, IPTNA) assessing the level of trust in other individuals were added together 
creating the Interpersonal Trust Index (IPTRUST4), shown on Table 4-9. 
Table 4-9:  Summary Table for Interpersonal Trust Index (IPTRUST) 
 Frequency Percentages 
High Interpersonal Trust 10 1.8 
Medium High Interpersonal Trust 71 12.5 
Medium Interpersonal Trust 313 55.2 
Medium Low Interpersonal Trust 145 25.6 
Low Interpersonal Trust 28 4.9 
Total (N) 567  
 
  
Similar to the attitudes toward politicians, Nicaraguans do not hold high levels of trust in 
other individuals.  A vast majority of 85.7 percent of the respondents exhibited “medium” 
to “low” levels of interpersonal trust.  This phenomenon appears to be a result of 
economic hardships and desperation experienced by many Nicaraguans on a daily basis. 
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To a North American in Nicaragua, prices at the beginning of the field research were 
much higher than at the end, as bargaining is expected for even the smallest of items in 
the cities, markets.  In this sense, each purchase begins with an inflated price so that the 
seller can get the highest price the buyer is willing to pay.  Each transaction involves the 
seller trying to take advantage of the buyer.  The more often these interactions occur, the 
more socialized they become; thus the seller trying to take advantage of the buyer and 
vice versa is a fact of everyday life.  Over time these transactions become a codified part 
of everyday life and may be one cause, or consequence, for the general lack of trust 
between individuals. 
Attitudes Toward Governmental Institutions  
 How does this lack of trust for individuals translate into trust for governmental 
institutions?  To gauge the level of trust for governmental institutions, the respondents 
were asked both about the confidence they have in these institutions (PIENC1-10) and 
whether they believe the actions of governmental institutions are correct (PET--).  
Belief That the Actions of Government Are Correct (BGAIND) 
Beliefs that the actions of the Nicaraguan government are correct, in both the 
individual variables and the index, show that the majority of the respondents express a 
medium to low belief.  Of the respondents, 84.9 percent feel, at best, the actions of the 
National Assembly (PETRG) are correct “some of the time,” with 52.7 percent stating the 
National Assembly is correct “almost never” or “never”.  Results for the President of 
Nicaragua, Enrique Bolaños, are slightly better with 78 percent stating his actions are 
correct at least “some of the time” and only 39 percent expressing “almost never” or 
“never” (PETFG).   City, Municipal, or local governments receive the best ratings, but 
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only slightly, with 75.5 percent of the respondents stating their actions are correct at least 
“some of the time” and 37.1 percent stating “almost never” or “never”(PETNG).  When 
asked about the actions of the Nicaraguan Government as a whole, 86.4 percent of the 
respondents claimed its actions were only correct “some of the time,” with 37.4 percent 
stating “almost never” or “never” (PETLG). 
These four variables are combined to create the Belief That the Actions of 
Government are Correct Index (BGAIND) as illustrated in Table 4-10. 
Table 4-10:  Summary Table for Belief That Government Actions Are Correct 
Index (BGAIND) 
 Frequency Percentages 
High Belief Government Actions Are Correct. 15 2.9 
Medium High Belief Government Actions Are Correct 58 11 
Medium Belief Government Actions are Correct 235 44.7 
Medium Low Belief Government Actions are Correct  141 26.8 
Low Belief Government Actions Are Correct 77 14.6 
Total 526  
 
 
As noted from the table, Nicaraguan’s belief in the correctness of governmental 
institutions is relatively low.  A meager 13.9 percent of the respondents demonstrate a 
“medium-high” or “high” belief that the actions of their government are correct.  
Nicaraguan skepticism about government institutions is to be expected with a political 
history ripe with political figures like the Somozas and even Ortega who have used the 
government to enrich their own lives and political capital.  Through informal 
conversations with many of the respondents, the only administration that met with 
positive reception was that of former President Violetta Chamorro.  With Nicaragua’s 
most recent former president, Arnoldo Alemán, under house arrest for stealing millions 
from government coffers and Daniel Ortega increasingly under criticism for leaving 
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nothing in the government budget upon his departure from office, seeing a democratic 
government as an institution for the people rather than for those in power is an extremely 
elusive concept. 
Confidence in Government Institutions (CIGIND)  
A second line of inquiry to gauge public attitudes towards governmental 
institutions, as well as non-governmental institutions, asks respondents to state their level 
of confidence in each institution.  The level of confidence is even more discouraging for 
the maintenance of democratic political institutions than the belief that their actions are 
correct.  According to Ai Camp (1999, 56) the level of confidence one has in the police 
force is an important indicator for government institutions as a whole, because it is with 
the police that potential respondents will have the greatest contact.  In Nicaragua the 
police (PEINC7) are the second highest governmental organization in terms of 
confidence, with only 51 percent of the respondents expressing “little” or “no” 
confidence.  The educational system (PEINC3) receives the highest marks, with only 
25.1 percent stating “little” or “no” confidence.  The National Assembly (PEINC8) 
receives the least amount of confidence, with 66.2 percent of the population expressing 
“little” or “no” confidence.  The judicial or legal system (PEINC4) does not fare much 
better, with 58.4 percent of the respondents expressing “little” or “no” confidence.  The 
respondents also show little confidence in the President, with 53.2 percent of the 
population claiming “little” or “no” confidence.  Finally, when asked about the political 
system as a whole (PEINC10), 69 percent of the respondents claim “little” or “no” 
confidence.   
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 Based on the analysis of these individual variables, there is little confidence in the 
political institutions.  Table 4-11 indexes these variables in the creation of the level of 
Confidence in Governmental Institutions Index (CIGIND): 
Table 4-11:  Summary Table for Confidence in Governmental Institutions 
(CIGIND) 
 Frequency Percentages 
High Confidence in Governmental Institutions 14 2.6 
Medium High Confidence in Governmental Institutions 86 16.1 
Medium Confidence in Governmental Institutions 180 33.6 
Medium Low Confidence in Governmental Institutions 142 26.5 
Low Confidence in Governmental Institutions  113 21.1 
Total 535  
 
 
As is evident from the table, 47.6 percent of the respondents demonstrate “low” to 
“medium-low” confidence in governmental institutions, with 33.6 percent showing 
“medium” confidence.  Moreover, only 18.7 percent of the respondents showed 
“medium-high” or “high” confidence in governmental institutions.  Once again, this is the 
result of socialized distrust of the government that accompanies civil wars and the 
indoctrination of oligarchic and autocratic regimes.  Another factor contributing to 
distrust or lack of confidence in governmental institutions has to do with the politicians 
themselves.  Nicaraguans constantly express the distrust they feel about politicians 
because of the large gap between what a politician promises and what they are able to 
accomplish.  This is due to the unattainable promises made by those running for political 
office, leading to a rise in expectations.  Nicaraguans have extremely high expectations of 
the government and tend to be consistently disappointed in the ability of the government 
to meet the demands of society. 
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 Low confidence levels are primarily directed towards governmental institutions as 
non-governmental institutions tend to be held in higher regard.  When asked to indicate 
the level of confidence in the church or denomination (PEINC2) the respondent attends, 
67.7 percent indicated “quite a lot” or “total” confidence.  However, when asked about 
the Nicaraguan Catholic Church (PEINC1), only 49 percent express “quite a lot” or “total 
confidence.” This discrepancy appears to be the result of the Nicaraguan Catholic 
Church’s role in politics.  Archbishop Obando y Bravo has been a political figure in 
Nicaragua on both sides, initially as a mediator between the FSLN and the Somozas, and 
then as an opponent of the Sandinista ideology.  The Traditional Catholic Church’s role 
in politics means that its status as a non-governmental institution is called into question.  
Furthermore, when respondents had converted to other religions, one of the primary 
reasons given for the conversion was opposition to the political role of the Catholic 
Church. 
 Large corporations and major companies (PEINC9) also do not engender high 
levels of confidence from Nicaraguans, as 56.8 percent of the respondents convey “little” 
to “no” confidence.  Unemployment and underemployment are high, and little benefit is 
seen from most foreign owned companies due to the Marxist indoctrination during the 
Sandinista regime viewing them as imperialistic. For example, the Sandinista literacy 
campaign of 1980, which reduced illiteracy by 50 percent to less than ten percent by 
1983, was criticized for Marxist and communist indoctrination due to their goal of raising 
“political literacy” (Walker 2003, p. 127-128) The unacceptable and exploitive conduct 
of foreign-owned and multinational corporations, dating back to Cornelius Vanderbilt 
and William Walker, has added to their poor reception.  Corporations receiving high 
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praise are Victoria, Toña, and Flor De Caña, which are Nicaraguan-owned and the most 
visible, sponsoring a huge number of events from volleyball and baseball games to 
various cultural events.     
The press (PEINC5) is a valued institution receiving, the highest approval with 
36.7 percent of the respondents stating “high” to “total confidence” and only 30.1 percent 
expressing “little” to “no” confidence.  The press is dominated by its major daily 
newspapers La Prensa, the conservative paper, and El Nuevo Diario, the most widely 
read, sensational, and Centrist of the papers. This is encouraging because it illustrates the 
value Nicaraguans place on the freedom of expression and finding a diversity of 
information.   
Support for Gradual Change 
Support for gradual change measures the respondent’s patience for the 
performance of the current democratic regime.  Over 85 percent of the population 
“agreed” or “strongly agreed” that society should be improved gradually through reforms 
(GCGIR).  This is encouraging, as Nicaraguans are expressing patience in allowing the 
government time to implement its programs.  However, Nicaraguans are fearful of a 
return to civil conflict; thus fear of political decay may be a better explanation for this 
level of tolerance.  The respondent is also asked to state their impression of the level of 
economic progress occurring in Nicaragua as an indicator of government performance 
(GCAEP).  Thirty-nine percent of the respondents stated Nicaragua was experiencing 
“bad” or “very bad” economic growth, with 50.3 percent expressing “Más O Menos” 
economic growth and 8 percent saying “good” or “very good” economic growth.  This is 
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encouraging as at least a majority of the respondents felt that some progress was being 
made. 
Respondents are also asked about the level of support for rapid change or for 
some sort of revolutionary action.  Support for the actions of revolutionaries is 
noteworthy, with 23.4 percent showing support and 68.1 percent of the respondents 
claiming they  “disagree” or ”strongly disagree” with the idea of changing society 
through the actions of revolutionaries (GCSRC).  Of the respondents, 87.3 percent feel 
Nicaraguan society should be defended against al subversive forces (GCDAS).  
Furthermore, 84.6 percent of the respondents “agree” or “strongly agree” that a priority 
of the central government should be to maintain stability and order (GCSSO).  Once 
again, these numbers do not necessarily illustrate support for a democratic regime, but a 
strong desire to avoid political or social conflict.  Nicaraguans want the government to 
provide answers even if that government does not do it as rapidly as the respondents 
would like.  The strong support for stability and order and call for defense against 
subversive forces trying to upset the current regime demonstrates the Nicaraguan desire 
for political stability and the lengths to which they would go to ensure it.  
Alternative Political Expression Tolerance Index (APIEND) 
Political expression is one aspect of democracy that is well institutionalized in 
Nicaragua, however, tolerance for all forms of expression is not equally distributed.  Of 
the respondents, 73.4 percent “agree” or “strongly agree” that signing a petition is an 
acceptable form of political expression (GCPPA).  A further 83.4 percent also “agree” or 
“strongly agree” that attending “lawful” demonstrations is an acceptable form of political 
expression (GCLDA).  Both forms of political expression are relatively common forms 
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that, generally, have little potential to erupt into violence or upset the current regime.  
However, more extreme forms of political expression are frowned upon.  Overall, 74.5 
percent “disagree” or “strongly disagree” with acceptance of joining a boycott (GCOBA) 
and 83.5 percent “disagree” that occupying buildings and factories is an acceptable form 
of political expression (GCPBA) 
These variables have been combined in an additive index called the Alternative 
Political Expression Tolerance Index (APEIND2), as demonstrated in Table 4-12.  
Table 4-12:  Summary Table for Tolerance of Alternative Political Expression Index 
(APIEND) 
 Frequency Percentages 
High Tolerance 4 .8 
Medium High Tolerance 79 18.8 
Medium Tolerance 276 55.1 
Medium Low Tolerance 133 26.5 
Low Tolerance 9 1.8 
Total (N) 501  
 
Of the respondents, 55.1 percent exhibit a “medium” level of tolerance, while 28.3 
percent have “medium-low” or “low” levels of trust.  These low levels are driven by the 
lack of tolerance in extreme forms of expression.  Overall, tolerance of pacific forms of 
expression is high, but once the possibility of confrontation emerges, tolerance levels 
plummet.  A problem with the study is that a boycott in Nicaragua essentially means a 
strike rather than refusal to buy a product or use a service as an expression of political 
beliefs. The potential for political violence during a strike is believed to be high, 
according to the respondents. 
Openness of Political Participation Index (OPINDX) 
A third line of inquiry asks respondents to indicate their level of agreement with 
the rights of individuals expressing negative views about government to participate in the 
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political system.  Overall, 56.5 percent of the respondents “agree” with their right to vote 
(GCSVV) and 75.8 “agree” with the right to hold lawful demonstrations for individuals 
who have only negative things to say about government (GCSSD). Furthermore, 68.1 
percent of the respondents at least “agree” with the right of people expressing negative 
views about the government to make public appearances on television for the purpose of 
expressing their views (GCSRS).  From this evidence it is clear that the majority of 
Nicaraguans agree with the rights of individuals with negative attitudes toward 
government to express themselves.  However, when it comes to allowing them to run for 
political office, Nicaraguans are less tolerant.  A minority, 44.4 percent of the 
respondents, “disagree” or “strongly disagree” with the right of individuals with negative 
attitudes toward the government to run for public office, with 48.7 percent of the 
respondents believing these individuals should have the right (GCSPO).  Nicaraguans are 
very tolerant when it comes to expression but the desire for political stability will at times 
override individual rights, thus providing some support for the use of oppressive 
measures.  As a whole, Table 4-13 shows an index of political tolerance for those 
expressing negative views toward government. 
Table 4-13:  Openness of Political Participation for Those Expressing Negative 
Views (OPINDX) 
 Frequency Percentages 
High Levels of Openness 76 13.4 
Medium High Levels of Openness 260 45.8 
Medium Levels of Openness 116 20.4 
Medium Low Levels of Openness 111 19.5 
Low Levels of Openness 5 .9 
Total 568  
 
Table 4-13 shows that 59.2 percent of the respondents exhibit “high” or “medium- high” 
levels of openness in the political system for those expressing negative attitudes toward 
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the government.  In the experience of the author, most Nicaraguans were critical of the 
government, but confident in the regime and their rights to criticize.  Many interviews 
went longer than an hour as respondents were eager to express their feelings toward 
government, both positive and negative.  Both the evidence and research experience 
demonstrates that freedom of expression is a well-institutionalized belief in the political 
structures; however, given the history of political violence in Nicaragua most respondents 
expressed less tolerance for political expression that could result in civil unrest.  It is a 
delicate balance Nicaraguans carry in terms of the political values to provide the freedom 
for expression but also the need for stability by limiting some liberties to ensure order in 
the nation.   
Control Variables 
Economic Rank (DIINF) 
 Of the 602 respondents, 437 knew their personal monthly income (DIINC) and 
430 knew their family’s monthly income (DIINCF).  Based on these responses the 
average personal monthly income (DIINC) among the sample population is 2,291.37 
Córdobas per month or $152.76 (U.S.).18  The average family income per month 
(DIINCF) was 4,521.56 Córdobas or $301.44 (U.S.) per month.19 The respondents are 
asked to provide a “minimum income” to control for observer intervention.  Nicaraguans 
working in the informal sector, like commerciantes, and many in the formal economy, 
such as transportistas, may have inconsistent monthly incomes due to fluctuations in the 
market from seasonal tourists or weather conditions affecting numbers of consumers.  
                                                 
18 Monthly personal income (DIINC) is translated into U.S. dollars based on a 15.00 Córdobas for each $1.  
This was the exchange rate during the majority of the field research in the spring and summer of 2003. 
19 According to the CIA World Factbook (2004) GDP per capita (PPP) is $2,300.  However, according to 
the 2001 Country Reports on Economic Policy and Trade Practices released by the U.S. Department of 
States, February 2002, finds the GDP per capita in real U.S. Dollars to be $468.00. 
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Underrepresented in this research may be the extreme ends of the economic 
spectrum.  The wealthy were extremely difficult to access as it was challenging to 
negotiate an interview through their domestic or security employees.  On the other end of 
the spectrum, urban impoverished neighborhoods proved too dangerous due to increased 
gang activity, making assistance in these barrios impossible to find. There are now a total 
of 62 gangs in urban Nicaragua with over 1000 members, which is small in comparison 
to 14,000 members in Guatemala, 10,500 in El Salvador, and 36,000 in Honduras 
(Rogers 2004).  The rise in gang activity has been attributed to an increased number of 
expelled Nicaraguans importing the “gang lifestyle” from U.S. cities like Miami and Los 
Angeles, as well as disaffection among the youth brought on by the processes of 
“democratization” and “demilitarization” occurring in the wake of Central American civil 
wars (Rodgers 2002; Lydersen 2004).20  
Table 4-14:  Summary Table for Minimum Family Monthly Income (DIINF) 
 Frequency Percentages 
8001 + C (Upper Income) 60 12.5 
6001 – 8000 C. (Upper Middle Income)  15 3.1 
4001 – 6000 C. (Middle Income)  67 13.9 
2001 – 4000 C. (Middle Lower Income) 145 30.1 
0 – 2000 (Lower Income)  194 40.1 
Total (N) 481  
 
Table 4-15 shows 40.1 percent of those respondents, who provided a monthly family 
income, were in the “Lower” economic class, with an additional 30.1 percent answering 
in the “Middle-Lower” economic class.  These respondents have an average monthly 
                                                 
20 The researcher was unable to find research assistants who would enter some of the more impoverished 
neighborhoods due to the fear of gangs. 
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family income of less than $267 per month.21  With an average household containing 6.12 
(DINOP) people, each individual receives around $43 per month for all living expenses. 
 While income is an important indicator of economic base or class, other factors 
are important for quality of life.  One interesting and surprising aspect of Nicaraguan life 
is the large numbers of homeowners.  Of the respondents providing answers, an 
astounding 84.4 percent own their own house, with only 14.8 percent renting (DIOWN).  
High homeownership rates are attributed mainly to the redistribution policies of the 
Sandinistas and many generations living in the same household, shown through the large 
numbers of people per household.  The largest number of people in a single household 
was 23, and 24.5 percent of the households had more than 10 people (DINOP).  Some of 
these numbers were astounding, given the majority of houses visited consisted of only 
one or two rooms divided by makeshift walls.  For example, 84.9 percent of the houses 
had roofs made of aluminum sheets (DIROF), and 46.9 percent had floors made of dirt or 
concrete (DIFLR). Household luxuries are rare, with a minority 48.1 percent of the 
respondents owning telephones (DITEL) and small majority of 50.8 percent owning 
refrigerators (DIREF).    
One comfort enjoyed by almost all Nicaraguans is television, as 95.3 percent 
(DIHTV) of the respondents were observed to have television sets.  Even in houses 
without electricity, it was common to find a small black and white set connected to a 
large battery.  Television viewing is a family activity and telenovelas (Latin America’s 
version of soap operas), variety, and evening news programs are particularly popular. 
Age (DIAGE1) 
                                                 
21 This figure was created by dividing 4000 Córdobas by 15 (Exchange Rate) to create an income in US 
Dollars.  This is not Purchase Power Parity.  
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 Theoretically, age structure is an important explanatory variable for participation 
in civil society.  For example, Putnam’s (2000, 247-276) analysis of civil society in the 
United States found that participation varied greatly by generation, with the World War II 
generation being the most active.  The Nicaraguan age structure is vastly different than 
the United States, and the discontinuous political development experienced by 
Nicaragua’s older generations may produce a dissimilar view of civil society.  According 
to the CIA World Factbook (2004), 38.5 percent of the population are below the age of 
14; 58.9 percent are between the ages of 15 and 64; and 3 percent are above the age of 
65, with an overall median age of 20.2.  For the purposes of this research and in keeping 
with Internal Review Board protocol, all respondents were over the age of 18, with a 
mean age of 39.34 and median age of 37 (DIAGE).22   As Table 4-15 shows, respondents 
over the age of 62 made up 9.5 percent of the population, meaning the age structure may 
be skewed to overrepresent the older population.  Regardless, a majority, 55.1 percent, 
are below the age of 40 and an overall 32.1 percent are between 18 and 28 years of age.    
Table 4-15:  Summary Table for Age (DIAGE1) 
 Frequency Percentages 
1985-1975 / 18-28 years old 193 32.1 
1974-1964 / 29-39 years old 138 23 
1963-1953 / 50-40 years old 129 21.5 
1952-1942 / 51-61 years old 84 14 
1941 + / 62 + years old 57 9.5 
Total (601) 601  
 
 
The surveys were conducted almost exclusively during weekdays meaning that those 
beyond their productive working ages may be overrepresented.     Women may also be 
                                                 
22 Median year born is 1966 and Mean year born 1963 (DIAGE).  (Median = 1966-2003; Mean = 1963-
2003) 
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slightly overrepresented, as according to the CIA World Factbook (2004) women make 
up 50 percent of the overall population and this research found women to compose 51 
percent of the sample population.  It was originally believed overrepresentation of 
women would be the result of conducting surveys during work hours where in traditional 
societies women are much less likely to enter the formal workforce.  However, high 
underemployment rates and limited hours of work means that even working individuals 
were likely to be in the residence at any point and time. 
Education Level (DIEDU) 
 Educational attainment through public institutions became a right under Article 58 
of the 1990 Constitution, where it had previously been a privilege.  Though the 1990 
Constitution (Article 58) provides for free public education, the education is hardly free.  
For the average Nicaraguan attending a public school, costs run about $100 U.S. dollars 
per year for uniforms and books, not to mention the loss of income from having a family 
member working in the informal economy.23  Table 4-16 shows the educational 
attainment of the sample population.   
Table 4-16:  Summary Table for Educational Attainment (DIEDU) 
 Frequency Percentages 
Post – University 8 1.3 
University / Technical 178 29.7 
Secondary  230 38.3 
Primary 139 23.2 
No School 45 7.5 
Total (N) 601  
 
 
                                                 
23 The research assistant hired for this research, an intelligent young man, had dropped out of the 9th grade 
claiming no real need for education because of the powerlessness in finding work and the inability to raise 
the necessary funds needed for educational attainment.  Paid 100 Córdobas per day, or roughly $6.67 U.S. 
dollars made him the strongest contributor to the family income, but still not sufficient to ensure returning 
to school, especially given the temporary nature of his employment. 
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Of the 45 respondents who never received any formal education, 62 percent were above 
the age of 50.  Furthermore, of the 184 respondents having a primary education or less, 
48.4 percent were above the age of 50.  This is significant, as overall respondents over 
the age of 50 make up only make up 23.5 percent of the sample population.  Though the 
younger generations have attained greater educational achievement due to increased 
access to educational institutions under the Sandinistas and the democratic regime in 
place since 1990, educational attainment as a proportion of society has begun to decline 
in recent years, as shown below. 
 The majority of the Nicaraguan population is young and educated.  Given these 
two facts, it would appear that this younger generation is in the best position to develop 
Nicaragua into stable, democratic state.  However, the field experience also brings to 
light the difficulties these same educated youth must cope with in a depressed economy 
where 50 percent of the population lives below the poverty line (CIA World Factbook, 
2004).  The disaffection of educated individuals unable to find the work in the disciplines 
they were trained is sending a message to those approaching and enrolled in secondary 
education that the time and expense of education may not be worth the immediate 
economic relief provided to larger family units by working in the informal economic 
sectors selling candy, fruits and nuts by the unit.  As a result the number of students 
dropping out of educational institutions has been rising over the last decade.   
According to World Bank Statistics (2003) the level of educational attainment 
among people 15 to 19 years of age to the proportion of this total age group plummets 
from 90 percent attending the first grade to a mere 23.9 percent reaching the ninth grade, 
suggesting high drop out rates.   Between the first and ninth grades among people ages 15 
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to 19, 66 percent of the population drop out of school, compared to 48 percent of those 
between the ages of 20-29; 50 percent between the ages of 30 to 39; and 49 percent 
between the ages of 40 to 49.  The overall numbers receiving educational opportunities 
has risen, but the proportion of educational attainment between age groups finds that drop 
out rates are much higher today than among previous generations.  This disaffection 
could have negative affects on both civil society and the health of democratic electoral 






Chapter Five examines religious affiliation and levels of religiosity in Nicaragua.  
It begins with an investigation of denominational affiliations and a discussion of the 
difficulties categorizing individuals by denomination.  Second, a number of variables are 
explored to determine whether religious denomination and religiosity, the importance of 
God in one’s life, are significant for participation in civil society and support for the 
maintenance of democratic institutions.    
 The second section of the chapter is a multivariate analysis of religious 
denominations and religiosity and the degree to which religion is explains the types and 
forms of civil society at work in Nicaragua today.  Religiosity and religious 
denominations are compared with age, education, and economic level to determine 
whether there are any significant relationships with the creation of a civil society capable 
of establishing and maintaining democratic political institutions.   
Religious Denomination in Nicaragua 
The trend away from Catholicism toward religious alternatives, such as 
Evangelical Protestantism and Pentecostalism is increasing throughout Latin America 
and has also become a force in Nicaragua.  Table 5-1 reveals the trend toward 
Evangelical Protestantism in the survey is on track with current estimates of its growth.24  
The 2000 census data in Nicaragua estimated the Evangelical Protestant population to be 
15 percent of the total population. 25   According to the survey, the movement continues 
its growth with 17.4 percent of the respondents claiming to be Evangelical Protestant in 
                                                 
24 See Stoll (1993 p.337) for an estimation chart through 2010 
25 2000 census data provided by U.S. Dept. of State, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2002/14052.htm 
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2003.  This 17.4 percent does not include general Protestants, Pentecostals, Baptists, 
Jehovah's Witnesses, Seventh Day Adventists, Mormons, or other non-Catholic Christian 
denominations, which make up an additional 8.8 percent of the population.  Overall, 29.6 
percent of the respondents claim to be non-Catholic, with .2 percent of these claiming to 
be Muslim and 3.3 percent espousing no religious affiliation.26  Catholics account for 
70.4 percent of the sample population, with 3 percent of those claiming to be members of 
CEB’s.  Distinguishing Charismatic Catholics from Traditional Roman Catholics proved 
to be an impossible task, though a few respondents did claim membership in the 
Charismatic sects of Catholicism. 
Table 5-1: Predominant Religious Denomination (RBPRP) 
 Frequency Percent 
Traditional Catholic 406 67.4 
Protestant 4 .7 
Evangelical 105 17.4 
Baptist 19 3.2 
Pentecostal 7 1.2 
Mormon 3 .5 
Seventh Day Adventist 7 1.2 
Jehovah’s Witness 12 2 
Christian Base Community 18 3 
Muslim 1 .2 
Other/None 20 3.3 
Total (N) 602 100 
 
One surprise in the data is the small Pentecostal population.  Alternative data 
sources, such as the World Christian Data Base, estimate the Nicaraguan Pentecostal 
population in 2005 to be seven percent of the Christian population.    The denominational 
                                                 
26 Other religious denominations may be present in Nicaragua.  The question asked the respondent to 
provide his or her own religious denomination.  The respondents were not shown a list of religious 
denominations.   
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figures on Table 5-1 show a lower number of Pentecostal adherents than expected at 1.2 
percent.  These low numbers may be the result of a problem selecting the sample 
population; the method for discerning denominational affiliation; or simply that the 
Pentecostal movement has not taken hold in these parts of Nicaragua as it has throughout 
the rest of Latin America.  Pentecostalism has been a staple of conversion in South 
American countries like Brazil, where evangelicals of Pentecostal origin make up ten 
percent of the total population.27  According to the World Christian Database, 
Pentecostalism is also popular in Central American, where in El Salvador the Pentecostal 
population is 7.34 percent of the Christian population, 7.65 percent in Guatemala, 7.3 
percent in Honduras, 12.8 percent in Panama, and 6.3 percent in Costa Rica.  However, in 
all of these countries Evangelical Churches are the most popular non-Catholic alternative 
denomination.28      
 Due to small populations among Pentecostals, Jehovah's Witnesses, Mormons, 
Seventh Day Adventists, and Baptists, as well as those who claimed to be "Protestant", it 
is difficult to make statistical statements about the individual denominations.  A second 
variable codes religious affiliation as “Traditional Catholics”, “Progressive Catholics”, 
and a compilation of all other non-Catholic Christian denominations coded as 
“Evangelical” (RBPRP4). This variable is used to provide an overall examination of the 
                                                 
27 Religious demographic statistics on Brazil down loaded from the Brazilian Institution for Geography and 
Statistics (IBGE) at http://www.ibge.govand are the results from the 2000 Census.  
(http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/estatistica/populacao/censo2000/populacao/religiao_Censo2000.pdf) 
28 Religious demography for El Salvador, Guatemala, Panama, Honduras and Costa Rica are calculated 
from statistics provided by World Christian Data Base (WCD)at The Center for the Study of Global 
Christianity Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary found at www.worldchristiandatabase.org The WCD 
found Nicaragua to have a Pentecostal population of seven percent, while this research found a much 
smaller population.  The Evangelical population in Nicaragua according to the WCD is eleven percent 
while this research estimates the Evangelical population to be 17.4 percent.  The WCD provides estimates 
for the population in 2005.  
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movement away from Catholicism.29 Theoretically, this is not a major problem as these 
denominations and churches are similar in their independent structure and the basis for 
conversion is similar across all denominations.   According to Stoll, the term 
“evangelical” in Latin America “…connotes a theological conservative, who emphasizes 
the Bible, personal salvation, and evangelism …[and] can refer to any non-Catholic 
Christian  (Stoll 1993, 4).”   Table 5-2 shows the percentages of Traditional Catholic 
respondents in contrast with Progressive Catholics, and Evangelical Protestants.   
Table 5-2:  Primary Religious Provider (RBPRP4) 
 Frequency Percent 
Traditional Catholic 406 67.4 
Progressive Catholic 18 3 
Evangelical 157 26.1 
Other 21 3.5 
Total 602 100 
 
 
Examination of the sample population finds 67.4 percent of the respondents assert 
Traditional Catholicism as their primary religious provider, with 26.1 percent 
pronouncing an alternative Christian denomination.    
A significant issue in studying the effects of denomination in a transitional 
religious environment is the process of conversion, which is often lagged and incomplete.  
Table 5-3 measures the level of conversion by asking respondents to state whether they 
are members of more than one denomination.  If respondents claim to be a member of 
more than one denomination (RBMOD), then the conversion process is incomplete.  The 
respondent has either not fully embraced their new religious affiliation or not totally 
given up the beliefs of their previous religious affiliation.  As a result, the effects of a 
                                                 
29 For the purposes of multiple regression analysis RBPRP4 was divided into four dummy variables: 
Traditional Catholics (CATDUM), Progressive Catholic (CEBDUM), Evangelical (EVANDUM) and Other 
(OTHDUM) 
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particular denomination may not be fully socialized among newer converts.  Table 5-3 
provides a breakdown of membership in more than one denomination. 
Table 5-3:  Member of More Than One Denomination (RBMOD) 
 Frequency Percent 
Member of only one Denomination 561 93.8 
Member of More than one Denomination 37 6.2 
Total 598 100 
 
 
As Table 5-3 demonstrates roughly 6.2 percent of the sample population claim to be a 
member of more than one denomination, with 93.8 percent claiming membership in only 
one denomination.  Of these, 6.2 percent (RBMOD) claiming membership in more than 
one denomination, 66.1 percent, or 4.2 percent of the sample population, claim 
Catholicism as their secondary religious provider (RBPOR).   Therefore, of the 26.1 
percent of the sample population claiming conversion to a religion outside of Catholicism 
(RBPRP3), 4.2 percent (RBPOR) still maintain an association with Catholicism in one of 
its forms Traditional, Progressive, or Charismatic.  This is significant as it illustrates the 
process of conversion is not definite and association with one religious denomination 
may not be mutually exclusive with association to other denominations.  A lag effect or 
learning curve occurs within conversion; it takes time for converts truly to understand 
and embrace their new religion, and some may return to their previous denomination. 
 A follow-up question asks the respondent to state their reason for conversion 
(RBRFC) to gain insight into the movement away from Catholicism toward more 
“Evangelical” Protestant denominations.  Respondents often expressed more than one 
reason for their conversions, which made coding their responses difficult.   For the sake 
of analysis, the first response given was assumed to be the respondent’s primary reason 
for conversion.  The responses were summarized and coded as: (1) “invited by friends or 
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family30”; (2) “better answers to social problems such as alcoholism”; (3) “better 
presentation of scripture and relationship with God”; (4) “Catholic Church is too 
political”; (5) “Dislike of Catholicism”; (6) and “Personal Decision”.   Table 5-4 provides 
an itemization of the major reasons for conversion among the respondents. 
Table 5-4:  Reason For Conversion (RBRFC) 
 Frequency Percent 
Invited /Family  15 14.7 
Answers to Social Problems 4 3.9 
Presentation of Scripture and God 54 52.9 
Political Involvement of Catholic Church 5 4.9 
Dislike of Catholicism 6 5.8 
Personal Decision 18 17.6 
Total (N) 102 99.3 
NOTE: The sample population for this table consists of only non-Catholics who provided a reason for 
conversion is a percentage of the whole population.  
 
Of those who have converted from Catholicism to another denomination, 14.7 
percent stated conversion was born out of an invitation by friends or family.  A further 
3.9 percent were looking for answers to social problems such as alcoholism and drug 
abuse. The majority of respondents, or 52.9 percent, felt that the presentation of the 
scripture and / or relationship with God was enhanced in Evangelical denominations.  
Informally, many claimed that Evangelical worship services were more personal and 
enjoyable with smaller congregations. Perks of association with Evangelical 
denominations included more personal relationships with “clergy”, the inclusion of 
                                                 
30 Family may also mean that the respondent was born to parents associated with Evangelical Protestant 
denominations and therefore may have been raised Evangelical Protestant. 
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music, and greater opportunity and acceptance of overt expressions of faith during 
worship services. 31  
Dislike of the Catholic Church’s involvement in politics is cited by 4.9 percent as 
a reason for conversion, and an additional 5.9 percent expressed overt dislike for the 
Catholic Church.  Finally, 17.6 percent claimed that their conversion was the result of a 
personal decision.  These respondents usually could not settle on a particular reason or 
did not want to express one.    
Religiosity in Nicaragua 
 Religiosity is a complicated construct with no less than three separate concepts 
requiring measures.  Inglehart and Norris (2004) define religiosity as “… religious 
participation, values and beliefs at [the] individual level” (Chapter 2 p. 6).  Accordingly 
the concept of religiosity (RELIGIOSITY) in this research is based on measures of the 
level of religious participation (RBLRP), religious value (RBLRV), and religious belief 
(RBLRB).   The level of religious participation (RBLRP) measures the frequency the 
respondent participates in religious consultation for guidance. The level of religious value 
(RBLRV) measures the level of devoutness the individual places on the product of 
consultation and the Bible as the irrefutable word of God. The greater the value 
respondents place on the results of religious of consultation, the greater respondents use 
religion for daily guidance. Level of religious belief (RBLRB) gauges the breadth of 
concepts used by respondents during religious participation.  The greater the number of 
concepts referenced when consulting religion for guidance, the greater the adherent’s 
                                                 
31 The statements regarding the benefits of conversion to Evangelical Protestantism are not part of the data 
set but an observation from discussions with respondents and other Nicaraguans. 
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reliance on religion. Finally, the greater the number of religious concepts referenced, the 
less room for alternative information or forms of guidance to be accessed. 
The goal of this research is to explore the relationship between religion and civil 
society at the individual level; thus two additional measures have also been constructed.  
The first is a measure of respondent beliefs regarding the role of religious institutions in 
the public/political sphere (RBCRS).  To operationalize the variable, respondents are 
asked to indicate on which issues they believe it is appropriate for “the Church” to make 
public statements.  Secondly, an assessment of how well religious organizations are 
responding to the needs of society (RBCPA) has been generated to provide a measure of 
performance.  These measures (RBCRS and RBCPAI) are designed to grasp the extent 
respondents want religious organizations to participate in civil society and how the 
respondent perceives their success.   
Level of Religious Participation (RBLRP) 
This study chose to measure participation through the respondent’s use of God for 
day-to-day guidance, a significant dimension of participation.  If an individual consults 
God daily to make decisions and find answers, then each day the respondent is praying or 
participating in worship and practicing religion. This variable helps control for the 
disparity in participation that might occur as a result of religious affiliation.  The 
respondent was asked how often they pray outside of religious services (RBPOR).  
Of the sample population, 54 percent claim they “always” pray outside of 
religious services; 26 percent responded “sometimes”; with the remaining 19.3 percent 
responding “almost never”, “only in times of crisis”, and “never.”   Given that 80 percent 
of the population “always” or “sometimes” communicate with God demonstrates, at least 
 115
on the individual level, participation is strong. Still, a large segment of the sample 
population at 19.3 percent rarely consults God, which is a significant number not 
participating.  Correlations between the levels of religious participation (RBLRP) showed 
a significant relationship between Evangelicals, but not between Traditional Catholics, 
Progressive Catholics, nor Non-Christians.   
Level of Religious Value (RBLRV) 
The second religiosity variable measures the value of religion in one’s life by 
asking the respondent to measure the importance of God in their life on a 10-point Likert 
Scale (RBIGL).  Results for this question showed little variation as 90.7 percent of the 
respondents state God is of “total importance (10)” in their lives.  Additionally, 4 percent 
found God “extremely important (9)” and 3.7 percent stated God is ‘very, very 
important” (8).  Observer interference may have played a large role in the limited 
variation as many respondents want to demonstrate faith, a noble characteristic in 
Nicaraguan society.  Furthermore, according to Inglehart and Norris (2004), religiosity 
levels in traditional societies are going to be much higher because they are not following 
the trend towards secularism in industrial societies, due to poor “human development”.  
Inglehart and Norris (2004, Chapter 2, p. 4) define “human development” as “…a 
complex process of social transformation, including changes in the economy with the 
shift from agricultural production to industrial production and the rise in the service 
sector”. 32    
  An alternative measure for the value of religion asks the respondents to state 
their level of agreement with whether “…the Bible contains the word of God and 
                                                 
32 For definition of human development see Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris Sacred and Secular: 
Religion and Politics World Wide New York: Cambridge University Press (In press, publication Fall 2004 
downloaded from http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~pnorris/). 
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everything in it is literally true (RBBLT)”.  Responses varied little, with 46 percent 
“strongly agreeing” and 44.8 percent “agreeing”, for an overall 90.8 percent agreeing that 
the Bible contains the “Word of God” and is literally true. A minority population of 4.1 
percent state they “neither agree nor disagree” and 5.1 percent either “disagree” or 
“strongly disagree.”    From this variable it is evident that Nicaraguans take the Bible as 
truth and thus its contents are of value in their daily lives.   
Replies were much more varied when asked whether “…eternal life was only 
possible for those who believe in Jesus Christ as God and Savior (RBHBG).”  An overall 
75.2 percent of the respondents agreed with the statement, but only 21.3 percent “strongly 
agreed”.  This indicates that while an overwhelming majority believe the Bible to be 
literally true (RBBLT), they are less certain that eternal life is only for those who believe 
in Jesus Christ as Lord and Savior (RBHBG).   These results highlight a common 
disjuncture between religious beliefs as a general concept and the religious beliefs in 
practice.  It is easy to state everything in the Bible is literally true. However, when 
confronted with a specific Biblical concept, such as the First Commandment33, 
respondents are less certain because their answer could have consequences for their own 
lives.  If the respondent is unsure whether he or she accepts “accepts Jesus Christ as Lord 
and Savior”, then they are less likely to deny eternal life to themselves or others. Thus, 
the Bible as a concept can be accepted easily, but applying specific Biblical concepts to 
one’s life takes a stronger faith in religion.  The cognitive dissonance associated with 
religion occurs everywhere and is not specific to Nicaraguans. 
Finally, 89 percent of the respondents find strength and comfort from religion 
(RBRSC).  This figure is significant because it shows that religion as an overall concept 
                                                 
33 1st Commandment, Verse 3 “Thou shall have no other God before me” 
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provides the respondent with comfort and strength, irrespective of its application.  
Religion, overall, is a positive construct in Nicaraguan society as a place to find answers, 
as well as escape from the hardships of everyday life.   
Level of Religious Belief (RBLRB) 
Assessment of religious belief asks respondents if they believe in particular 
Biblical concepts as read from a list (RBWTB) and illustrated on Table 5-5.  Beliefs in 
particular Biblical concepts are important because they imply the number or breadth of 
beliefs respondents implement for guidance in daily life. Religious value and religious 
belief are not mutually exclusive concepts, but differ in one major respect.  Religious 
belief (RBLRB) explores the diversity of religious constructs the respondent applies to 
life rather than just the value (RBLRV) placed on the broader construct of religion as a 
whole.   An interesting finding in Table 5-5 shows disconnection again occurs between 
applying positive over negative constructs to daily life. 
Table 5-5: “Please indicate whether you believe in any of the following (RBWTB1-9) 
 “Yes” in Percentages “No” in Percentages N 
God (RBWTB1) 99.7 .3 598 
Life After Death (RBWTB2) 86.5 13.5 550 
A Soul (RBWTB3) 95 4.9 576 
The Devil Exists (RBWTB4) 76.6 23.3 579 
Hell Exists (RBWTB5) 74 26 572 
Heaven Exists (RBWTB6) 93.8 6.2 584 
In Sin (RBWTB7) 98.5 1.5 601 
Resurrection of the Dead (RBWTB8) 89.1 10.9 570 
Reincarnation (RBWTB9) 61.9 38.1 564 
Note:  Reincarnation is not a Biblical concept but was included as a test of religious knowledge.   
     
As demonstrated by Table 5-5, religious belief is extremely strong in Nicaragua, 
as every religious concept represented produced a statement of belief by a majority of the 
respondents.  Table 5-5 also uncovers an intriguing trend where respondents have a 
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stronger belief in positive attributes of religion over negative.  An average of 93.3 percent 
of the respondents believe in the positive religious attributes of God (RBWTB1), life 
after death (RBWTB2), a soul (RBWTB3), and the existence of heaven (RBWTB6).   In 
contrast, an average of 83.3 percent of the sample population believe in negative religious 
attributes like the existence of the devil (RBWTB4), the existence of hell (RBWTB5) and 
sin (RBWTB7)34.  This disconnection again demonstrates the general construct of 
religion as positive.  In the process of applying religion to one’s daily life, the most often 
used constructs are positive.  The greater use of positive religious concepts is evidence of 
the desire for religion to provide a diversion from social and economic challenges facing 
citizens in traditional societies as a source of escape.   
Role of Religion in Society (RBCRS) 
To gain an understanding of respondents’ attitudes toward the role of religion in 
society (RBCRS) they are asked whether they believe religious organizations can be 
effective in addressing problems of the community (RBRAP).  Overall, 73.9 percent of 
the respondents “agree” that the “Church” can be effective in addressing problems of the 
community.  The majority of respondents “agreeing” religious organizations are effective 
in addressing community problems demonstrates the prevalence among the sample 
population to deem religious organizations as effective social institutions that should 
retain a major role in society.  This is not a great surprise, given the poor economic 
capacity of Nicaraguan governmental institutions effectively to address larger socio-
economic problems, leaving religious organizations to fill the void.   
  When respondents are asked whether the religious organizations or churches 
“they attend” should work to solve social issues (RBSSP), a larger portion of the sample 
                                                 
34 If sin (RBWTB7) is excluded the average belief in negative religious concepts drops to 75.2 percent.  
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population at 86.2 percent “agreed” or “strongly agreed”.   Presented with the broader 
construct of a generic religious organization, respondents are not as certain about the role 
of religion in society.  However, when discussing the religious organizations respondents 
are affiliated with, they are more certain about their particular organization’s capacity for 
addressing community problems.  This points to an overall attitude regarding religious 
organizations and church communities as a whole.  The greatest level of confidence is 
directed toward the religious institutions with which respondents are associated.  If 
respondents are engaged with a specific religious organization, they have greater 
awareness of the activities of that particular organization.  Respondents cannot speak for 
all religious organizations and are less certain other religious institutions should or do 
play a large role in society.  Disjuncture in the role of religion in society between generic 
and specific organizations shows, at the individual level, reciprocal associational 
activities are creating institutional confidence in the respondent’s religious organization.   
 To further explore the role of religious organizations in society, respondents are 
asked to state whether it is appropriate for “the Church” to speak out on certain social 
issues (RBCRS).  These variables, illustrated on Table 5-6, measure the span of issues on 
which respondents find it appropriate for the Church to be involved.  
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Table 5-6:  “Should the Church speak out on these issues…(RBCRS)?” 
 Yes (Valid %) No (Valid %) N 
Disarmament (RBCRS1) 69.4 30.4 575 
Problems of Third World (RBCRS3) 77.4 22.4 554 
Extra Marital Affairs (RBCRS4) 76.6 23.3 558 
Drug Addiction (RBCRS5) 92.1 7.7 594 
Alcoholism (RBCRS6) 90.5 8.1 594 
Unemployment (RBCRS7) 82.8 16.6 580 
Racial Discrimination (RBCRS8) 86.2 13.6 580 
Euthanasia (RBCRS9) 75.2 24.8 476 
Homosexuality (RBCRS10) 66.1 33.7 575 
Ecology and the Environment (RBCRS11) 86.6 13.4 584 
Politics and Government (RBCRS12) 41.8 58.2 586 
Human Rights (RBCRS13) 93.8 6.2 597 
Note: Opinions about abortion were collected, but due to a mistranslation of the term during the first part of 
the survey it was omitted.  
 
Judging from these figures, Nicaraguans want religious organizations to play a 
considerable role in society.  Addiction recovery is the most significant moral issue for 
Church involvement while issues relating to sex, such as homosexuality (RBCRS10) and 
extra marital affairs (RBCRS4), receive less support for religious involvement. 
Respondents are also supportive of religious involvement in the public sphere when 
involvement encompasses employment issues (BRCRS7), disarmament (RBCRS1), 
problems of the “third world” (RBCRS3), and human rights (RBCRS13).  
Respondents are overwhelmingly against religious involvement in “Politics and 
Government” (RBCRS12).  Given the tenuous church and state relationship throughout 
Nicaragua’s chaotic political history, this finding is not astonishing.  Contemporary 
political history illustrates a schizophrenic Church and State relationship.  Under the 
Somoza regime, the Catholic Church split, with “Traditional Catholics” viewed as 
maintaining the status quo as opposed to the “Progressive Church” professing a doctrine 
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of liberation. Under the Sandinista regime, the Catholic Church was again divided, with 
the “Progressive Church” perceived as creating and maintaining the Revolutionary status 
quo, as opposed to the “Traditional Catholic Church” seeking greater religious freedoms 
and separation of Church and State. Fragmentation within the Nicaraguan Catholic 
Church was also intensified with Progressive clergy playing frontline roles in the 
revolution and occupying key political positions in the Sandinista Regime (Walker 2004, 
Sabia 1997, Mulligan 1991).  As Deneonandan (2001, p. 449) stated, the Progressive 
Church’s close association with the status quo of the Sandinistas might have been a major 
cause of its decline.  In the wake of the Contra War the Sandinistas introduced policies 
that hurt the CEB’s and the poor in general. 
Success of Religious Organizations in Society (RBCPAI) 
 Table 5-7 provides an overview of how successful respondents in the study 
believe religious institutions are when entering into the public sphere in an effort to 
address social problems.  While it is evident respondents want religious institutions to 
address social problems, the perception of success among religious institutions may 
translate into positive attitudes toward other social, political, and economic institutions. 
Table 5-7: “Is the Church providing adequate answers to …(RBCPA)?” 
 Yes (Valid %) No (Valid %) N 
Moral needs and problems of the individual (RBCPA1) 64 36 578 
The problems of family life (RBCPA2) 72.1 27.7 587 
The spiritual needs of the population (RBCPA3) 83.3 16.7 581 
Social problems facing the country (RBCPA4) 65.8 34.2 573 
The financial problems facing individuals (RBCPA5) 46.9 53.1 569 
Your church provides a sense of community (RBCPA6) 78.4 21.6 569 
 
 Religious organizations are successful fulfilling their main function as spiritual 
providers (RBCPA3), according to 83.3 percent of the respondents.  Religious institutions 
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are also accomplishing their mission as community centers, with 78.4 percent of the 
respondents claiming their church provides a sense of community (RBCPA6).  The sense 
of community is crucial for the causal relationship put forth by Putnam (2000, 1995, 
1993) that reciprocal positive interactions among individuals in a community translates 
into interpersonal trust and trust in other individual and institutions.  This is the 
production of social capital, a necessary ingredient for a successful democratic polity. 
In terms of social (RBCPA4), moral (RBCPA1), and family (RBCPA2) issues, 
religious institutions are less successful, with 65.8 percent, 64 percent, and 72.1 percent 
of the respondents claiming the Church is providing adequate answers to these issues.  
Finally, a minority 46.9 percent of the respondents, believes that religious institutions are 
providing adequate answers to the financial problems facing individuals (RBCPA5).   
Religious Denominations and Civil Society 
 The analysis now turns toward an exploration of the effects of religion on the 
propensity of respondents to participate in civil society, as well as whether the effects of 
participation, such as attitudes supportive of democratic institutions, are being accrued by 
respondents.  The first section examines the effect of affiliation with particular religious 
denominations on participation in civil society. This section also explores the secondary 
effects of civil society participation in terms of providing healthy democratic values 
necessary for the maintenance of democratic political institutions. The religious 
denomination variable (RBRPR4) is divided into four dummy variables for multiple 
regression analysis. Table 5-8 shows the Beta coefficients for the civil society dependent 
variables and the independent variables of religious denomination as characterized by 
Traditional Catholic (CATDUM), Progressive Catholic (CEBDUM), Evangelical 
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(EVANDUM) and omitted from the list is other religious affiliation (OTHDUM).  
Control variables include age (DIAGE1), education (DIEDU), gender (DIGEN), and 
income (DIINF).  
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.082 .098 .056 
Gender 
(DIGEN) 
.226*** .081* -.039 .046 .009 .238*** .059 .211*** -.045 -.024 .132** 
Education 
(DIEDU) 









-.039 .017 .033 .022 -.047 .071 -.031 .085* -.036 -.076 -.067 
Adjusted  R 
squared 
.111 .077 .09 .103 -.001 .117 -.001 .095 .007 .033 .025 
* p< .1; **p<.05;***p<.01
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Religious Denomination and Participation in Formal Civil Society  
 An examination of Table 5-8 finds no significant relationships between religious 
denominations and participation in formal organizations (FOCIND) outside of religious 
organizations.  Gender (DIGEN), education (DIEDU), and age (DIAGE) are all 
significant indicators of formal civil society participation (FOCIND).  Gender (DIGEN) 
is significant as males are more likely to participate in formal civil society than females.  
Correlations showed significant relationships between gender and participation in sports 
or recreation groups, political parties, labor unions, and professional associations.   
The majority of participation in formal organizations occur in sports organizations 
in which a plethora of men’s teams exist and very few women’s. During the field research 
the author lived across the street from a sports complex built by a Japanese aid 
organization that contained a full-length basketball court and a baseball facility with three 
fields, bleachers, and press boxes.  During evenings and weekends the facility was 
packed with baseball and softball leagues of all ages, as well as frequent basketball 
tournaments.  While ages varied for the numerous leagues, gender did not as no women’s 
leagues or teams were ever observed utilizing the facilities. 
Men also dominate participation in labor unions, mainly through transportation 
cooperatives.  In the four months of the field research, the author depended solely on 
public transportation either by bus or taxi, often four or five times a day.  Whether in 
Managua, Masaya, Granada, or the Pueblos Blancos areas there were only two separate 
incidents where the driver or the individual collecting fares was female.   In other labor 
unions, like artisan cooperatives, gender was less of a factor.   Professional associations 
and political parties are also men’s organizations.  Of the respondents claiming to be 
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“very active” or “active” members of political parties, 75 percent are men.  In regards to 
professional associations 73 percent of “active” or “somewhat active” members are men.  
Therefore, concerning formal civil society structures outside of religious organizations, 
Nicaragua remains a traditional society with men entering into secular formal 
associational activity with significantly more frequency than women, even after the 
Sandinista Revolution. 
Religious Denomination and Informal Civil Society 
 Relationships between religious denomination and the variables measuring 
informal civil society are also illustrated on Table 5-8.  Traditional Catholics show a 
significant negative relationship in support for informal civil society (ICSSIN).  
Essentially, Traditional Catholics are less likely to donate time, money, or materials to 
solve problems of the community or one of its members.  Progressive Catholics are more 
likely to participate in informal civil society (ICSPIN) by attending or organizing 
meetings and donating their work to resolve the problems of the community or one of its 
members.  Evangelicals show no significant relationship between their religious 
denomination and their propensity to support (ICSSIN) or participate (ICSPIN) in 
informal civil society.   
 Other significant indicators of participation and support for informal civil society 
are education (DIEDU) and age (DIAGE1).  The more educated respondents are, the 
more likely they are to participate and support informal civil society.  That is, the 
educated are more involved in trying to find solutions to community and individual 
problems.  Age (DIAGE1) is a significant indicator as older respondents are more likely 
to support and participate in finding solutions to community problems or the problems of 
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one of its members.  The willingness of older generations to participate and support 
informal civil society appears to be a residual effect of having worked with barrio or 
neighborhood level organizations during the Sandinista regime.  Furthermore, older 
respondents may have been cognitively responding to Sandinista community organizing 
because the survey instrument simply asks whether they had participated or supported 
civil society, not when participation occurred.  Informally, many respondents would 
recall the work they did with community organizations during the Sandinista regime.  
Furthermore, in Managua many of the barrios are still organized around a neighborhood 
“jefe” and a committee working on community issues. 
Overall, religious denominations are erratic indicators of a person’s propensity to 
support or participate in civil society; but age, gender, and education are stronger 
predictors.  The exception among religious denominations is Progressive Catholicism, 
which is a positive significant indicator of whether a respondent will participate in 
informal civil society (ICSPIN).  However, this relationship may be fragile, as 
Progressive Catholics made up only 18 of the 602 total respondents, or 3 percent of the 
sample population.  Furthermore, Progressive Catholicism is vanishing as a religious 
institution.  Interviews in Managua with a number of respondents from Barrio La Luz35 
found that in 1995 most working class barrios had their own CEB’s, but the last ten years 
has seen a sharp decline in membership. Today, Managua has only one city wide CEB, 
with infrequent meetings.    
Religious Denomination and Effects of Civil Society 
                                                 
35 Barrio La Luz is a working class neighborhood in the center of Managua.  It is also know as 14 de Juneo 
which was its official name during the Sandinista Regime.  The author lived in this neighborhood in 1995 
and attended meetings with the CEB.  However, today that CEB does not exist on the neighborhood level, 
but a few of the originators still attend the Managua wide CEB. 
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 The absence of a major effect of denomination, especially among Traditional 
Catholics and Evangelicals, on the respondent’s propensity to support and participate in 
civil society carries over into the effects of civil society.  Associational activity occurring 
both within religious denominations are not significant indicators of democratic values 
capable of maintaining democratic institutions.  As shown on Table 5-8, and contrary to 
the hypotheses, involvement with Evangelical denominations (EVANDUM) and the 
associational activity occurring within those organizations is not an indicator of 
respondents’ level of political efficacy (POLEF), interpersonal trust (IPTRUST), or 
political knowledge (PKIND).  Being Evangelical is also not an indicator of whether the 
respondent believes in an open political system (OPINDX), acceptance of alternative 
political expressions (APIEND), confidence in governmental institutions (CIGIND), or a 
belief that governmental actions are correct (BGAIND).  
On the other hand, being a Traditional Catholic (CATDUM) is a positive 
significant indicator of whether respondents have confidence in governmental institutions 
(CIGIND).  That is, Traditional Catholics have greater confidence in governmental 
institutions than Evangelicals.   
Surprisingly, Progressive Catholicism (CEBDUM) also produces a positive 
significant relationship with confidence in governmental institutions (CIGIND).  A 
common perception is that Progressive Catholicism (CEBDUM) creates an anti-
tyrannical form of civil society, which it in no doubt did before and during the Sandinista 
Revolution.  Today the civil society produced within these denominations appears to be 
more along a democratic civil society as demonstrated by the confidence held in 
governmental institutions (CIGIND). 
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Religiosity and Civil Society 
 With religious denomination as an explanation for civil society providing only 
minor insight, the research now turns toward the concept of religiosity.   As noted earlier, 
religiosity is the culmination of the level of religious belief (RBLRB), value (RBLRV), 
and participation (RBLRP).  This research utilizes these concepts but also adds two other 
constructs of religiosity.  The first corollary construct of religiosity is an examination of 
the role respondents believe religious organizations should play in society (TOTAL).  
The second alternative concept is an exploration of the perceived success of religious 
organizations in their societal roles (RCBPAI).  These two additional aspects of 
religiosity are significant in economically challenged societies, as religious organizations 
often play a large societal role (Inglehart and Norris 2004).  As found in Chapter Four, 
most Nicaraguans expect religious organizations to play a major role in society. 
 Table 5-9 shows the effect of religiosity on civil society.36  The combination of 
religious belief (RBLRB), value (RBLRV), and participation (RBLRP) as an index of 
religiosity variable (RELIGIOSITY) shows no significant relationship with any of the 
dependent civil society variables.  However, two significant relationships exist between 
religiosity (RELIGIOSITY) and the effects of civil society.  Religiosity (RELIGIOSITY) 
is an indicator of a person’s level of interpersonal trust (IPTRUST) and confidence in 
governmental institutions (CIGIND).  The greater the respondent’s religiosity, the greater 
their level of interpersonal trust (IPTRUST), or the more they trust people in general.  
Furthermore, the greater a person’s religiosity, the greater the confidence they have in 
governmental institutions (CIGIND).  Accordingly, religiosity may be significant in 
                                                 
36 The religiosity variable used here is an additive index of the respondents level of religious belief, 
participation, and value (RBLRP + RBLRB + RBLRV) 
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creating supportive democratic attitudes.  It must be noted that the adjusted R squared for 
the models where religiosity is a significant indicator are low.  As with religious 
denominations, the major indicators for participation and support of civil society and the 
effects accrued through involvement in civil society are level of education, age, gender 
and income level. 
 Religiosity (RELIGIOSITY) as an index variable may lack the explanatory power 
desired, but, unpacked into its three major elements, its explanatory value increases as 
shown by Table 5-10.  Formal civil society participation (FOCIND), is greatly explained 
by education (DIEDU), age (DIAGE1), and gender (DIGEN), but a significant negative 
relationship also is found with the level of religious belief (RBLRB).  Respondents who 
exhibit high levels of religious belief (RBLRB) are significantly less likely to participate 
in formal civil society (FOCIND) outside of religious organizations.  The greater one 
believes in religion, the less likely they use or need secular civil society institutions such 
as labor unions, sports organizations, political parties, etc.   
 Further examination of Table 5-10 shows a significant negative relationship 
between the levels of religious belief (RBLRB) and the respondent’s propensity to 
participate in or support informal civil society (ICSTIN).  The greater the level of 
religious belief (RBLRB), the less likely respondents will work to find a solution to 
community problems or the problems of one of its members.  Respondents in these cases 
may be defining community as those individuals within the immediate geographical 


























































-.018 .048 .026 .050 .030 -.028 .122* -.058 .040 .121** .062 
Gender 
(DIGEN) 
.222*** .067 -.041 .036 .001 .238*** .056 .210*** -.048 -.031 .129** 
Education 
(DIEDU) 
.268*** .205*** .266*** .265*** -.075 .213*** .067 .176*** -.104 -.081 .019 
Age (DIAGE1) 
 




-.040 .021 .029 .023 -.039 .063 -.003 .071 -.030 -.048 -.055 
Adjusted  R 
squared 
.104 .057 .059 .077 -.006 .114 .004 .090 .010 .023 .027 






































































.017 .101* .036 .086* .045 -.114** .134** -.138*** -.008 .108** .049 
Gender 
(DIGEN) 
.223*** .077 -.039 .043 .007 .223*** .069 .193*** -.051 -.018 .134** 
Education 
(DIEDU) 









-.039 .024 .028 .025 -.038 .061 -.003 .068 -.029 -.049 -.055 
Adjusted  R 
squared 
.110 .071 .061 .090 -.007 .127 .012 .104 .014 .028 .024 
* p< .1; **p<.05;***p<.01
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The level of religious participation (RBLRP) also has positive significant 
relationships with the effects of civil society.  Greater participation in religion has a 
positive significant relationship with interpersonal trust (IPTRUST).  The greater the 
religious participation among respondents, the more likely they are going to trust other 
individuals. This finding is likely the result of positive reciprocal associational activity 
with other participants in their religious organizations.  The positive significant 
relationship between religious participation (RBLRP) and interpersonal trust (IPTRUST) 
may also translate into a trust in people in general, resulting in a trust of people in 
government.  This relationship is demonstrated by the significant positive relationship 
found between the level of religious participation (RBLRP) and the confidence in 
governmental institutions (CIGIND). 
A second possible explanation may also be that people participating in religion 
develop a “parochial” or “subject” mindset, as demonstrated by Almond and Verba 
(1963).   A “parochial” is an individual who does not interact with the state and whose 
world view does not extend beyond the direct geographical region.     A “subject” is one 
who has knowledge about politics but does not choose to participate in the state beyond 
voting.  These concepts are demonstrated by the significant negative relationships 
between the level of religious participation (RBLRP) and the respondent’s level of 
political knowledge (PKIND) and openness of political participation (OPINDX).  The 
greater respondents participate in religion (RBLRP), the less likely respondents are to 
know the president of Nicaragua, the president of the United States, or the mayor of the 
respondent’s city or town (PKIND).  The relationship suggests that the more time 
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respondents invest in religious participation, the less time dedicated to understanding or 
learning about politics.  
A significant negative relationship also exists between the level of religious 
participation (RBLRP) and openness of political participation (OPINDX).  This 
relationship suggests that the more respondents participate in religion (RBLRP), the less 
open they are to extend participation rights in the political system to those with 
alternative views (OPINDX).  This demonstrates less of a willingness among active 
religious respondents to accept alternative viewpoints and allow those with alternative 
views to participate.  
Religious respondents may not have fully institutionalized the democratic concept 
of freedom of expression, which, according to Dahl (1971), is both necessary and 
sufficient for the maintenance of democracy within a state.  The potential for democratic 
decay lies in respondents’ desire for stability and order over the freedom of expression.  
Again this may be a product specific to societies affected by a political history 
characterized by civil war and instability.  Finally, there are no significant relationships 
between the level of religious value (RBLRV) and formal civil society (FOCIND), 
informal civil society (ICSTIN), or any of the effects of civil society. 
Role of Religion in Civil Society (RBCRS) 
 The role of religion in society (RBCRS) examines the respondents’ attitude 
toward the breadth of issues appropriate for religious organizations to address when 
entering into the public sphere or an expression of the issues appropriate for Church 
action.  Provided on Table 5-11 are multiple regression beta coefficients showing the 
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relationship between the role respondents want religion to play in society and the 
dependent civil society variables. 
Positive significant relationships exist between the role of religion in society 
(RBCRS) and informal civil society (ICSTIN), political efficacy (POLEF), and openness 
of political participation (OPINDX).  The broader the role for religious institutions 
(RBCRS), the greater the likelihood that respondents will participate and support 
informal civil society (ICSTIN).  This relationship indicates that participation on and 
support for informal civil society are being developed through associational activities 
inside religious organizations.  The role of the religious organization becomes the role of 
individuals.  The broader the role for religion in society, the broader the respondents’ 
responsibility is to society.  
Another intriguing finding is the positive significant relationship between the role 
of religion in society (RBCRS) and the effects of civil society, measured partly by 
political efficacy (POLEF) and openness of political participation (OPINDX).  If the 
respondent believes religious organizations have a major role in society, then the 
respondent also exhibits high political efficacy. In other words, the greater the role for 
religious organizations in society, the greater the impact respondents believe they have on 
the political system.  Not only are respondents more confident about their effect on the 
political system, they are also more secure and likely to extend political participation to 
































































.027 .104* .182*** .253*** .133** .022 .083 .108** .083 .011 .022 
Gender 
(DIGEN) 
.222*** .063 -.048 .029 -.004 .238*** .050 .208*** -.051 -.034 .127** 
Education 
(DIEDU) 









-.038 .014 .024 .015 -.044 .066 -.019 .077 -.036 -.063 -.063 
Adjusted  
R squared 
.104 .065 .090 .097 .010 .113 -.004 .097 .015 .008 .023 
* p< .1; **p<.05;***p<.01 
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View of Religious Success in Society (RBCPAI)  
 
A final concept in discerning the effects of religion on civil society is to identify 
any possible relationships between attitudes towards the success of religious 
organizations when fulfilling their mission and the dependent civil society variables.  Is 
there any relationship between perceived success of religious institutions and other social 
and political institutions?  Table 5-12 shows the multiple regression beta coefficients 
using the view of religious success in society (RBCPAI) as an explanatory variable for 
the dependent civil society variables.  There are no significant relationships between the 
view of religious success in society (RBCPAI) and participation in formal civil society 
(FOCIND) and informal civil society support and participation (ICSTIN).  However, a 
number of significant relationships are found with the effects of civil society. 
Examination of Table 5-12 shows positive significant relationships between the 
perceived success of religious institutions in society (RBCPAI) and the respondent’s 
political efficacy (POLEF), level of interpersonal trust (IPTRUST), confidence in 
governmental institutions (CIGIND), and belief that the actions of government are correct 
(BGAIND).  If respondents view religious institutions as effective, they also view their 
participation in the political system as effective.  Again, an extension of attitudes toward 
religious institutions affects attitudes toward governmental institutions. Interpersonal 
trust (IPTRUST) is also significantly related to the view of religious success in society 
(RBCPAI).  If a respondent views religious institutions as successful in society, then they 
may view those working within the institutions as trustworthy.   This trust may also be 
extended to other types of institutions. 
 138
 
























































-.060 .008 .015 .011 .200*** -.067 .136** -.083 .065 .278*** .211*** 
Gender 
(DIGEN) 
.224*** .066 -.042 .034 -.004 .241*** .050 .213*** -.050 -.040 .123** 
Education 
(DIEDU) 









.-041 .016 .027 .018 -.033 .063 -.011 .074 -.032 -.050 -.052 
Adjusted  
R squared 
.110 .057 .061 .078 .033 .119 .010 .095 .015 .083 .066 
Significance Levels: * p< .1; **p<.05;***p<.01 
 
 139
The relationship is further documented by the significant positive relationships between 
view of religious success (RBCPAI) and attitudes toward political institutions, measured 
through the confidence in governmental institutions (CIGIND) and belief that 
government actions are correct (BGAIND).  If people believe that religious institutions 
are successful in society, they also tend to view political institutions as worthy of 
confidence and believe their actions to be correct.  A trust in one set of political and 
social institutions may provide for a broader trust of institutions in general.   
Discussion 
 The regression models presented above provide interesting insight between 
religion and civil society.  First, it does not appear that any of the particular religious 
denominations studied here are significant producers of Civil Society I or those forms of 
civil society that help maintain democratic institutions.  On the other hand, there is also 
no evidence that participation in any of the denominations under review is truly a 
hindrance to democracy.  The relationship between religious institutions and the creation 
of a civil society capable of maintaining democratic institutions has very little to do with 
denomination and is more closely related to religiosity.  The concepts of religiosity 
producing significant relationships are to the role of religious institutions in society 
(RBCPAI) as well as their perceived success (RCBRST).   
 Respondents believing that religious institutions should play a larger role in 
society are more likely to participate and support informal civil society, display greater 
political efficacy, and support an open political environment.  This relationship suggests 
that if religious institutions are to play a large role in society, then so, too, must the 
adherents.  Adherents believing this are then more likely to involve themselves in finding 
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solutions to society’s problems.  In other words, associational activity occurring within 
religious institutions influences the adherents to live out their religion in society and thus 
work to find solutions to social, economic, and political problems.   
 A second interesting finding worth discussion is the relationship between the 
respondents’ perception of success among religious institutions and their view of all 
institutions.  If respondents view religious institutions as successful they are more likely 
to display high levels of political efficacy and interpersonal trust.  Furthermore, success 
or confidence in religious institutions translates into confidence in governmental 
institutions and belief that the actions of government are correct.  Essentially, perceived 
success of one set of institutions may translate into perceived success of social, 
economic, and political institutions in general. 
 From these findings it appears that religious institutions are playing a large role in 
Nicaraguan society and are successful at doing it.  The associational activities found in 
religious institutions may be directly adding to civil society by producing positive 





Introduction:  The Case of El Salvador 
 Chapter Six explores the effects of religion on civil society through a comparative 
case study of El Salvador.  Analysis in this chapter is conducted to gain an appreciation 
of whether the religious trends taking place are specific to Nicaragua or part of a larger 
movement within Central America.  Data on El Salvador comes from the 1995-1996 
wave of the World Values Survey (WVS) managed by Inglehart (2004), at the Institute 
for Social Research at The University of Michigan.   The survey of El Salvador, though 
not published until 2004, was conducted using the third wave 1995-1996 World Value 
Survey Codebook.37 
 Examination of the 1995-1996 World Value Survey Codebook finds comparable 
measures to the independent and dependent variables constructed for Nicaragua.  
However, not all questions were asked in every country represented in the 1995-1996 
wave of the WVS.  As a result the author was unable to reconstruct measures for 
Informal Civil Society (WVS: V59), Role of Religion in Society (not available in WVS), 
or Success of Religion in Society (WVS: V187-190).  The measure for the Level of 
Religious Participation the author uses for Nicaragua are in the WVS Codebook (V197-
199), but not asked in El Salvador.  Level of Religious Participation was reconstructed 
using the frequency of church attendance (WVS: V181).  Finally, only one question 
measuring the Level of Religious Value (WVS: V191) was asked in El Salvador.  
                                                 
37 The 1995-1996 World Values Survey Codebook was down loaded from 
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/statistics/index.html  
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 As a result of discrepancies in available variables, as well as differences in 
question wording and coding, the author was unable to reconstruct many of the index 
variables.  The analysis provided in this chapter is descriptive and preliminary in nature.   
Background  
Geographically, El Salvador is the smallest and most densely populated state in 
Central America, with a population of 6,587,541 on 20,720 square kilometers (CIA 
World Factbook 2004).  Comparatively, Nicaragua is the largest and least densely 
populated state in Central America, with a population of 5,359,759 on 120,254 square 
kilometers of land (CIA World Factbook 2004).  Irrespective of geographical diversity, 
the majority of the population in both states live in urban areas due to considerable rural 
to urban transition prompted by war and social dislocation (Williams 1998, 183-186; 
Williams and Peterson 1996, 873-374). 
Like Nicaragua, El Salvador also experienced a prolonged civil war between 
Salvadoran elites protecting their economic power through the Alianza Republicana 
Nacional (ARENA) and a Marxist-inspired revolutionary movement led by the Frente 
Farabundo Martí de Liberación Nacional (FMLN).  Fought first in civil society, the 
attempts by elites to subdue lower classes unleashed opposition civil society actors like 
the Progressive Church, as well as teachers and workers unions (Foley 1996, p. 67-68).  
Characterized by death squads and indiscriminant killing, El Salvador’s civil war was one 
of the deadliest in the region, lasting 12 years with tens of thousands “disappeared, ”  
75,000 Salvadorans killed, and 500,000 refugees created (Chavez 2004; Foley 1996). 
Similar to the civil war in Nicaragua, religious actors, namely the “Progressive” Catholic 
Church, played a major role in the struggle.  Inspiration for the Progressive Church in El 
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Salvador came from Archbishop Oscar Romero, who was assassinated for his criticisms 
of government and support for popular organizations (Williams and Peterson 1996, p. 
874-877). 
Socioeconomic status is one difference between otherwise similar states.  
According to the United Nations Development Office (UNDP), Nicaragua ranks 118 on 
the Human Development Index, with a Gross Domestic Produce per capita income of 
$2,400 (ppp).  El Salvador ranks 103 on the Human Development Index, with a Gross 
Domestic Product per capita twice that of Nicaragua at $4890 (ppp).38  The enhanced 
economic development of El Salvador should provide an advantage in democratization 
efforts and the development of civil society. 39  Przeworski and Limongi (1997, p. 155-
157) claim economic development is vital to the success of democratic institutions, as per 
capita income correctly classifies democracies in 77 percent of 4126 observations. 
By and large, Nicaragua and El Salvador are comparable due to their similar 
political histories. Both states experienced Marxist inspired civil wars similarly 
influenced by fragmentation between the Traditional and Progressive Catholic Church 
(Williams 1998, p. 184-186).  A second similarity in the transformation of religious 
institutions includes a steady growth in Evangelical Protestant and Pentecostal 
populations.  According to Stoll (1990, p. 337), Evangelicals and Pentecostals in El 
Salvador grew from 2.45 percent of the population in 1960 to 12.78 percent in 1985.  
                                                 
38 These statistics were downloaded from the United Nations Human Development Office at 
http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/indic/indic_124_1_1.html.  The Human Development Index (HDI) ranks 
were downloaded from http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2004/pdf/presskit/HDR04_PKE_HDI.pdf.  A 
states human development according to Gross Domestic Product per capita, Life Expectancy at Birth, and 
Literacy Rate.  GDP per capita measure are 2002 estimates 
39 Accurding to the UNDP Human Development Report El Salvador has the fourth highest GDP per capita 
among the seven Central American states. For a complete list see 
http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/indicator/indic_4_1_1.html  
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Nicaragua’s religious transformation is less dramatic, going from 2.26 percent of the 
population in 1960 to 6.32 percent in 1985 (Stoll 1990, p. 337) 
Religious Denomination in El Salvador (WVS:  V179) 
 More recent estimates for religious demographics in El Salvador vary greatly 
depending on the source.  The CIA World Fact Book (2004) estimates Catholics to make 
up 83 percent of the overall population. The multi-denominational Christian legal 
organization Advocates International approximates the Catholic population to be a mere 
48 percent of the population, with an Evangelical population of 30 percent (2004).  
According to the U.S. Department of State, a 1995 survey conducted by the Central 
American University Public Opinion Institute (IUDOP), found a Catholic population of 
56.7 percent.40  Table 6-1 provides religious populations found by the 1995-1996 wave of 
the WVS. 
Table 6-1:  Religious Denominations in El Salvador (WVS: V179) 
 Frequency Percentages 
Roman Catholic 406 32.4 
Catholic: “Does not follow rules” 332 26.5 
Evangelical 288 23 
Buddhist 28 2.2 
Not A Member 200 15.9 
Total 1254 100 
 
Table 6-1 shows that in El Salvador, 58.9 percent of the sample population choose 
Catholicism as their primary religious provider.  Catholicism is further divided between 
the 32.4 percent of the sample population claiming to be Traditional Roman Catholic and 
                                                 
40 Information from the U.S. Department of State was downloaded from 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2001/5639.htm.  Information from Advocates International was 
downloaded from www.advocatesinternational.org. Advocates International statistics come from their 
website last modified on October 14, 2004. Information from the C.I.A. World Factbook was downloaded 
from http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/es.html.  
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the 26.5 percent claiming to be a Catholic which “Does not follow rules.” Catholics who 
do not follow the rules include Progressive, Charismatic, and non-practicing Catholics.   
El Salvador also has a substantial Evangelical population at 23 percent.  Unfortunately, 
the WVS does not provide a further breakdown of Evangelicals into their specific 
denominations, making it difficult to make definite statements about denominational 
effects.   
 Compared with Nicaragua, the Evangelical movement in El Salvador shows a 
similar pattern. Salvadoran Evangelicals account for 23 percent of the population, which 
is slightly less of a proportion of the population than the 26.1 percent in Nicaragua. The 
two states differ greatly in regards to Traditional Catholic adherents, with 67.4 percent in 
Nicaragua doubling the 32.4 percent in El Salvador.  Yet in El Salvador, 26.5 percent of 
the sample population does claim to be Catholic outside the Traditional Roman Catholic 
Church.  Discrepancies between Catholic populations in Nicaragua and El Salvador may 
be explained by differences in interview techniques used for discerning among the 
variations of Catholicism. 
 El Salvador’s political and economic development may also explain the high 
percentage of the population choosing alternative forms of Catholicism and Evangelical 
denominations.  Acccording to Williams “… 
The dramatic growth of Pentecostalism in El Salvador after the mid 1970s 
is undoubtedly related to the deepening political and economic crisis that 
plunged the country into an unending cycle of violence and despair…The 
social dislocation resulting from the war and economic crisis created 
increasingly precarious condition for the majority of Salvadorans (1998, p. 
183) 
 
Williams further states that the large number of dislocated Salvadorans and the 
over 1.2 million making the urban to rural transition left many citizens searching 
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for “…solutions to their spiritual and physical insecurities” (Williams 1998, p. 
183-185). 
 A second interesting religious phenomenon differentiating Nicaragua and El 
Salvador are respondents claiming to be non-members of Christian denominations. In 
Nicaragua 3.5 percent of the sample population stated being non-Christian or other, with 
.2 percent being Muslim.  The WVS (2004) finds El Salvador’s population claiming to be 
non-Christian or other at 18.1 percent, with 2.2 percent espousing Buddhism.  Overall, 
15.9 percent of the Salvadoran population denies membership in any religious 
organization.  This is astounding given the critical role of religion in traditional societies.    
Religiosity in El Salvador 
Level of Religious Participation – V181  
 The level of religious participation in the WVS is measured by the frequency of 
church attendance.  Unfortunately, how often the respondent participates in religion 
through consultation with God, though on the WVS questionnaire, was not asked in El 
Salvador.  Table 6-2 provides the WVS (2004) estimation for the frequency of church 
attendance in El Salvador. 
Table 6-2:   “How often do you attend religious services (WVS:  V181)?”—                     
El Salvador 
 Frequency Percentages 
More than once a week 357 28.5 
Once a week 351 29.6 
Once a month 134 10.7 
Only on special holy days 75 6.0 
Once a year 78 6.2 
Less often 87 6.9 
Never 151 12.1 
Total (N) 1253 100 
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Analysis of Table 6-2 finds 58.1 percent of the sample population attends church 
services once a week or more.  Furthermore, 13.7 percent of the population claim to be 
non-members of religious denomination, but only 12.1 percent claim they never attend 
religious services.  This inconsistency leaves 1.6 percent of the population either inflating 
church attendance or misrepresenting themselves as non-members. Irrespective of this, 
the level of religious participation, as measured by Church attendance, shows an actively 
religious population, demonstrating that religiosity is still high in El Salvador.  These 
findings run counter to the idea of secularization among Salvadoran society triggered by 
relative economic progress.  Active Church participation may be crucial to the 
development of democratic civil society and social capital as the most common form of 
associational activity.    
Level of Religious Value (V191) 
The Level of Religious Value (WVS: V191) is measured by asking Salvadoran 
respondents to state whether they find strength and comfort in religion.  This question 
was also asked in Nicaragua, yielding similar results.   Table 6-8 is shows a comparative 
analysis of both populations. 
Table 6-3:   “Do you find strength and comfort from religion (WVS: V191)?” 








Yes 1078 88.5 525 89.7 
No 140 11.5 60 10.3 
Total (N) 1218 100 585 100 
 
The findings are similar, with 89.7 percent of respondents in Nicaragua and 88.5 
percent in El Salvador stating they find strength and comfort in their religion.  Significant 
portions of both societies having positive feelings for religion implies that religion 
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continues to be a valuable component of both societies.  These high rates also suggest 
that respondents in both societies utilize religious organizations and associational 
activities as an escape from daily obstacles.  Finding strength and comfort from religion 
implies that, when the faced with obstacles or feelings of despair emerge, the majority of 
respondents look to religion for relief and security. 
Level of Religious Belief – (V183-189) 
 The level of religious belief (WVS: V183-189) measures the span of religious 
constructs used by respondents when consulting religion for solutions to life’s obstacles.  
Table 6-2 shows similar religious characteristics between Nicaraguan and Salvadoran 
respondents. 


















God (V183) 99.4 .6 1250 99.7 .3 598 
Life After Death (V184)  83.4 16.6 1190 86.5 13.5 550 
A Soul (V185) 93.6 6.4 1233 95 4.9 576 
The Devil Exists (V186) 74.4 25.6 1238 76.6 23.3 579 
Hell Exists (V187) 76.4 23.6 1236 74 26 572 
Heaven Exists (V188) 86.1 13.9 1229 93.8 6.2 584 
Sin (V189)  95.1 4.9 1251 98.5 1.5 601 
Note: Belief in Resurrection of the Dead and Reincarnation do not appear in the 1995-1996 World Values 
Survey Codebook.  
 
An examination of Table 6-4 shows remarkable similarities in the level of 
religious value between data provided by the WVS for El Salvador and the Nicaraguan 
data collected for this research.  Nearly 100 percent of respondents in both countries 
believe in God, and both sets of respondents display similar patterns of greater belief in 
the positive over the negative religious concepts.  Both populations find the lowest rates 
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of belief in the negative religious constructs of Hell and the Devil.  Surprisingly, both 
also have the third lowest rate of belief in the positive construct of life after death.  This 
relationship can be explained by the fact that life after death can be both a negative and 
positive construct.  The question (WVS: V184) does not specify whether respondents will 
be spending life after death in heaven or hell.  
The diverging beliefs between positive and negative constructs of religion 
strengthen the assertion that conversion is activated through a desire to escape everyday 
hardships by way of religious expression and institutions.  The otherworldly concept of a 
soul, providing identity, and heaven, providing paradise, gives hope to individuals.  
These positive constructs are more easily applied to one’s life than negative constructs.  
The fear brought on by belief in the existence of the devil and hell does not provide hope 
to the individual, but are undesirable consequences of bad behavior.  The purpose of 
these constructs is to restrict behavior.   
State of Formal Civil Society41 
 This section examines the state of formal civil society participation in El 
Salvador.  Table 6-5 is a breakdown of membership in various civil society organizations.  
The variables provided below are parallel to those on the Nicaraguan survey instrument.  
One major difference is the coding of answers.  The Nicaraguan survey instrument places 
the level of participation with formal civil society organizations on a five-point Likert 
Scale.  The 1995-1996 WVS survey instrument codes the level of membership on a three-
point Likert Scale. 
 
                                                 
41 Formal Civil Society in the World Values Survey (WVS 1995-1996) measured by variables (V 29, 30, 
31, 32, 33, 34, 35) Membership or participation in Formal Civil Society in the WVS 1995-1996 Codebook 
is placed on a three rather than five point Likert-scale. 
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Table 6-5:  Membership in Formal Civil Society Organizations – El Salvador 
 Active Member Inactive 
Member 
Not a Member Total 
Member of sports or recreation group 



























































Note:  Scores not in parenthesis are percentages and those in parenthesis are frequencies 
 Analysis of Table 6- 5 is taken variable by variable below to provide a thorough 
understanding of formal civil society participation outside of religious institutions in El 
Salvador. Overall, participation in the formal sectors of civil society is very similar in 
Nicaragua and El Salvador.  Membership in formal organizations also does not appear to 
be a central concern to the majority of Salvadorans.   
Sports, Arts and Education Membership in El Salvador (WVS: V29; V30) 
In El Salvador sports and recreation groups (WVS: V29) are among the most 
popular formal organizations, with 11.7 percent of the sample population claiming 
“active” membership, which is larger than the 9.9 percent in Nicaragua.42  Educational 
and arts organizations (WVS: V30) also share a similar pattern between the two 
populations, with 9.9 percent of Salvadorans and 8.3 percent of Nicaraguans claiming 
membership.  Though alike, El Salvador does have a slightly higher percentage of the 
population participating in these organizations.  It appears that in El Salvador these 
organizations are slightly better organized. 
Political Parties (WVS: V32) 
                                                 
42 The World Values Survey (1995-1996) measures membership on a three point scale with the options 
being “Active Member”; “Inactive Member”; and “Not a Member” 
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Membership in political parties is stronger in Nicaragua than in El Salvador.  
Only 3.7 percent of the Salvadoran sample population state “active” or “inactive” 
membership in political parties, while 12.5 percent of the Nicaraguan population claims 
some level of membership.  Discrepancies in the sample populations may be the result of 
one major difference in their political histories.  While both states endured civil war 
through Marxist uprisings, the success of the FSLN in Nicaragua influenced party 
membership, as a strong party is central to Communist movements.  Furthermore, El 
Salvador’s civil war was an extremely bloody affair, with indiscriminant violence.  For 
example, Chavez (2004, 31) states “El Salvador…is often described as one of the most 
violent countries in the region”.  The political environment throughout the civil war was 
one where any expression or overt statement of political belief was extremely dangerous 
and perceived as a threat to one side or the other.  The residual effect of previous political 
violence may generate hesitance among Salvadoran respondents outwardly to commit to 
one party over another.  
El Salvador and Nicaragua also demonstrate similar patterns in self-placement on 
the Left-Right continuum.   Table 6- 6 shows a comparative itemization of respondents’ 
political self-placement on the political spectrum for both sample populations. 
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Table 6-6:  Political Self-placement on the Left-Right Continuum in El Salvador 
(WVS: V123) and Nicaragua 








Right – 10 252 25.1 87 14.5 
9 32 3.2 39 3.6 
8 71 7.1 61 10.1 
7 59 5.9 41 6.8 
6 161 16.0 17 2.8 
5 257 25.6 225 37.4 
4 20 2.0 11 1.8 
3 17 1.7 33 5.5 
2 16 1.6 18 3.5 
Left - 1 119 11.9 69 11.5 
Total 1004 100 601  
 
Similar to the political self-placement of Nicaraguans, large segments of the 
Salvadoran sample population place themselves near the center or do not strongly 
associate with the left or right.  For those respondents associating themselves with the left 
or right, a greater number of Salvadorans place their political beliefs on the right as 
opposed to the left.  This trend is also occurring in Nicaragua, suggesting a similar 
political culture born out of a backlash toward leftist parties like the FSLN and FMLN.  
Support for leftist parties renews the fear of violence and civil war, which remains fresh 
in the collective memories of the voting age public.  However, informal interviewer 
conversations found many supporters of the FSLN in Nicaragua to be enthusiastic and 
collectively fear a return to the repressive regimes of men like the Somozas.   
Labor Unions (V31) 
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 Labor unions in El Salvador have also not been institutionalized.  Only one 
percent of the sample population state “active” membership, with 1.2 percent stating 
“inactive” membership.  In contrast, Nicaragua has 3.7 percent espousing “active” 
membership with an overall 5.3 percent stating membership in some form.  The 
discrepancy between membership in Nicaragua and El Salvador is likely the result of the 
state imposed Sandinista Confederation of Labor (CST) for urban workers and the 
Association of Agricultural Workers (ATC) for agrarian workers under the slogan “Only 
one workers’ class, only one trade union” (Belli 1986, p. 79-81).  Under the Sandinista 
regime these institutions could not be considered civil society due to their state affiliation. 
Today the CST and ATC are considered private civil society organizations regardless of 
their current association with the FSLN. 
Professional Associations (V34) 
Membership in professional associations is slightly less common in El Salvador, 
with 6.3 percent claiming “inactive” membership and 4.7 percent claiming “active” 
membership.  Nicaragua, by contrast, has 8.2 percent of the population espousing 
membership. Of the Nicaraguan respondents, 7.9 percent stated “active” or “somewhat 
active” membership.  Inflation among Nicaraguan respondents may exist as many of the 
respondents may have equated professional associations with transportation or artisan 
collectives.  El Salvador has a healthier economy, meaning that a greater number of 
professional associations may exist.   
Charitable Organization (V35) 
 Memberships in charitable or philanthropic organizations are more popular in El 
Salvador than Nicaragua.  Only 3.2 percent of the respondents claimed membership to 
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these organizations in Nicaragua, but a surprising 11.2 percent stated membership in El 
Salvador. Overall, 9.8 percent of the Salvadoran respondents claim “active” membership.  
Low membership in charitable organizations among Nicaraguan respondents may be the 
result of a bias in the sample population.  The researcher encountered difficulty accessing 
upper income respondents, as they were either uninterested in participating or the 
interviewer was denied access by those working at the residence.  Income levels are 
associated with participation in charitable organizations, and given El Salvador’s higher 
per capita income and better ranking on the Human Development Index, may also explain 
strong participation rates among Salvadorans in these organizations. 
Effects of Civil Society 
  
Interpersonal Trust (WVS: V27) 
 The 1995-1996 World Values Survey Codebook (WVS) provides similar 
questions for interpersonal trust to those supplied on the Nicaragua survey instrument. 
Unfortunately, these questions were not asked in El Salvador.  To gain insight into 
interpersonal trust, the WVS simply asked the respondent whether most people can be 
trusted.  Trust in other individuals in El Salvador is rather dismal. Only 14.1 percent of 
the population feels most people can be trusted, while 85.9 percent feel that you must be 
careful when dealing with others.   In Nicaragua interpersonal trust levels are higher, with 
27.4 percent of the sample population finding others to be generally trustworthy (IPTPG).  
However, when asked whether people try to take advantage of others, 78.5 percent of the 
sample population in Nicaragua “agrees”.  The results indicate that interpersonal trust 
levels in El Salvador and Nicaragua are quite low.   
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Causes for low interpersonal trust levels among Salvadorans are likely related to 
the prolonged ten-year civil war.  El Salvador is also a very densely populated country, 
with the majority living in and around San Salvador.  Social dislocation and higher 
population density increases the contact between citizens, especially for those going 
through the rural to urban transition.  Negative interactions with desperate individuals in 
a new environment may also be exacerbating lower interpersonal trust levels.   
Confidence in Governmental Institutions 
 Confidence in Governmental Institutions (CIGIND) on the Nicaraguan survey 
instrument asks respondents to state their level of confidence on a five-point Likert scale. 
The 1995-1996 WVS Codebook uses a four-point scale.  The major difference is the 
Nicaraguan survey instrument allows respondents to state whether they have “total 
confidence” in the institution.  Other differences include the institutions represented.  The 
Nicaraguan survey instrument provided the respondent with “The President”, and does 
not include the “Armed Forces”.  Table 6-6 provides an examination of confidence 
respondents have in governmental intuitions.  
 
Table 6-17:  How much confidence do you have in the following institutions? – 
 El Salvador 

































































Examination of Table 6-7 shows that 49 percent of the Salvadoran respondents have “a 
great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the police.  In Nicaragua, 49 percent of the 
sample population stated having “somewhat” to “total” confidence in the police.  
Therefore, in both states the police are one of the most widely regarded political 
institutions.  Relatively high confidence levels in the police for each society shows that 
the government organization involved in most interactions with citizens is doing a good 
job garnering confidence in the government.  These high confidence rates may also be 
linked to a desire on the part of the citizens for stability and order following decades of 
civil unrest.   
 Confidence in legislative bodies is also similar across the two states.  In El 
Salvador, 69 percent of the sample population have “little” or “no” confidence in the 
unicameral Asamblea Legislativa.  In Nicaragua, 66.2 percent of the sample population 
state having “little” or “no” confidence in the unicameral Asamblea Nacional.  Low 
confidence levels in legislative bodies are negative for the maintenance of democratic 
institutions.  Neither Salvadorans nor Nicaraguans view legislative bodies as 
representative of society in general and are constantly disappointed by the inability of 
politicians and legislators to fulfill their campaign promises.  This constant 
disappointment may have created a belief that legislative bodies are not effective political 
institutions.  Furthermore, in both societies civil unrest was born out of the concept of 
class warfare, meaning the majority of poor and working class respondents may view 
their respective legislative bodies as elite institutions. 
 The legal systems of Nicaragua and El Salvador also share low rates of 
confidence.  In El Salvador, 59.1 percent of the sample population state having “not very 
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much” to “no” confidence in the legal system.  Comparably, 58.4 percent of the 
Nicaraguan sample population state having “little” to “no” confidence in the legal 
system.  The Nicaraguan and Salvadoran lack of confidence in their respective legal 
systems is part of an overall distrust of domestic political institutions.  The legal systems 
of both states may also be seen as elite institutions. 
 The lack of confidence in the majority of domestic political institutions is 
unfavorable for the maintenance of democracy in the region.  On the positive side, those 
institutions where the greatest interaction between governmental officials and the citizens 
take place, the police, confidence seem to be developing.  However, confidence in the 
police may be the result of a desire for stability and order.  As one moves up the ladder of 
political institutions, further and further away from the average citizen, confidence begins 
to wane.  This lack of confidence has been born out of civil uprisings inspired by 
economic class divergence, where high profile government institutions have traditionally 
been seen as elite institutions.   
Acceptance of Alternative Political Expressions (V: 118; 119; 120; 121; 122) 
 Acceptance of alternative political expressions in the WVS differs from the 
research conducted in Nicaragua in regards to responses.  The survey in Nicaragua asks 
respondents to state their level of agreement with alternative political activities as a form 
of political expression.  The WVS in El Salvador asks respondents their experiences with 
alternative forms of political expressions.  As a result responses vary as respondents may 
accept alternative forms of expression even though they have not participated in such 
activities.   
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Table 6-8:  Have you ever participated in the following form of political expression? 
El Salvador 
 Have Done Might Do Never Do Total 
Signing a Petition 









Attending Lawful Demonstration 









Joining Unofficial Strikes 









Occupying Buildings and Factories  









Note: In parentheses are the frequencies from the WVS survey.  Not in parentheses are the valid 
percentages.  “Joining Boycotts”, though in the WVS codebook was not asked in El Salvador. 
 
 Irrespective of measurement differences, acceptance of alternative forms of 
political expression show similar patterns in Nicaragua and El Salvador.  In El Salvador a 
combined 60.4 percent of the sample population “have” or “might” consider signing a 
petition as an acceptable form of political expression.  In Nicaragua 73.4 percent of the 
sample population “agree” or “strongly agree” that signing a petition is an acceptable 
form of political expression.  For the maintenance of democratic institutions, high rates of 
acceptance for signing a petition demonstrates health as freedom of expression has been 
institutionalized.   
 In El Salvador, 19.2 percent of the sample population “have” or “might” attend 
legal demonstrations.  In Nicaragua, 83.4 percent of the sample population “strongly 
agree” or “agree” with the right of people to attend legal demonstrations.  The 
discrepancy between these two populations is most likely the result of coding techniques. 
In El Salvador respondents might not attend legal demonstrations, but it does not mean 
these respondents disagree with the right of individuals to attend legal demonstrations.  In 
both states signing petitions and attending legal demonstrations appear to be acceptable 
forms of political expression.  These two forms tend to be the most widely accepted 
because they are the least likely to result in violence.  It appears that in both Nicaragua 
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and El Salvador the freedom of expression has been institutionalized as long as that form 
does not engender a potential for violence.  Essentially, the acceptance of freedom of 
expression is positive for the maintenance of democratic political institutions. 
 In El Salvador, only 7.8 percent of the population “have” or “might” join 
unofficial strikes and even less, 5.7 percent of the sample population “have” or “might” 
occupy buildings or factories.  Similar patterns emerge in Nicaragua, as 74.5 percent of 
the respondents “disagree” or “strongly disagree” with joining boycotts.  Furthermore, 
83.5 percent of the Nicaraguan sample population “disagrees” or “strongly disagrees” 
with the occupation of buildings or factories.  The sharp decline in support for these two 
alternative political expressions is likely caused by the inherent potential in each form of 
expression to escalate into violence.  Both Nicaraguans and Salvadorans demonstrate 
little tolerance for political violence, which is not surprising given their violent political 
histories.  On the whole, it appears that in both societies there exists a respect for the 
freedom of expression.  The Nicaraguan field research is testimony to this by the 
eagerness of respondents who enthusiastically expressed themselves in the course of 
interviews.  However, this democratic freedom does have its limits.  Essentially, 
alternative forms of political expression with a propensity for violence are not tolerated. 
Discussion 
Chapter Six strives to provide an understanding as to whether the religious and 
political transformations taking place are unique to Nicaragua or part of a larger trend 
effecting Central America as a whole.  Judging from the similarities between Nicaragua 
and El Salvador, it appears that political and religious transformations are occurring 
throughout the Central America.  In both societies participation in formal civil society 
 160
organizations outside religious institutions is somewhat rare.  Both societies openly 
accept the freedom of expression, but place strict limitations based on the expressions 
propensity to result in violence.  Nicaragua and El Salvador both suffer low confidence in 
governmental institutions, which is most likely the result of socialized class conflict 
before and during Marxist uprisings.  The majority of Nicaraguans and Salvadorans see 
the national political institutions as elite institutions incapable or unwilling to address the 
economic, social, and political challenges facing the majority of Nicaraguans and 
Salvadorans. 
Greater economic and social dislocation occurring in El Salvador has produced a 
more intense change in the domestic religious structure.  Greater dislocation shows a 
more dramatic fragmentation in the Catholic Church, with the Catholic population 
relatively equally dispersed between “Traditional” and those who “Do not follow the 
rules” (WVS:V179, 2004).  Trends away from Catholicism are just as staggering, with 
large portions of society shifting toward Evangelical Protestantism, largely through 
Pentecostalism.  Moreover, secularization appears to be occurring with democratization 
and economic changes in El Salvador, as a large portion of the sample population claim 
to be non-members of Christian denominations.   
The number of respondents claiming no religious affiliation may also be a 
residual effect of the violent civil war.  During the civil war, association with the 
Progressive Church may have brought forth a wrath from the right in the form of death 
squads.  Conversely, affiliation with the Traditional Salvadoran Catholic Church may 
have resulted in oppression by Left or FMLN sympathizers.  The few groups in society 
not perceived as a threat to the Left or Right, were non-members, Charismatic Catholics, 
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and Evangelicals.  This is one possible explanation for the dramatic religious 
fragmentation within the Catholic Church, as well as the exponential growth of 
Evangelical Protestantism and Pentecostalism in El Salvador.  The relationship between 
civil war, social dislocation, and diversity of religion is similar in both countries though 






Formal Civil Society 
  
Formal civil society organizations, like politicians and political institutions, have 
failed the average Nicaraguan by making unfeasible promises and raising expectations.  
Formal organizations have also not truly established themselves as sources of 
associational activities for the aggregation of interests for the average Nicaraguan.  Under 
the Somozas the majority of formal organizations were essentially elite organizations, as 
no formal organization could survive in opposition to the dictatorial regime.  During the 
Sandinista regime the majority of formal civil society organizations, such as labor unions, 
were absorbed and made part of the state.  Throughout the Sandinista regime the 
associational activities taking place failed to meet a major criterion to be considered civil 
society, that is working outside the state.  Ironically, it is the state imposed social 
structures during the Sandinista regime that offer the best hope for the establishment of a 
formal civil society.  The structure of barrio organizations, built around a “jefe” flanked 
by a group of community members, could serve as the infrastructure or starting point for 
the creation of a more stable formal civil society sector.   
The findings in this research are consistent with the conclusions of Booth and 
Richard (1998, 796-798) on Central America inasmuch as formal civil society is not well 
established or defined.   The majority of associational activity takes place at the 
community level and may not produce the effects that Putnam (2000; 1995) had hoped.  
For example, this research, like Booth and Richard (1998), found that even with large 
amounts of communal associational activity occurring, the levels of interpersonal trust 
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are low.  Booth and Richard (1998 797) call this a “repression affect” and claim it may 
not create systemic democracy, as in the past the governments co-opted communal 
organizations to ensure regime survival.  In Nicaragua the “repression effect” occurred as 
a result of the muted civil society under the Somozas and the state imposed associational 
activities under the Sandinistas.  This “repression effect” may be one of the central causes 
for the lack of development in formal civil society. 
Informal Civil Society 
 Outside of formal institutions, on the community or “barrio” level, associational 
activity thrives, both within and outside religious communities.  Close physical as well as 
socio-economic proximity creates informal community ties through constant interaction.   
Thus, in Nicaragua informal civil society appears to be very healthy, which is a positive 
for the maintenance and establishment of democratic institutions.  The strong 
participation and support of informal civil society activities and organizations is likely a 
residual effect of not only Sandinista community organizing, but also the Progressive 
Church organized in CEBs and the independent structure of Evangelical Protestant 
Churches.   
The health of informal civil society within these organizations is the stating point, 
or basic infrastructure, to initiate the development of more healthy formal civil society 
organizations.  Organizations or groups of grassroots churches and Evangelical 
movements are crucial to the establishment of formal civil society because they are 
institutions which provide the average Nicaraguan an opportunity to participate.  
Furthermore, the associational activities occurring within these types of organizations are 
taking place with respondents of similar socio-economic backgrounds creating an identity 
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with others in the group and providing a sense of worth in their small religious 
communities. 
Religious Denomination and Civil Society 
H1. Pentecostalism will have a positive significant relationship with a civil society 
capable of establishing and maintaining democratic institutions.  
 
Given the small number of Pentecostal respondents, it is impossible to make any 
assertion about the relationship between Pentecostal respondents and the dependent civil 
society variables, as their numbers were too low to make significant statistical statements.  
As a result the hypothesis that Pentecostals create a civil society capable of establishing 
and maintaining democratic institutions is not supported here.  In Nicaragua there is no 
evidence that Pentecostals will engender different relationships to civil society as the 
independent Protestant 
H2. Evangelical Protestantism will have a positive significant relationship with a civil 
society capable of establishing and maintaining democratic institutions. 
 
It appears Evangelical religions are no more or less capable of creating civil 
society I than Traditional Catholics.  That is, Evangelical Protestants are no more or less 
capable of maintaining democratic institutions than the other denominations analyzed 
here.  The hypothesis that Evangelical religious denominations are better at creating a 
civil society capable of maintaining democratic institutions is not supported.  Association 
with Evangelical denominations provided no significant positive or negative relationships 
with the dependent formal and informal civil society variables, or the variables measuring 
the effect of participation in civil society.   
 
H3. Traditional Catholicism will have a negative significant relationship with a civil 
society a capable of establishing and maintaining democratic institutions. 
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Traditional Catholicism does not appear to create or hinder the development of a 
civil society capable of maintaining democratic institutions.    The negative significant 
relationship between being Traditional Catholic and informal civil society support 
implies that being Catholic is detrimental to civil society development.  However, being a 
Traditional Catholic increases the likelihood that respondents have confidence in 
governmental institutions, which is positive for the development Civil Society I.  The 
hypothesis implying that Traditional Catholicism is less capable of producing Civil 
Society I is neither fully supported nor denied. 
H4. Progressive Catholicism, as espoused by Liberation Theology, will have a negative 
significant relationship with a civil society capable of establishing and maintaining 
democratic institutions. 
 
Progressive Catholicism does not appear to produce Civil Society II as previously 
thought.  While Progressive Catholicism does not engender positive significant 
relationships with all of the indicators of Civil Society I, it does yield some interesting 
results.  First, the significant positive relationship with informal civil society support 
shows that associational activity and organizing is occurring, which is good for producing 
a civil society capable of sustaining democratic political institutions.  If Progressive 
Catholicism is producing Civil Society II, or anti regime civil society, then a significant 
negative relationship with the levels of confidence in governmental institutions would be 
expected.  On the contrary, being a Progressive Catholic is a positive significant indicator 
of confidence in governmental institutions.  Progressive Catholics are also significantly 
more likely to have high levels of political efficacy and interpersonal trust.  If Progressive 
Catholicism were producing Civil Society II, then low political efficacy levels would be 
expected because within tyrannical regimes participation in formal political mechanisms 
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like voting are ineffectual.  Interpersonal trust and high political efficacy are valuable 
relationships for the establishment of Civil Society I.   Overall, Progressive Catholicism 
does appear to create a pro democratic civil society.  The hypothesis for Progressive 
Catholics creating a civil society capable of maintaining democratic institutions is 
supported.   
H5.  Charismatic Catholicism will have a positive significant relationship with a civil 
society capable of establishing and maintaining democratic institutions 
 
 The hypothesis regarding the capacity of Charismatic Catholicism to create a civil 
society capable of establishing and maintaining democratic institutions has not been 
supported here.  This is not to say that Charismatic Catholics do not have the influence on 
society acknowledged by Stoll (1993). Similar to Pentecostals, the number of 
Charismatic Catholic respondents in this research was not sufficient for statistical 
analysis.  There appears to have been a problem in the interview technique for 
determining the differences between Traditional and Charismatic Catholics.  As a result, 
Charismatic Catholics were not coded and excluded from the study.    
Overall, no religious denomination fully meets the criteria established for the 
creation of Civil Society I, II, or III.  Progressive Catholicism is the closest, producing 
five positive significant relationships with the eleven civil society dependent variables.  
Furthermore, Progressive Catholicism does not appear to be producing Civil Society II 
due to its positive relationship with confidence in governmental institutions.  Traditional 
Catholicism produces a significant negative relationship with support for informal civil 
society and a positive significant relationship with confidence in governmental 
institutions.  These two relationships are not enough to determine whether Traditional 
Catholicism is producing Civil Society I, II, or III.  Finally, the lack of any significant 
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relationships between Evangelical Protestantism and the civil society dependent variables 
also makes it difficult to make any statements regarding the production of Civil Society I, 
II, or III.   
Judging from the tables and analysis provided above, it appears that association 
within one denomination has minimal effect on either the propensity to participate in civil 
society or to accrue democratic values as a result of participation.  The driving factors for 
participation in civil society outside of religious organizations are gender, education, and 
age. 
Religiosity and Civil Society 
 One contribution of this study is the attempt to find alternative and comprehensive 
measures of religiosity and the effect of participation in religious organizations on the 
creation of civil society.  Religiosity, as a broad construct, is difficult to measure as well 
as analyze.  However, when the concepts of religiosity are separated, a more concrete 
understanding of the effects of religion begin to emerge.   
 Religiosity, as a broad construct, did not produce a large number of significant 
relationships.  The level of religiosity did produce positive significant relationships with 
interpersonal trust and confidence in governmental institutions.  These relationships are 
positive for the creation of Civil Society I.  However, there are no significant 
relationships between religiosity and participation in formal or informal civil society, nor 
for the effects of participation measured through political efficacy, political knowledge, 
interpersonal trust, openness of political participation, and acceptance of alternative 
political expression.  As a broad construct, religiosity does not provide adequate 
explanations for the development of Civil Society I.  Age, gender, and educational 
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attainment all provided more significant relationships with civil society and better 
explanations. 
 Analyzing religiosity through its three separate components, level of religious 
beliefs, value, and participation, produces better results.  Level of religious belief has 
significant negative relationships with participation in formal and informal civil society.  
This finding may run counter to the creation of Civil Society I.  According to Putnam 
(2000, p. 77), Evangelical churches, at least in the United States, are exclusive in nature 
and the associational activities occurring within them does not spread outside of those 
institutions.  Evangelicals in this research have significant positive relationships with all 
of the independent religiosity variables, suggesting the highest levels of religiosity are 
among Nicaraguan Evangelicals.  If informal civil society is occurring within 
independent Evangelical churches in Nicaragua, then a negative relationship between 
religious belief and participation in formal and informal civil society shows that 
participation in these Evangelical Church comes at the expense of other civil society 
actors, both formal and informal. That is, the more time spent within the Evangelical 
Churches, the less time dedicated to other civil society actors.  The implication here is 
that Evangelicals in Nicaragua are also exclusive, keeping the benefits of associational 
activity within their church communities.  This does not explain the lack of significant 
relationships between Evangelical denominations and the dependent civil society 
variables. 
 The level of religious value finds no statistically significant relationships with the 
dependent civil society variables or the effects of civil society.  However, the level of 
religious participation shows both positive and negative relationships.  The significant 
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positive relationships between religious participation and informal civil society 
participation are good for the development of Civil Society I.  Religious participation 
generates informal civil society participation, which produces attitudes necessary for the 
development of confidence in governmental institutions.   
The problem in making this assertion is the negative significant relationship 
between religious participation and the levels of political knowledge and openness of 
political participation.  These relationships suggest that confidence in governmental 
institutions is based on a lack of knowledge about politics, creating a false sense of 
confidence.    This relationship is further evidence that people who participate in religion 
do so out of a desire to escape the hardships of daily life. Religious participation may 
produce an avoidance of politics, as noted by the relationship with political knowledge.  
Religious participation may also produce conservative attitudes encouraging maintenance 
of the status quo.  The motivation behind these attitudes is to avoid political conflict and 
violence, as shown by the significant negative relationship with the openness of political 
participation.   
 The most intriguing findings are the relationships between the view of religious 
success in society and the role respondents believe religious institutions should play in 
the social, political, and economic sphere.  These findings are significant because they 
demonstrate a relationship in attitudes towards religious institutions being reflected in the 
attitudes towards political institutions.  
 If respondents believe religious institutions should play a major role in society, 
then respondents are more likely to participate in and support informal civil society.  
They are also more likely to have high political efficacy and believe in the openness of 
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political participation.   The implication of this relationship is that if religious institutions 
are playing a major role in society, respondents are empowered by this role and are 
producing attitudes that encourage political efficacy and open political processes.  These 
relationships are positive for the production of Civil Society I, as the more political 
efficacy respondents have, the more likely they are to invest in society through 
participation. 
 Respondent’s views regarding the success of religious institutions also illustrate a 
noteworthy relationship.  The respondents’ view of success among religious institutions 
in society has significant positive relationships with political efficacy, interpersonal trust, 
confidence in governmental institutions, and belief that governmental institutions are 
correct.  These relationships suggest that if respondents view religious institutions as 
successful, they also view other institutions as successful.  Respondents in Nicaragua are 
much closer to their religious institutions than their political ones.  Positive attitudes 
about religious institutions among respondents may foster positive attitudes about 
political institutions, which is encouraging for the creation of Civil Society I. 
The relationships of attitudes towards religious institutions affecting attitudes 
about other political and social institutions are significant.  They demonstrate that even 
though religious institutions have fragmented and denominational affiliation is in 
transition, religious institutions remain the central social institutions in the lives of most 
Nicaraguans.  Whether it comes from the hierarchy of the Traditional Catholic Church or 
the grassroots model of Evangelical Protestantism and Progressive Catholicism, religious 
institutions are among the most important in society.  The evidence presented here 
supports the assertions of Inglehart and Norris’ (2004) that traditional societies in 
 171
underdeveloped states are not following the secularization model of developed world.  
The state of “human development” in such countries means religious organizations fill 
the voids in civil society where other private and governmental institutions cannot 
provide solutions to daily problems.  Nicaragua is no exception to these claims, 
especially when the relationship between the role of religion in society and the effects of 
civil society are taken into consideration.  
Control Variables and Civil Society 
Education seems to be the most significant variable when trying to gain an 
understanding of civil society development and its effects.  Unfortunately, this fact does 
not bode well for the future of Nicaragua, as many of today’s youth are foregoing formal 
education due to a lack of opportunity upon graduation and the immediate economic 
needs of the family.  To develop Civil Society I, it is important that an educated and 
caring population is being fostered.  Success utilizing the organizational capacity of 
informal civil society established through the Sandinista regime and the grassroots 
organization of popular religious organization for the development of formal civil society 
will be the responsibility of the next generation.  If educational attainment continues its 
downward trend and poor economic performance persists, the future for the next 
generation appears bleak.  With little incentive existing to educate themselves today, the 
future of civil society development is in danger as the burden on already strapped 
religious, social, and political institutions, as well as other civil society actors, will 
increase.   
Need for Further Investigation 
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The findings of this research add to the theoretical literature surrounding the role 
of religion in politics, and civil society, however the results are not uniformly robust, and 
leave room for further analysis.  First the relationship between religion and democracy 
needs to be further explored.  The idea that Catholicism, due to its structure and mediated 
relationship with God is anti-democratic, put forth by Weber, Lipset, Barro, and 
Huntington, is not as strong today as in the past.  That is, as religious institutions, like the 
Catholic Church and many of the mainline Protestant denominations, have fragmented, 
the uniformity of their message has also fragmented.  The belief that religious institutions 
provide the framework through which individuals can interpret their increasingly 
complex world (Inglehart 1988; Wald, Owen and Hill 1990; 1988; Griffith, Plamentz, 
and Pennock 1956) may be true, but making generalizations by denomination is less 
relevant.   
As Gill(1999; 1994) and Iannacone, Fink, and Stark(1997) have pointed out, the 
decline of the Catholic monopoly in Latin America has led to an open religious market 
where Evangelical Protestant denominations are working to establish themselves.  
Furthermore, Cleary (1997) finds that these new Evangelical Protestant denominations 
are not mirror images of their sister denominations to the north.  These independent 
Evangelical churches are built on “survival strategies” where religious leaders are not 
only charged with providing the weekly biblical lessons, but also recruiting members and 
raising funds.  Through these duties the consistency of religious belief by denomination is 
altered by each specific religious leader in their survival efforts.  Thus, the religious 
message is inconsistent across individual churches and within denominations.  Due to this 
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inconsistency, making statements about large sections of society by denomination 
becomes a difficult task.  
 Modernization has also changed the impact of religion on the individual.  
Nicaragua is one of the poorest states in the Western Hemisphere, yet technological 
development has increased the accessibility of television and radio to all sectors of 
society.  Accessibility to these technologies has decreased the importance of religious 
organizations as the providers of political information necessary for the creation political 
beliefs.  These findings do not deny that religion is not an important part of society.  
Religious organizations and institutions are extremely important sources of community 
and arenas where spirituality is developed.  The political role of religious organizations is 
shifting, especially in developing countries, where they are used as escapes from the 
harshness of the real world rather than the primary interpreters of it.   
To understand the role of religion and politics, research needs to move beyond the 
typologies of religious denomination and religiosity to a more comprehensive 
understanding of how people apply their religious beliefs and knowledge in everyday life. 
Religion itself is an interpretation of some religious document or set of principles; as 
people submit themselves to those rules, they also engage in interpretation. Therefore, 
application of religion in daily life is not done uniformly.  People with different levels of 
belief and knowledge will apply their religious background in different ways based on 
what they know.  The result is a different worldview based on attitudes towards society 
and politics interpreted through their religious knowledge and religious communities. 
Development of formal civil society in Nicaragua is possible if formal civil 
society actors are able to revitalize or replicate the local organizing infrastructure created 
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by the Sandinista regime and popular religious organizations.  Further research needs to 
examine what is left of former barrio level community organizing and revitalize it in 
more pro democratic forms.  Research also needs to explore ways to incorporate the 
small and exclusive independent Evangelical Churches, as well as other churches, in 
ways that allow them to effectively participate in civil society.  The structure of these 
small communities created inside Evangelical Churches also needs more exploration to 
understand the nature of their exclusivity and find ways to incorporate these small 
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Code Book for the 2003 Nicaraguan Survey Instrument – John G. Poffenbarger 
 
1.  Number – the number of the survey 
2.  Date 
3.  Start Time 
4.  End Time  
5.  Neighborhood 
6.  Rural (1) or Urban (2) 
 
Political Participation (PP---) 
 
7.A) Do you vote in National Elections (PPVNE) 
Almost (5)  
Almost Always (4)  
Sometimes (3)  
Almost Never (2)  
Never (1)   
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
 
7.B. Do you vote in Local Elections? (PPVLE) 
Almost (5)  
Almost Always (4)  
Sometimes (3)  
Almost Never (2)  
Never (1)   
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
 
Show Card B. 
7C. Did you vote in the elections held on November 4, 2001? (PPVRE) 
Yes (2)  
No (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
7C1.  (If no on 7C).  I am going to read a series of statements.  Please indicate which of the following as 
reasons for not voting in the last election (PPRNV#) 
                                                                                                               Yes (2)  No (1)  DK(99) NA(88) 
1. I am not interested in politics or government.(PPRNV1                   ____    _____   _____    _____ 
2. The same party always wins (PPRNV2)               ____    _____   _____    _____ 
3. Nothing ever changes (PPRNV3)              ____    _____   _____    _____ 
4. Important issues were never addressed. (PPRNV4)             ____    _____   _____    _____ 
5. Did not know there was an election (PPRNV5) ____    _____    _____    _____ 
6. I did not know where to vote (PPRNV6)                                            ____ ____    _____    _____ 
7. I did not agree with any of the candidates (PPRNV7)                        ____ ____    _____    _____ 
8. I did not have an identification card (PPRNV8) ____ ____    _____    _____ 
9. My registration card did not match my polling place. (PPRNV9)      ____ ____    _____    _____ 
10. I was busy (PPRNV10) ____ ____    _____    _____ 
11. I forgot (PPRNV11) ____   ____    _____    _____ 
12. I was ill (PPRNV12) ____    _____    _____ 
13. I did not have sufficient information to decide on a candidate (PPRNV13)  ____    _____   _____ 
14. Other reasons: (PPRNV14) ____ ____    _____    _____ 
 
7D Have you ever worked for a candidate or party? 
Yes (2)  
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No (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
 
7E. Have you ever tried to convince others how to vote? (PPCOV) 
Yes (2)  
No (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
 
Show card C 
7E1. If yes on 7E, How frequently have you tried to convince other how to vote? (PPFCV) 
Very Frequently (5)  
Frequently (4)  
Occasionally (3)  
Rarely (2)  
Never (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
Show Card B 
7G.  What do you consider to be most important when deciding whom to vote for?  (PPIID) 
 Yes (1) No (0) DK (99) NA(88) 
Party (PPIIDP)     
Candidate (PPIIDC)     
Plan of Government 
(PPIIDG) 
    
 
Political Knowledge (PK---) 
8A.) Who is the president of Nicaragua?  (PKPRN) 
Knows (2)  
Does not know (1)  
DNA (99)  
NA(88)  
8B.) Who is the President of the United States? (PKPUS) 
Knows (2)  
Does not know (1)  
DNA (99)  
NA(88)  
8C.) Who is the mayor of your city or town? (PKMCT) 
Knows (2)  
Does not know (1)  
DNA (99)  
NA(88)  
 
Formal Civil Society (FOC--) 
 
Show Card D 
For each of the following organizations please indicate whether you are: Very active member (4); Active 
Member (3) Somewhat active member (2); Inactive Member (1); Not a Member (0); DK (99) 
 
9A.) Sports or recreation organization? (FOCSR) 
Very Active Member (5)  
Active Member (4)  
Somewhat Active Member (3)  
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Inactive Member (2)  
Not a Member (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
9A1) If yes, what sports or recreational activities do you take part in? (FOCSR1) 
9A2) If yes, how many times per month do you take part in these activities?  (FOCSR2) 
9A3) Other than sports what other recreational activities do you participate in? (FOCSR3) 
 
9B) Art, music, or educational organizations? (FOCAM) 
Very Active Member (5)  
Active Member (4)  
Somewhat Active Member (3)  
Inactive Member (2)  
Not a Member (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
9B1.) If yes, what are these organizations? (FOCAM1) 
9B2.) If yes, how many times in a month do you participate in activities with this (these) organization(s)? 
(FOCAM2) 
 
9C.) Labor Unions (FOCLU) 
Very Active Member (5)  
Active Member (4)  
Somewhat Active Member (3)  
Inactive Member (2)  
Not a Member (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
9C1.) If yes, what is the name of this labor union? (FOCLU1) 
9C2.) If yes, how often does this organization meet? (FOCLU2) 
 
9D.) Political Party (FOCPP) 
Very Active Member (5)  
Active Member (4)  
Somewhat Active Member (3)  
Inactive Member (2)  
Not a Member (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
9D1.) If yes, what is the name of the political party? (FOCPP1) 
9D2.) If yes, how often do you attend party meetings? (FOCPP2) 
 
9E.) Environmental Organization (FOCEO) 
Very Active Member (5)  
Active Member (4)  
Somewhat Active Member (3)  
Inactive Member (2)  
Not a Member (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
9E1.) If yes, what is the name of the environmental organization? (FOCEO1) 
9E2.) If yes, how frequently do you attend meetings of this organization (FOCEO2) 
 
9F.) Professional Association (FOCPA) 
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Very Active Member (5)  
Active Member (4)  
Somewhat Active Member (3)  
Inactive Member (2)  
Not a Member (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
9F1.) If yes, what is the name of this professional association? (FOCPA1) 




9G.) Charitable or Philanthropic Organization (FOCCP): for example the Rotary Club 
Very Active Member (5)  
Active Member (4)  
Somewhat Active Member (3)  
Inactive Member (2)  
Not a Member (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
9G1.) If yes, what is the name of the organization? (FOCCP1) 
9G2.) If yes, how frequently do you attend meetings of this organization? (FOCCP2) 
9G3.) Are these organizations affiliated with any religious organizations? (FOCCP3) 
Yes (2)  
No (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
9G4.) If yes (to 9G3), what religious organization(s) are they affiliated with? (FOCCP4) 
9H.) Do you belong to any other organizations? What is/are their name(s)? 
 
Informal Civil Society (IOC--) 
 
Show Card B 
10A.) Do you belong to any groups in your community or neighborhood associations? (IOCCG) 
Yes (2)  
No (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
10A1.) If yes, what activities or services do these groups offer? (IOCCG1) 
10A2.) If yes, how often do these groups meet? (IOCCG2) 
10A3.) Are these groups affiliated with religious organizations? (IOCCG3) 
Yes (2)  
No (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
 
10B.) Have you ever worked or tried to resolve a community problem or a problem of one of the members 
of your community? (IOCCP) 
Yes (2)  
No (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
10B1.) If yes, what problems did you try to resolve? (IOCCP1) 
10B2.) If yes, were these problems resolved satisfactorily? (IOCCP2) yes: in part; no 
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Yes (3)  
In part (2)  
No (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
10C.) Have you ever donated money or materials to solve a problem, or to improve the community? 
(IOCDM) 
Yes (2)  
No (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
10C1.) If yes, what sort of assistance did you provide? (IOCDM1) 
10D.) Have you ever donated your work to solve a problem or to improve the community? (IOCDW) 
Yes (2)  
No (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
10D1.) If yes, what sort of assistance did you provide? (IOCDW1) 
10E.) Have you ever attended a meeting about a problem of or improvement to the community? (IOCAM) 
Yes (2)  
No (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
10E1.) If yes (10E), how many time or often have you done this? (IOCAM1) 
10E2.) If yes (10E), who attended these meetings? (IOCAM2) 
10E3.) If yes (10E), what problems were being discussed? (IOCAM3) 
10E4.) If yes (10E), where these problems resolved satisfactorily? (IOCAM4) 
Yes (3)  
In part (2)  
No (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
10E5.) If yes (10E), does this group still meet today? (IOCAM5) 
Yes (2)  
No (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
10F.) Have you ever helped organize a group to solve a local problem or to search for an improvement to 
the community? (IOCNG) 
Yes (2)  
No (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
10F1.) If yes (10F), how many time or often have you done this? (IOCNG1) 
10F2.) If yes (10F), who attended these meetings? (IOCNG2) 
10F3.) If yes (10F), what problems were being discussed? (IOCNG3) 
10F4.) If yes (10F), where these problems resolved satisfactorily? (IOCNG4) 
Yes (3)  
In part (2)  
No (1)  
DK (99)  
NA(88)  
10F5.) If yes (10F), does this group still meet today? (IOCNG5) 
Yes (2)  
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No (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
 
Interpersonal Trust (ITP--) 
 
Show Card E 
I am going to read a series of statements, for each statement pleas indicate whether you: Strongly Agree; 
Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree; Strongly Disagree ; Do not know 
 
11A.) I find that in general people are trustworthy (IPTGT) 
Strongly Agree (5)  
Agree (4)  
Neither Agree nor disagree (3)  
Disagree (2)  
Strongly Disagree (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
 
11B.) Most of the time people only worry about themselves. (IPTWT)* CODE IN REVERSE 
Strongly Agree (5)  
Agree (4)  
Neither Agree nor disagree (3)  
Disagree (2)  
Strongly Disagree (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
11C.) Most of the time people try to help other people. (IPTHO) 
Strongly Agree (5)  
Agree (4)  
Neither Agree nor disagree (3)  
Disagree (2)  
Strongly Disagree (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
11D.) If given a chance, most people will try to take advantage of you. (IPTTA)*CODE IN REVERSE 
Strongly Agree (5)  
Agree (4)  
Neither Agree nor disagree (3)  
Disagree (2)  
Strongly Disagree (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
11E.) Generally, people do not try to take advantage of you. (IPTNA) 
Strongly Agree (5)  
Agree (4)  
Neither Agree nor disagree (3)  
Disagree (2)  
Strongly Disagree (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
 
Political Efficacy (PE---) 
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Show Card E 
 
I am going to read a series of statements, for each statement pleas indicate whether you: Strongly Agree; 
Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree; Strongly Disagree ; Do not know 
12A.) If I have a problem, I feel I can ask for the help and cooperation of a member of the National 
Assembly. (PEHNC) 
Strongly Agree (5)  
Agree (4)  
Neither Agree nor disagree (3)  
Disagree (2)  
Strongly Disagree (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
12B.) If I have a problem, I feel I can ask for the help and cooperation of the mayor or his/her 
representative. (PEMMO) 
Strongly Agree (5)  
Agree (4)  
Neither Agree nor disagree (3)  
Disagree (2)  
Strongly Disagree (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
 
12C.) The government is responsive to the needs of society. (PERNS) 
Strongly Agree (5)  
Agree (4)  
Neither Agree nor disagree (3)  
Disagree (2)  
Strongly Disagree (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
12D.) My vote and participation in the electoral system is important. (PEVPI) 
Strongly Agree (5)  
Agree (4)  
Neither Agree nor disagree (3)  
Disagree (2)  
Strongly Disagree (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
12E.) Generally speaking, would you say that the government is run for the benefit of a few people, or for 
the benefit of the population as a whole? (PEGFP) 
For the benefit of population (2)  
For the benefit of a few (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
 
Show Card F 
12F.) In general, the actions of the Nicaraguan government are correct. (PETNG) 
Almost Always (5)  
The majority of the time (4)  
Some of the time (3)  
Almost Never (2)  
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Never (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
12F1.) In general, the actions of the President of Nicaragua (Bolanos) are correct. (PETFG) 
Almost Always (5)  
The majority of the time (4)  
Some of the time (3)  
Almost Never (2)  
Never (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
12F2.) In general, the actions of the National Assembly are correct. ( PETRG) 
Almost Always (5)  
The majority of the time (4)  
Some of the time (3)  
Almost Never (2)  
Never (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
12F3.) In general, the actions of the municipal government in your community are correct?  (PETLG) 
Almost Always (5)  
The majority of the time (4)  
Some of the time (3)  
Almost Never (2)  
Never (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
 
Show Card G 
12G.) How much confidence do you have in the following organizations? (PEINC) 
12G1.) The Catholic Church (PEINC1) 
Total confidence (5)  
Quite a lot (4)  
Some confidence (3)   
Not very much (2)  
None at all (1)  
DK(99)  
NA (88)  
12G2.) The church or denomination you attend if any. (PEINC2) 
Total confidence (5)  
Quite a lot (4)  
Some confidence (3)   
Not very much (2)  
None at all (1)  
DK(99)  
NA (88)  
12G3.) The public education system (PEINC3) 
Total confidence (5)  
Quite a lot (4)  
Some confidence (3)   
Not very much (2)  
None at all (1)  
DK(99)  
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NA (88)  
12G4.) The judicial or legal system (PEINC4) 
Total confidence (5)  
Quite a lot (4)  
Some confidence (3)   
Not very much (2)  
None at all (1)  
DK(99)  
NA (88)  
12G5.) The Press (PEINC5) 
Total confidence (5)  
Quite a lot (4)  
Some confidence (3)   
Not very much (2)  
None at all (1)  
DK(99)  
NA (88)  
12G6.) Trade Unions (Organizaciones representantes de los comerciantes locales)  (PEINC6) 
Total confidence (5)  
Quite a lot (4)  
Some confidence (3)   
Not very much (2)  
None at all (1)  
DK(99)  
NA (88)  
12G7.) Community Organizations (PIENC7) 
Total confidence (5)  
Quite a lot (4)  
Some confidence (3)   
Not very much (2)  
None at all (1)  
DK(99)  
NA (88)  
 
12G8.) The National Police (PEINC8) 
Total confidence (5)  
Quite a lot (4)  
Some confidence (3)   
Not very much (2)  
None at all (1)  
DK(99)  
NA (88)  
12G9.) The National Assembly (PEINC9) 
Total confidence (5)  
Quite a lot (4)  
Some confidence (3)   
Not very much (2)  
None at all (1)  
DK(99)  
NA (88)  
12G10.) Major Companies (Las Grand Empresas y companies) (PEINC10) 
Total confidence (5)  
Quite a lot (4)  
Some confidence (3)   
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Not very much (2)  
None at all (1)  
DK(99)  
NA (88)  
12G11.) The Political System of Nicaragua (PEINC11) 
Total confidence (5)  
Quite a lot (4)  
Some confidence (3)   
Not very much (2)  
None at all (1)  
DK(99)  
NA (88)  
12G12.) The President of Nicaragua (PEINC12) 
Total confidence (5)  
Quite a lot (4)  
Some confidence (3)   
Not very much (2)  
None at all (1)  
DK(99)  
NA (88)  
 
Support for Gradual Change (GC---) 
 
Show Card E 
I am going to read a series of statements, for each statement pleas indicate whether you: Strongly Agree; 
Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree; Strongly Disagree ; Do not know 
 
13A.) A priority of the government (central) is to maintain stability and order in the nation (GCSSO) 
Strongly Agree (5)  
Agree (4)  
Neither Agree nor disagree (3)  
Disagree (2)  
Strongly Disagree (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
 
13B.) I feel the government should move more rapidly in solving social problems (GCGTS)* CODE IN 
REVERSE 
Strongly Agree (5)  
Agree (4)  
Neither Agree nor disagree (3)  
Disagree (2)  
Strongly Disagree (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
13C.) The structure and organization of Nicaraguan society needs to be changed through the actions of 
revolutionaries. (GCSRC)*CODE IN REVERSE 
Strongly Agree (1)  
Agree (2)  
Neither Agree nor disagree (3)  
Disagree (4)  
Strongly Disagree (5)  
DK (99)  
NA(88)  
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13D.) Our society must be gradually improved through reforms. (GCGIR) 
Strongly Agree (5)  
Agree (4)  
Neither Agree nor disagree (3)  
Disagree (2)  
Strongly Disagree (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
13E.) Nicaraguan society must be defended against all subversive forces (GCDAS) 
Strongly Agree (5)  
Agree (4)  
Neither Agree nor disagree (3)  
Disagree (2)  
Strongly Disagree (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
13F.) Signing a petition is an acceptable form of political expression (GCPPA) 
Strongly Agree (5)  
Agree (4)  
Neither Agree nor disagree (3)  
Disagree (2)  
Strongly Disagree (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
13G.) Joining a boycott is an acceptable form of political expression (GCBPA) 
Strongly Agree (5)  
Agree (4)  
Neither Agree nor disagree (3)  
Disagree (2)  
Strongly Disagree (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
13H.) Attending lawful demonstrations is an acceptable form of political expression (GCLDA) 
Strongly Agree (5)  
Agree (4)  
Neither Agree nor disagree (3)  
Disagree (2)  
Strongly Disagree (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
 
13I.) Occupying buildings or factories are acceptable forms of political expression (GCOBA) 
Strongly Agree (5)  
Agree (4)  
Neither Agree nor disagree (3)  
Disagree (2)  
Strongly Disagree (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
 
Show Card H 
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13J.) There are people who have only negative things to say about the government.  To what extent do you 
agree with the right of these people to vote. (GCSVV) 
Strongly Agree (5)  
Agree (4)  
Neither Agree nor disagree (3)  
Disagree (2)  
Strongly Disagree (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
13K.)  There are people who have only negative things to say about the government.  To what extent do 
you agree with the right of these people to hold peaceful public demonstrations for the purpose of 
expressing their views.  (GCSSD) 
Strongly Agree (5)  
Agree (4)  
Neither Agree nor disagree (3)  
Disagree (2)  
Strongly Disagree (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
13L.)  There are people who have only negative things to say about the government.  To what extent do 
you agree with the right of these people to run for political office? (GCSPO) 
Strongly Agree (5)  
Agree (4)  
Neither Agree nor disagree (3)  
Disagree (2)  
Strongly Disagree (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
13M.) There are people who have only negative things to say about the government.  To what extent to you 
agree with the right of these people to appear on radio or television or make public speeches? (GCSRS) 
Strongly Agree (5)  
Agree (4)  
Neither Agree nor disagree (3)  
Disagree (2)  
Strongly Disagree (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
 
Show Card I 
 
13N.) What is your attitude toward the economic progress of Nicaragua today? (GCAEP) 
Muy bien progresso (5)  
Bien progresso(4)  
Mas o menos progresso (3)  
Mal progresso (2)  
Muy mal progresso (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
 
13O.) On this page there is a scale that goes from left to right.  Today when people discuss political 
tendencies, they talk about “rightists” and “leftists”, that is, people sympathesize more with the left (FSLN) 
or the right (PLC).   According with what the terms left or right mean to you when you think of your own 
point of view, where would you place yourself? (GCLRC) 
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Left 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Right 
            
 
Religious Background (RB---) 
14A.) Which religious denomination do you consider to be you primary provider? (RBPRP) 
Catholic (1)  
Protestant (2)  
Evangelico (3)  
Baptist (4)   
Methodist (5)  
Pentecostal (6)  
Mormon (7)  
Seventh Day Adventist (8)  
Jehovah’s Witness (9)   
Jewish (10)  
Muslim (11)  
Other: (12)  
None (13)  
DK (14)  
14A1.) Catholic or not Catholic – NOT ASKED _ TAKEN FROM ABOVE (RBCON) 
Catholic (1)  
Not Catholic (0)  
NA (88)  
DK (99)  
14B.) Do you consider yourself to be a member of more than one denomination? (RBMOD) 
Yes (2)  
No (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
14B1.) If yes (14B), what other religions do you practice? (RBORP) 
14B2.) If yes (14B), which religion do practice most often? (RBNOC) 
14B3.) If yes (14B), how long have you been attending this other religion? (RBYOA) 
14B4.) When did you convert? (RBNYA) 
14B5.) Why did you convert? (RBRFC) 
 
Show Card E 
 
14C.) I am going to read you a list of religious denominations, using this card indicate which statement best 
describes your attitude toward that denomination. (RBAOD) 
14C1.) The Catholic Church (RBAOD1) 
Strongly Agree (5)  
Agree (4)  
Neither Agree nor disagree (3)  
Disagree (2)  
Strongly Disagree (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
14C2.) Christian Base Communities (RBAOD2) 
Strongly Agree (5)  
Agree (4)  
Neither Agree nor disagree (3)  
Disagree (2)  
Strongly Disagree (1)  
DK (99)  
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NA (88)  
14C3.) Pentecostals (RBAOD3) 
Strongly Agree (5)  
Agree (4)  
Neither Agree nor disagree (3)  
Disagree (2)  
Strongly Disagree (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
14C4.) Protestants (RBAOD4) 
Strongly Agree (5)  
Agree (4)  
Neither Agree nor disagree (3)  
Disagree (2)  
Strongly Disagree (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
14C5.) Baptists (RBAOD5) 
Strongly Agree (5)  
Agree (4)  
Neither Agree nor disagree (3)  
Disagree (2)  
Strongly Disagree (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
14C6.) Evangelicals (RBAOD6) 
Strongly Agree (5)  
Agree (4)  
Neither Agree nor disagree (3)  
Disagree (2)  
Strongly Disagree (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
14C7.) Seventh Day Adventists (RBAOD7) 
Strongly Agree (5)  
Agree (4)  
Neither Agree nor disagree (3)  
Disagree (2)  
Strongly Disagree (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
14C8.) Jehovah’s Witnesses (RBAOD8) 
Strongly Agree (5)  
Agree (4)  
Neither Agree nor disagree (3)  
Disagree (2)  
Strongly Disagree (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
14C9.) Mormons (RBAOD9) 
Strongly Agree (5)  
Agree (4)  
Neither Agree nor disagree (3)  
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Disagree (2)  
Strongly Disagree (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
 
14C10.) Muslim (RBAOD10) 
Strongly Agree (5)  
Agree (4)  
Neither Agree nor disagree (3)  
Disagree (2)  
Strongly Disagree (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
14C11.) Hindu (RBAOD11) 
Strongly Agree (5)  
Agree (4)  
Neither Agree nor disagree (3)  
Disagree (2)  
Strongly Disagree (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
  
Show Card E 
 
I am going to read a series of statements, for each statement pleas indicate whether you: Strongly Agree; 
Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree; Strongly Disagree ; Do not know 
 
14D.) The Bible contains the word of God and everything this says is literally true. (RBBLT) 
Strongly Agree (5)  
Agree (4)  
Neither Agree nor disagree (3)  
Disagree (2)  
Strongly Disagree (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
14E.) Eternal life is only possible for those who believe in Jesus Christ as God and Savior (RBHBG) 
Strongly Agree (5)  
Agree (4)  
Neither Agree nor disagree (3)  
Disagree (2)  
Strongly Disagree (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
14F.) Religion does not provide me with a guide for my daily life (RBRGL)* CODE IN REVERSE 
Strongly Agree (1)  
Agree (2)  
Neither Agree nor disagree (3)  
Disagree (4)  
Strongly Disagree (5)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
14G.) Religious organizations can be effective in addressing problems of the community (RBRAP) 
Strongly Agree (5)  
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Agree (4)  
Neither Agree nor disagree (3)  
Disagree (2)  
Strongly Disagree (1)  
DK (99)  





14H.) The religious organizations and church to which I belong should work to solve social problems 
(RBSSP) 
Strongly Agree (5)  
Agree (4)  
Neither Agree nor disagree (3)  
Disagree (2)  
Strongly Disagree (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
14I) Please indicate whether you believe in any of the following (RBWTB) 
 14I1.) God (RBWTB1) 
Yes (2)  
No (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
14I2.) Life after death (RBWTB2) 
Yes (2)  
No (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
14I3.) A Soul (RBWTB3) 
Yes (2)  
No (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
14I4.) The Devil (RBWTB4) 
Yes (2)  
No (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
14I5.) Hell (RBWTB5) 
Yes (2)  
No (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
14I6.) Heaven (RBWTB6) 
Yes (2)  
No (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
14I7.) Sin (RBWTB7) 
Yes (2)  
No (1)  
DK (99)  
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NA (88)  
14I8.) Resurrection of the Dead (RBWTB8) 
Yes (2)  
No (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
14I9.) Reincarnation (RBWTB9) 
Yes (2)  
No (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
 
 
14J.) On a scale from 1 t o10, with 10 being very important and 1 being not important at all: How important 











DK (99)  
NA (88)  
14K.) Do you find strength and comfort from religious? (RBRSC) 
Yes (2)  
No (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
14L.) How often do you pray outside of religious services? Would you say … (RBPOR) 
Always (5)  
Sometimes (4)  
Almost Never (3)  
Only in times of crisis (2)  
Never (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
14M.) Independently of whether or not you go to church, would you say you are a …. (RBTRP) 
A religious person (3)  
Not a religious person (2)  
Atheist (1)   
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
 







14N.) Do you believe it is appropriate for your church to speak out on…(RBCRS) 
 14N1.) Disarmament (RBCRS1) 
Yes (2)  
No (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
 14N2.) Abortion (RBCRS2) **** DID NOT WORK: MISINTERPRETED 
Yes (2)  
No (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
 14N3.) Problems of the Third World (RBCRS3) 
Yes (2)  
No (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
 14N4.) Extramarital Affairs (RBCRS4) 
Yes (2)  
No (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
 
 14N5.) Drug Addiction (RBCRS5) 
Yes (2)  
No (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
 14N6.) Alcoholism (RBCRS6) 
Yes (2)  
No (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
 14N7.) Unemployment (RBCRS7) 
Yes (2)  
No (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
 14N8.) Racial Discrimination (RBCRS8) 
Yes (2)  
No (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
 14N9.) Euthanasia (RBCRS9) ***** 
Yes (2)  
No (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
 14N10.) Homosexuality (RBCRS10) 
Yes (2)  
No (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
 14N11.) Ecology and the Environment (RBCRS11) 
Yes (2)  
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No (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
 14N12.) Politics and Government (RBCRS12) 
Yes (2)  
No (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
 14N13.) Human Rights (RBCRS13) 
Yes (2)  
No (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
14O.) Generally speaking, do you think that your church is giving, in your country, adequate answers to the 
following:  (RBCPA) 
 14O1.) The moral needs and problems of the individual? (RBCPA1) 
Yes (2)  
No (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
            14O2.) The problems of family life (RBCPA2) 
Yes (2)  
No (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
            
 14O3.) The spiritual needs of the population (RBCPA3) 
Yes (2)  
No (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
            14O4.) The social problems facing the country (RBCPA4) 
Yes (2)  
No (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
            14O5.) The financial problems facing individuals (RBCPA5) 
Yes (2)  
No (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
            14O6.) A sense or source of community (RBCPA6) 
Yes (2)  
No (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
 
Demographic Information (DI---) 
15A.) Male or Female   1  Male   0 Female (DIGEN) 
15B.) What year were you born?   _______ (DIAGE) 
15C.) What was the last year of school you completed? (DIEDU) 
College + (5)  
College (4)  
Secondary (3)  
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Elementary (2)  
None (1)  
DK (99)  
15D.) In your best estimate, what is your minimum income per month (DIINC) -- CORDOBAS 
15E.) In your best estimate, what is you family's minimum income per month (DIINCF) -- CORDOBAS 
15F.) Do you live in a house or apartment?  (2) House  (1) Apartment (DILAH) 
15G.) How many people live in your house or apartment? (DINOP) 
15H.) How many people over the age of 18 live in your house or apartment (DIOLD)? 
15I.) How many people under the age of 18 live in your house or apartment (DIYTH)? 
15J.) Do you own your house or apartment or do you rent? (DIOWN) 
Own (2)  
Rent (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
15K.) Do you have a telephone? (DITEL) 
Yes (2)  
No (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
15L.) Do you have a refrigerator? (DIREF) 
Yes (2)  
No (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
 
 
15M.) What material is the floor of you house made of (observe do not ask)? (DIFLR) 
Tile (4)  
Concrete (3)  
Dirt (2)  
Other (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
15N.) How is your residence roofed (observe do not ask)? (DIROF) 
Terracotta (4)   
Shingle (3)  
Zinc (2)  
Thatch (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
15O.) What is you occupation (DIJOB) 
15P.) How many years have you done this kind of work (DIYRJ) 
15Q.) Do you listen to news on the radio daily?  (DINOR)  
Yes (2)  
No (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
15R.) If no on 15Q how often do you listen to the news on the radio per week? (DINRW) 
15S.) Do you have a television? (DIHTV) 
Yes (2)  
No (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
15T.) How often do you watch the news on television? (DINTV) 
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Daily (5)  
2 or 3 times a week (4)  
Once a week (3)  
Monthly (2)  
Never (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
15U.) Do you usually read the news paper? (DIRNP) 
Yes (2)  
No (1)  
DK (99)  
NA (88)  
15V.) How often do you read the news paper (DIFNP) 
Daily (5)  
2 or 3 times a week (4)  
Once a week (3)  
Monthly (2)  
Never (1)  
DK (99)  












CIVIL SOCIETY VARIABLES 
Formal Civil Society Index (FOCIND) 
Informal Civil Society Participation Index (ICSPIN) 
Informal Civil Society Support Index (ICSSIN) 
Informal Civil Society Total Index (ICSTIN) 
 
EFFECTS OF CIVIL SOCIETY 
Political Efficacy Index (POLEF) 
Political Knowledge Index (PKIND) 
Interpersonal Trust Index (IPTRUST) 
 
OPINIONS ABOUT GOVERNMENT 
Belief Actions of Government are Correct Index (BGAIND) 
Confidence in Government Index (CIGIND) 
 
POLITICAL TOLERANCE 
Alternative Political Expression Acceptance Index (APEIND) 





Level of Religious Participation (RBLRP) 
Level of Religious Value (RBLRV) 
Level of Religious Belief (RBLRB) 
Levels of Role of Religions in Society (RBRRCS), (RBCRRS 1), (RBCRRS 2) 
Level of Religious Success in Society (RBCPAI) 
 
RELIGIOUS DENOMINATION 
Primary Religious Provider (RBPRP) 
Catholics, CEB, Other Christians (Evangelical), Non-Christian (RBPRP) 
 
AGE 
2003 – year of birth (DIAGE1) 
 
INCOME 






What was the last grade or year of school you attended (DIEDU) 
 
 207
Civil Society Indices 
 
Political Efficacy Index (POLEF) 
 12A - PEHNC 
 12B - PEMMO 
 12C - PERNS 
 12D - PEVPI 
 
Political Knowledge Index (PKIND) 
 8A - PKPRN 
 8B - PKPUS 
 8C - PKMCT 
 
Formal Civil Society Index (FOCIND) 
 9A - FOCSR 
 9B - FOCAM 
 9C - FOCLU  
 9D - FOCPP 
 9E - FOCEO 
 9F - FOCPA  
 9G - FOCCP 
 
Informal Civil Society Participation Index (ICSPIN) 
 10A - IOCCG 
 10D - IOCDW 
 10F - IOCNG 
 10E - IOCAM 
 
Informal Civil Society Support Index (ICSSIN) 
 10B - IOCCP 
 10C - IOCDM 
 
Informal Civil Society Total Index (ICSTIN) 
ICSSIN   
 ICSPIN 
 
Interpersonal Trust Index (IPTRUST) 
 11A - IPTGT 
 11C - IPTHO 
11E - IPTNA 
 
Belief Actions of Government are Correct Index (BGAIND)  
 12F - PETNG 
 12F1 - PETFG 
 12F2 - PETRG 
 12F3 - PETLG 
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Confidence in Government Index (CIGIND)  
 12G3 - PEINC3  (Public Education System) 
 12G4 - PEINC4  (Legal/Judicial System) 
 12G8 - PEINC7  (Police) 
 12G9 - PEINC8 (The National Assembly) 
 12G11 - PEINC10  (Political System) 
 12G12 - PEINC11 (President of Nicaragua) 
 
Alternative Political Expression Acceptance Index (APEIND)  
 13I - GCOBA 
 13H - GCLDA 
 13G - GCPBA 
 13F - GCPPA 
 
Openness of Participation (OPINDX2) 
13J - GCSSV 
13K - GCSSD 
13L - GCSPO 




Level of Religious Participation (RBLRP) 
14L - RBPOR 
14M - RBTRP 
 
Level of Religious Value (RBLRV) 
14D - RBBLT  
14E - RBHGB  
14K - RBRSC 
 
Level of Religious Belief (RBLRB) 
14I1 - RBWTB1  
14I2 - RBWTB2  
14I3 - RBWTB3 
14I4 - RBWTB4 
14I5 - RBWTB5 
14I6 - RBWTB6 
14I7 - RBWTB7 







Levels of Role of Religions in Society (RBRRCS) 
14G - RBRAP  
14H - RBSSP  
14N1 - RBCRS1 
14N3 - RBCRS2  
14N4 - RBCRS4  
14N5 - RBCRS5 
14N6 - RBCRS6 
14N7 - RBCRS7 
14N8 - RBCRS8 
14N9 - RBCRS9 
14N10 - RBCRS10 
14N11 - RBCRS11 
14N12 - RBCRS12 
14N13 - RBCRS13 
 
RBCRRS 1 
14N1 - RBCRS1 
14N3 - RBCRS2  
14N4 - RBCRS4  
14N5 - RBCRS5 
14N6 - RBCRS6 
14N7 - RBCRS7 
14N8 - RBCRS8 
14N9 - RBCRS9 
14N10 - RBCRS10 
14N11 - RBCRS11 
14N12 - RBCRS12 
14N13 - RBCRS13  
 
RBCRRS 2 
14G - RBRAP  
14H - RBSSP 
 
Level of Religious Success in Society (RBCPAI) 
14O1 - RBCPA1 
14O2 - RBCPA2 
14O3 - RBCPA3 
14O4 - RBCPA4 
14O5 - RBCPA5 
14O6 - RBCPA6 
 
 
 
 
